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THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
PSYCHOLOGY 



BY 



JARED SPARKS MOORE, Ph.D. 

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN 
WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY 



PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 

PRINCETON 

LONDON : HUMPHREY MILFORD 

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 

1921 



e^^l 



Copyright 1921, by 

•Princeton University Press 

Princeton, N. J. 



Published 1921 
Printed in the United States of America 



.&n!.A653806 



FEB I 1 1922 



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TO EDWARD HERRICK GRIFFIN, D.D., LL.D. 

PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, AND SOME- 
TIME DEAN OF THE COLLEGE FACULTY, IN THE 
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 

MY FIRST TEACHER IN PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY 

I DEDICATE WITH SINCERE RESPECT AND AFFECTION THIS MY 

FIRST PUBLISHED VOLUME 



PREFACE 

The present volume is designed to serve a twofold purpose 
— (i) as a textbook in advanced courses in general psychol- 
ogy, and (2) for general reading on the subject of the nature 
and methods of mental science. The work contains matter 
not usually found in the ordinary brief textbooks and manuals 
of psychology, and yet it is the endeavor of the author to 
present his material in such a form that it may be grasped by 
any interested reader who is familiar with those facts of the 
science which may be found recorded in any good textbook. 

The only work in English which in any degree covers the 
ground that I myself have traversed is the book by Boris Sidis 
on The Foundations of Normal and Abnormal Psychology. 
But though reference is frequently made in the following 
pages to this valuable work, a comparison of the tables of con- 
tents of Dr. Sidis's book and my own will be sufficient to in- 
dicate our differences in plan and aim. 

Another writer frequently cited in the ensuing pages is 
Hugo Miinsterberg, and I wish to record here my deep sense 
of indebtedness to him for his illuminating work on the great 
problems of philosophy and of natural and mental science. 
This indebtedness is manifested many times in the ensuing 
work, notwithstanding my differences with him on many 
points. I think it may truthfully be said that in his death 
America has lost its one great theoretical psychologist — and 
in so writing, I say nothing of his invaluable work as a 
pioneer in the fields of practical and applied psychology. 

All quotations are in the exact words of the original writ- 
ers, though I have not hesitated to change the marks of punctu- 
ation when such change has seemed to be in the interests of 
clearness. Words in square brackets [ ] have been added by 
the author of this book. 

Vii 



viii PREFACE 

Sections are numbered consecutively throughout the book, 
regardless of chapters, and numbers in parenthesis in the text 
refer always to those numbered sections. Chapters also are 
numbered consecutively, regardless of the larger "Books/' 
Most of the chapters are broken up into "Divisions," the num- 
bering of which starts anew in each successive chapter. 

I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of my 
wife in the preparation of the manuscript, and of my father- 
in-law, Mr. D. W. Linch, in the drawing of some of the cuts; 
and also the interest of my colleagues, Professor M. M. Curtis 
and Professor H. A. Aikins. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Preface vii 

Bibliography xvii 

Introduction i 

BOOK I 

THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 

chapter page 

I. Historic Concepts of Psychology 7 

1, The Two Most General Concepts of Psy- 

chology 7 

1. Rational and Empirical Psychology 7 

2. Rational Psychology 7 

3. Empirical Psychology 8 

2. The Schools of Rational Psychology 8 

4. Spiritualism, Materialism, Dualism, and Mon- 

ism 8 

5. Dualism ,. . 9 

6. Monism , . 10 

7. Conclusion of this Subject 10 

J. The Development of Empirical Psychology ii 

8. The Nature of Empirical Psychology. .; il 

9. The Conditions of Scientific Psychology 12 

a. Faculty Psychology 12 

10. The Faculty Theory 12 

11. Criticism of Faculty Psychology 13 

h. Associationism 15 

12. The Associationist Theory 15 

13. Principles of Associationism 17 

14. Criticism of Associationism 17 

ix 



X TABLE OF CONTENTS 

c. Modern Scientific Psychology . . .' 19 

15. Genesis of Scientific Psychology 19 

16. Extreme Views of Scientific Psychology. ... 19 
Table L Historic Concepts of Psychol- 
ogy 21 

II, Current Concepts of Scientific Psychology.. 22 

1. Points of View in Psychology. 22 

17. Mental Process vs. Mental Content 22 

18. The Structural and Functional Points of View 

in Psychology 24 

19. Examples of Process and Content 25 

Table II. Experience as Process and as 

Content 26 

2. Structuralism and Functionalism as 

Schools of Psychology 27 

20. Contemporary Schools of Psychology 27 

21. Structuralism 27 

22. Functionalism 28 

23. Reconciliation of Structuralism and Function- 

alism. 30 

5. Behaviorism 31 

24. General Position of the Behaviorists 31 

a. Behavior vs. Consciousness 32 

25. The Behavioristic Program 32 

26. Kinds of Behavior 33 

2y. Frost's Behaviorism 36 

28. Criticism of the Behavioristic Program 37 

29. Behaviorism and the Mind-Body Problem ... 40 
h. Behaviorism and Introspection 41 

30. Introspection as Psychological Observation. . 41 

31. The Nature of Introspection 42 

32. The Difficulties of Introspection 45 

33. The Necessity and Limitations of Introspec- 

tion 52 



TABLE OF CONTENTS xi 

c. Conclusion 55 

34. Reconciliation of Behaviorism and Mentalism 55 

35. Behaviorism and the Biological Sciences.... 58 
Table III. The Biological Sciences 62 

36. Behaviorism and Psychology 61 

III. Current Concepts of Psychology, Continued 68 

1. Self-Psychology 68 

a. Statement and Defence of the Principle 68 

37. Self -Psychology 68 

38. Inadequacy of Structuralism and Functional- 

ism 69 

39. Positive Considerations 70 

40. The Nature of the Psychologist's Self 70 

41. Self -Psychology as Reconciliation of Struc- 

turalism and Functionalism 71 

h. Criticism of Self -Psychology 74 

42. The Metaphysical Nature of Self -Psychology 74 

43. The Alleged Universality of Self -Conscious- 

ness yy 

44. The Indefinability of the Self 80 

45. Self -Psychology as Reconciliation of Struc- 

turalism and Functionalism 81 

46. Self-Psychology and Sociology 83 

2. General Conclusions 84 

47. The Relations of the Contemporary Schools. 84 

48. The Definition of Psychology 84 

Table IV. The Current of Scientific 

Psychology 86 

BOOK II 
THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 

IV. Psychology and Metaphysics 89 

49. The Problem of the Basis of a Scientific Psy- 

chology 89 



xii TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. The Problem of Science 89 

50. The General Problem of Science. 89 

51. Scientific Description 90 

52. Scientific Explanation 91 

53. The Concept of Causation 91 

54. The Nature and Kinds of Scientific Hypothe- 

ses 92 

55. The Validity of Conceptual Hypotheses 94 

56. Is Science purely Descriptive? 95 

Table V. Stages of the Scientific 

Method 97 

2. The Problem of Metaphysics, and its Re- 

lation TO Science 97 

57. The General Problem of Metapsyhics 97 

58. The Artificiality of Science 98 

59. Psychology and Meanings 100 

60. Must Metaphysics be Rejected? 105 

J. Psychology as Science and as Metaphysics 106 

61. Aspects of Personality 106 

62. Psychology vs. Metaphysics 108 

63. Corresponding Attitudes toward Nature 109 

4. Psychology and Real Life iii 

64. Psychology and the True Personality ... ill 

65. Physical Science and the Real World. . 113 

66. The Necessity of a Scientific Study of the 

Mind 115 

6y. The Place of the Contemporary Schools of 

Psychology 117 

5. Psychology and Other "Mental Sciences" 117 

68. The Mental Sciences and the Fine Arts 117 

69. The Classification of the Sciences 120 

Table VI. The Classification of the 

Sciences 121 

70. Psychology and Religion 122 



TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii 

V. Psychology and the Material Sciences 125 

J. Theories of their Differentiation 125 

71. The Problem 125 

72. The Inner Sense Theory 125 

73. The Immediate Experience Theory 127 

74. Criticism and Conclusions 129 

2. The Differentiation of Mental from Ma- 
terial Facts 132 

75. The Non-Spatial Character of Mental Objects 132 

76. Consciousness as Potential Energy 134 

yy. The Privacy of Mental Facts vs. the Commun- 
ity of Physical Facts 138 

78. Sidis's Doctrine of Mental vs. Physical 142 

79. Various Secondary Characteristics of Mental 

Phenomena 146 

80. The Interpretation of the Mental-Physical 

Distinction 148 

81. Conclusion 149 

J. Conditions of Psychological Description. . . 150 

82. General Conditions of a Scientific Psychology 150 

83. Munsterberg*s Theory 150 

84. Criticism of Miinsterberg's Doctrine 152 

BOOK III 
THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 

VI. The Postulates in General 159 

1. The Statement OF THE Postulates 159 

85. The Postulates 159 

Table VII. Summary of the Postulates 162 

2. The Principle of Psychocerebral Parallel- 

ism 163 

86. Psychophysical and Psychocerebral Parallelism 163 
Note on the Principle of Independence. 166 



xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS 

J. The Principle of Independent Psychical 

Causation i68 

a. The Problem of Psychological Explanation. ... i68 

87. The Problem 168 

b. The Difficulties of Independent Psychical Causa- 

tion 169 

88. The Laws of Psychology 169 

89. Causation in the Physical and Mental Realms 170 

c. The Cerebral Theory of Psychical Causation. . . 174 

90. The Cerebral Theory 174 

91. Criticism of the Cerebral Theory 176 

d. Defence of the Independence Theory 178 

92. Methods of Explanation in Psychology 178 

Table VIIL Theories of Psychological 

Explanation 179 

93. The Difficulties of Independent Psychical 

Causation 180 

94. The Problem of Sensations 181 

95. The Problem of the Discontinuity of Mental 

Life 184 

Table IX. Difficulties in Accepting the 
Principle of Independent Psychical 
Causation, and How they may be Met 185 

e. The Doctrine of Chance in Psychology ........ 185 

96. Sidis's Doctrine of Chance in Mental Life. .. . 185 

97. Criticism of the Doctrine of Chance in Psy- 

chology 186 

Vll. The Subconscious 189 

1. The Concept of the Subconscious 189 

98. Meaning of the Term 189 

99. The Place of the Concept in Modern Psychol- 

ogy 189 

100. The Grounds for Postulating the Subconscious 190 

2. Evidences of the Subconscious 192 



TABLE OF CONTENTS xv 

loi. Phenomena involving Personal Continuity. . . 192 

102. Phenomena having no Conscious Causes.... 195 

103. Phenomena apparently involving Intelligence. 197 

J. Dissociation and the Coconscious 198 

104. Meaning of the Terms 198 

105. Examples of Dissociation 200 

VIII. Theories of the Subconscious 202 

1. Types of Theory 202 

106. The Main Problem 202 

107. The Dual Mind Theory 203 

108. The Ultra-Marginal View of the Subconscious 204 

109. The Subconscious as the Subliminal 207 

2. Criticisms of the Concept of the Subcon- 

scious 208 

no. The Subconscious and its Critics 208 

111. The Subconscious as Self -Contradictory 209 

1 12. The Subconscious as Futile 211 

113. The Subconscious as Gratuitous 211 

J. The Theory of Unconscious Cerebration. . . 215 

114. The Cerebral Explanation of the So-called 

conscious Phenomena 215 

115. Criticism of the Theory of Unconscious Cere- 

bration 217 

116. Consciousness and Content 219 

4. Recent Developments in the Theory of the 

Subconscious 220 

117. Freud and Prince 220 

118. Freud's Theory of the Subconscious 220 

119. Prince's Theory of the Subconscious 221 

120. Comparison and Suggested Modification of 

Freud's and Prince's Theories 222 

Table X. Classification of Psychical 
States, etc 224 



xvi TABLE OF CONTENTS 

5. Conclusions 225 

121. Principles of Psychological Explanation 225 

122. The Explanation of Memory 226 

123. Explanation of the Varieties of the Subcon- 

scious 228 

124. Sidis's Criticism of the Doctrine of the Un- 

conscious 230 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Following is an alphabetical list of all the books (not peri- 
odicals) which are cited in the reference lists at the close of the 
several chapters, arranged according to authors. 

Calkins, Mary Whiton— 

An Introduction to Psychology (Macmillan: 1901). 
A First Book in Psychology (Macmillan: Fourth Edi- 
tion, 1914). 

CORIAT, ISADOR H. 

Abnormal Psychology (Moffat, Yard & Co.: Second 
Edition, 19 14). 
DuNLAP, Knight — 

A System of Psychology (Scribners: 1912). 
Freud, Sigmund — 

The Interpretation of Dreams (trans, by A. A. Brill. 
Macmillan: 1913). 
Galloway, George — 

The Philosophy of Religion (Scribners: 1914). 
Hart, Bernard — 

The Psychology of Insanity (Cambridge University 
Press: 1912). 
Hoffman, Frank Sargent — 

The Sphere of Science (Putnams: 1898). 
Holt, Edwin Bissell — 

The Freudian Wish, and its Place in Ethics (Henry Holt 
& Co.: 1915). 
James, William — 

Principles of Psychology (Henry Holt & Co.: 1890). 
Psychology, Briefer Course (Henry Holt & Co. : 1892). 
The Varieties of Religious Experience (Longmans, 
Green, & Co. : 1902). 
Jastrow, Joseph — 

The Subconscious (Houghton, Mifflin & Co.: 1906). 
Klemm, Otto — 

A History of Psychology (trans, by E. C. Wilm and R. 
Pintner. Scribners: 1914). 
xvii 



xviii BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Meyer, Max Friedrich — 

The Fundamental Laws of Humam, Behavior (Richard 
G. Badger, Boston: 191 1). 
More, Louis Trenchard — 

The Limitations of Science (Henry Holt & Co.: 1915). 
Munsterberg, Hugo — 

Psychology and Life (Houghton, Mifflin & Co. : 1899). 

Science and Idealism. (Do. : 1906). 

The Eternal Values (Do.: 1909). 

Psychotherapy (Moffat, Yard & Co.: 1909). 

Psychology General and Applied (Appletons: 191 4). 
Myers, Frederic W. H. — 

Human Personality, and its Survival of Bodily Death 
(Two vols. Longmans, Green & Co.: 1903. 
Abridged Edition, i vol., 1907). 
Parmelee, Maurice — 

The Science of Human B ehavior ( Macmillan : 1 9 1 3 ) . 
Paton, Stewart — 

Human Behavior (Scribners: 1921). 
Pearson, Karl — 

The Grammar of Science (Third Edition, Vol., I. Lon- 
don, A. & C. Black: 1911). 
Prince, Morton — 

The Unconscious (Macmillan: 191 4). 
ROYCE, JosiAH — 

Studies of Good and Evil (Appletons: 1898). 

Outlines of Psychology (Macmillan: 1903). 
Scripture, E. W. — 

The New Psychology (Scribners: 1898). 
Sellars, Roy Wood — 

Critical Realism (Rand, McNally & Co., Chicago: 191 6). 
SiDis, Boris — 

The Foundations of Normal and Abnormal Psychology 
(Richard G. Badger, Boston: 1914). 
Titchener, Edward Bradford — 

A Textbook of Psychology (Macmillan: 1910). 

A Beginner's Psychology (Macmillan: 1915). 
Villa, Guido — 

Contew^porary Psychology (Macmillan: 1903). 
Ward, James — 

Psychological Principles (Cambridge University Press: 
1918). 



BIBLIOGRAPHY xix 

Watson, John Broadus — 

Behavior: An Introduction to Comparative Psychology 

(Henry Holt & Co.: 1914). 
Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist (Lip- 
pincott: 191 9). 
Wells, Frederic LymaN' — 

Mental Adjustments (Appletons: 191 7). 

WUNDT, WiLHELM 

Outlines of Psychology (trans, by C. H. Judd. Third 
Revised English Edition. Leipzig and New York, 
1907). 
Yerkes, Robert Mearns — 

Introduction to Psychology (Henry Holt & Co. : 191 1). 



Essays, Philosophical and Psychological, in Honor of William 

James (Longmans, Green & Co. : 1908). 
Studies in Philosophy and Psychology, by former students of 

Edward Garman (Houghton, Mifflin & Co.: 1906). 
Subconscious Phenomena, by various authors (Richard G. 

Badger, Boston: 1910). 



INTRODUCTION 

"There are periods in the growth of science when it is well 
to turn our attention from its imposing superstructure and to 
carefully examine its foundations." With these words Karl 
Pearson opened the preface to the first edition of his Gram- 
mar of Science, and they are fitting words with which to in- 
troduce our present study also. This is an age of great de- 
velopment in all fields of scientific investigation, and in no 
field more strikingly than in that of psychology. But although 
there are many builders of foundations — such men as Pear- 
son, More, Enriques, Mivart, Poincare — it is chiefly the physi- 
cal and biological sciences in whose bases they are interested, 
and rarely are the separate claims of psychology given their 
just due, if indeed they are considered at all. 

Nor are the psychologists themselves altogether free from 
blame in this matter. Justly proud of the freedom which 
their science now enjoys — liberated comparatively late in time 
as it was from the shackles of metaphysical speculation, and 
resting securely upon the hard rock of empirical fact — they are 
giving their time and attention almost entirely to the develop- 
ment of the experimental method and the discovery of indi- 
vidual facts by its means, to the serious neglect of the broader 
significance of these facts. I do not mean to imply that there 
is no interest among psychologists in the foundation principles 
of their science, but I do mean that the interest is relatively 
slight, and that what work is being done in this field is griev- 
ously lacking in unity either of aim or of result. We find, in 
other words, not one science of psychology but many — struc- 
turalist psychologies, functionalist psychologies, behaviorist 
psychologies and others, each one claiming to be the truly 
scientific psychology, but having aims and ideals inharmonious 
with all the rest. Experimentation goes merrily on, building 



2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

up a truly "imposing superstructure" where a half-century 
ago was nothing at all, but instead of one foundation fitly 
joining all the parts a number of distinct and mutually de- 
structive foundations. What psychology needs most of all 
today is not so much more superstructure as a stronger foun- 
dation, not so much an analytic examination of facts as a 
synthetic view of the entire field. 

It is for the purpose of at least securing a synthetic glimpse 
if not a complete view of this field that the present work has 
been undertaken. The situation and problem are these : First, 
as to the situation, psychology is today undoubtedly an em- 
pirical, inductive, observational, experimental, positive and 
concrete science. It is no longer a branch of philosophy, nor 
is it necessarily any more closely affiliated with philosophy than 
are any of the physical or biological sciences; for all sciences, 
non-psychological as well as psychological, must have a philo- 
sophical foundation. But at this point arises the problem: 
is psychology also a distinct science among its sister sciences? 
Is it, or can it become, as independent of physiology, of neu- 
rology, of biology, as it is of philosophy? Is the introspective 
study of the mind scientific psychology, or is the latter term 
applicable only to the experimental study of behavior? Cer- 
tainly the tendency today is strongly toward the second of 
these alternatives, but as over against this tendency it is the 
underlying purpose of this book to defend the thesis that 
scientific psychology is independent alike of metaphysics on 
the one hand and of the biological sciences on the other, that 
there can be a complete science of psychology on this indepen- 
dent basis, and that introspection is really scientific and the 
distinctive method of scientific psychology; and to undertake 
the task of establishing some of the essential principles upon 
which such a complete and independent science of psychology 
must and may be built up. 

The work will be divided into three parts; discussing (i) 
the various definitions or conceptions of psychology which 



INTRODUCTION 3 

have been suggested in the past and are being expounded to- 
day, with the aim of drawing a synthetic and positive con- 
clusion as to the merits of these various conceptions; (2) the 
field of scientific psychology, its distinctiveness from meta- 
physics on the one hand and from physical and biological sci- 
ences on the other; and (3) the postulates necessary for the 
construction of a scientific psychology, with especial attention 
to the problems of parallelism, psychical causation, and the 
subconscious. And in closing these introductory remarks I 
again emphasize the fact that my aim is primarily not criti- 
cal but constructive, and not constructive in the sense of seek- 
ing to build a new foundation for psychology but of synthetiz- 
ing the foundations upon which the science is even now built. 
For the chief need of psychology today, and of philosophy too, 
is by no means the establishment of new schools, but the 
synthesis of the diverse but perfectly harmonizable truths that 
the great thinkers of the past have contributed to the treasury 
of present day knowledge. 



BOOK I 
THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 



CHAPTER I 

Historic Concepts of Psychology 

I. The Two Most General Concepts of Psychology. 

1. Since the beginning of man's interest in the study of his 
own mental life that interest has taken a twofold form, one 
metaphysical and the other scientific. The metaphysical in- 
terest, springing primarily from the religious needs of man, 
the hope of immortality and the belief in a soul life surviving 
the death of the body, gradually takes the form of what we 
know later as Rational'^ psychology: the scientific interest, 
arising out of man's intellectual nature, fulfilled in a truly 
scientific procedure, takes the form of what has long been 
known as EmpiricaP- psychology. These, then, are the two 
most general concepts — conceptions or ideals — of what psy- 
chology is and means, that have appeared in the history of 
that branch of human knowledge. 

2. Rational Psychology has for its problem the nature, ori- 
gin, and destiny of the soul. As such it is a branch of phi- 
losophy, and not strictly speaking a science at all.^ Philosophy 
has among its various problems that of the general nature of 
reality, the part of philosophy which studies this problem be- 
ing metaphysics. As the soul, if it exists at all, is one of the 

iThe use of these terms comes from the old antithesis in the theory 
of knowledge between reason and experience, "empirical" being the adjec- 
tive corresponding to the noun "experience." However, the words have a 
well-established meaning, and that which we term "empirical psychology," 
as will soon appear, has by no means always been "scientific": hence it 
is better to retain the terms chosen than to reject them for no better 
reason than their merely etymological ambiguity. 

2 The significance of this distinction, which is a distinction of the first 
importance, will appear later (v. especially, Chap. IV). 



8 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

most important of all realities, rational psychology, which has 
the soul for its subject-matter, is one of the chief divisions of 
metaphysics. All the individual truths about the soul or 
mental life which rational psychology derives, therefore, are 
deduced from the general concept or definition of what the 
soul itself is. 

3. Empirical Psychology, on the contrary, is interested in 
the facts of mental life just as they appear in our experience 
for their own sake, without inquiring into the real inner na- 
ture of the soul, or even caring whether there is such a reality 
as a soul. Rational psychology asks what mind or soul is, 
empirical psychology asks what the mind does or how it acts. 
Hence, the latter usually discards the word "soul" altogether, 
substituting for it such terms as "mind," "self," or "con- 
sciousness." It has come, therefore, in recent years to be 
spoken of, by its adherents proudly and by its critics reproach- 
fully, as a "psychology without a soul." This designation 
serves clearly to mark off the empirical from the metaphysical 
type of psychology, and at the same time to emphasize the 
fact that empirical psychology is by its very nature incomplete 
and one-sided, and by no means, as its devotees too often 
claim, the last word on the subject of mental life. It also 
warns us not to allow ourselves to imagine for one moment 
that because rational psychology is older than empirical, and 
empirical psychology alone fashionable today, the problems 
and methods of metaphysics are therefore no longer of any 
importance. There is as valuable a place for metaphysical 
psychology in the world of thought today as there ever was, 
and there always will be such a place. This point, however, 
must be postponed until a later period in our investigations.^ 

2. The Schools of Rational Psychology.^ 

4. The schools of rational psychology are distinguished 
primarily according to their conception of the nature of the 

3 V. Chap. IV. 

* Cf., throughout this chapter, Table I, on p. 21. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 9 

mind: hence a classification of them is rather a classification 
of theories of mind than of concepts of psychology. On the 
question of the nature of the soul there have always been two 
schools in rational psychology — spiritualism and materialism; 
and on the question of the degree of relationship between the 
soul and the body, two — dualism and monism. Spiritiialism 
in psychology is the doctrine that all the phenomena of mental 
life are manifestations of a non-material soul, materialisfn 
in psychology is the theory that all psychical processes are 
modes or manifestations of matter. According to the dual- 
istic conception, mind and matter are two sharply opposed 
substances: according to the monistic conception, mind and 
matter are in some way identified, as different manifestations 
of one form of reality. It follows from these definitions that 
dualism if consistent must necessarily be spiritualistic in its 
theory of the soul, but that monism may be either spiritualistic 
or materialistic according as this "one form of reality" is re- 
garded as primarily spiritual or material in nature. There 
are, then, ultimately but three distinct schools of rational 
psychology — Dualism, Spiritualistic Monism, and Materialism, 
Dualism is the original school, the two forms of monism 
arising out of the necessity for resolving the inevitable diffi- 
culties of the dualistic position. 

5. Dualism. — The dualistic view of human nature appears 
early in the history of the race, the experiences of dreams and 
of the permanent sleep we call death naturally leading to the 
conviction that man has a soul which, though bound up with 
the body during the waking hours, wanders freely out of the 
body in sleep, and at the time of death becomes separated from 
that body forever. Primitive conceptions of the soul are, in- 
deed, crude and in many ways materialistic, the "soul" being 
thought of as little more than a detachable shadow of the 
body ; but as time goes on the concept becomes more and more 
spiritualized, until in the systems of Plato and Aristotle we 
have a purely idealistic notion of what constitutes the essen- 
tial element of human nature. According to Aristotle, how- 



lo THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

ever, the soul is not so much an outside principle separate 
from the body, but rather is identified with the vital principle 
which dwells in and energizes the body. The psychology of 
Scholasticism continues this notion of immanent dimHsm, as 
we may call it, and it is not until the time of Descartes ( 1 596- 
1650) that the dualistic conception reaches its logical climax 
in the transcendent view that the soul is a substance entirely 
distinct from the body and interacting with it from outside. 

6. Monism. — It is this problem of interaction and the diffi- 
culty of explaining it that have led to the formulation of the 
monistic theory that mind and matter are not distinct realities, 
but different manifestations of one fundamental reality. Just 
as the dualistic theory of the universe is in its primitive form 
materialistic in its concept of the soul, but can become con- 
sistent only when the latter concept has been spiritualized; so 
the monistic theory of the universe as we first find it in Spi- 
noza ( 1 632-1 677) is a neutral type of monism, the universe 
being regarded as fundamentally neither spiritual nor material, 
but such a general monistic metaphysics inevitably involves 
either a spiritualistic or a materialistic psychology — whatever 
the universe at large may be, the soul must be either material 
or non-material. 

Dualism being necessarily spiritualistic, spiritualistic mon- 
ism is the natural heir of the older, and by Spinoza and his 
adherents discarded, view of the soul. As representatives of 
this concept after Spinoza we may name especially Leibniz, 
Berkeley, Kant and his followers, and Lotze. In reaction 
against this view is the opposing doctrine of materialism, 
traceable to its origin in the Greek philosopher Democritus, 
and finding modern representatives of quite different types in 
Hobbes, Diderot, Moleschott, Biichner, Haeckel, and others. 

7. But it would take us too far afield to dwell upon the 
distinction and relationship between the various schools of 
rational psychology, or to so much as hint at a comparison 
and criticism of them. Such a task belongs to the philosopher, 
and not to the psychologist in the current sense of that word. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY ii 

But it is well to be familiar with the meanings of these philo- 
sophical concepts, not only because this makes the far differ- 
ent problems of empirical psychology stand out all the more 
clearly by contrast, but also because those philosophical prob- 
lems still exist and still cry for solution. I repeat that empiri- 
cal psychology has not superseded rational psychology, but 
has merely added itself to the latter. Today the term "psy- 
chology" when used by itself always, and rightly, means em- 
pirical or scientific psychology; and the term "rational psy- 
chology" is nowadays little favored, the broader term "meta- 
physics," of which rational psychology is one branch, doing 
service for the parts as well as the whole, because of the in- 
extricable interrelation of all metaphysical problems. But 
both adjectives are of permanent value, notwithstanding. 

3. The Development of Empirical Psychology. 

8. By empirical psychology is meant a study of mind which 
is based on observation of the facts of mental life, not derived 
deductively from general metaphysical concepts. It is, or 
aims to be, scientific rather than philosophical in that it starts 
with facts of observation, and aims to determine the connec- 
tions between these facts and so far as possible to formulate 
the laws which govern these connections. 

Empirical methods of studying mental life were employed 
as early as Plato and Aristotle, in both of whose writings 
valuable comments on mental phenomena, with analyses of 
the mind and classifications of psychical processes, are to be 
found. Especially is this true of Aristotle, to whom we owe 
the first systematic treatise on psychology. Throughout the 
middle ages the empirical interest was as active along with, 
but always strictly subordinated to, the metaphysical. In fact 
this is the characteristic feature of Greek, medieval, and most 
modern psychology before the middle of the last century — 
empirical methods of study cropping up from time to time, 
but always in subordination to rational or philosophical in- 
terests. Modern empirical psychology may properly be said 



12 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

to begin with John Locke (1632- 1704), with whom the em- 
pirical interest was even stronger than the metaphysical, but 
whose psychology is nevertheless but an outgrowth of his 
general metaphysical thought. It is not until the latter half — 
indeed, hardly until the last quarter — of the nineteenth cen- 
tury that psychology finally attains its independence of phi- 
losophy and its present status as a distinct science. 

9. Conditions of Scientific Psychology. — A scientific psy- 
chology must not only describe mental facts, it must also ex- 
plain them. Like other sciences, psychology has passed 
through two stages in its history — a purely descriptive stage, 
and a descriptive and explanatory stage. But even explana- 
tory psychology is not necessarily scientific in the strict sense 
of the term, so long as psychological facts are explained, as 
they long were, in terms of philosophical concepts. Two im- 
portant transitioned schools which appear in the prescientific 
period of the history of empirical psychology must therefore 
be discussed before we are prepared to understand the meth- 
ods and ideals of modern scientific psychology- — the schools of 
Faculty Psychology and of Associationism. 

a. Faculty Psychology 

10. The so-called faculty theory of the mind in one form or 
another practically dominates empirical psychology from the 
very beginning until the eighteenth century, although the word 
"mental faculty" itself appears for the first time in the sys- 
tem of Christian Wolff (1679-1754). 

According to this doctrine the mind is thought of as divided 
into compartments — faculties or powers — which are regarded 
as independent forces, and all individual mental phenomena 
are explained as products or expressions of these faculties. 
Such class-concepts of modern psychology as sensation, mem- 
ory, imagination, thought, feeling, will, desire, etc., are re- 
garded by this school not merely as convenient groups of 
mental processes but as actual forces which produce the 
phenomena included under those heads. Thus we see because 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 13 

we have a faculty of sensation, we think by means of our 
thought faculty, we act by virtue of the fact that our will is 
an independent faculty which is free from the restraints of 
physical causation. 

Throughout the history of the science, however, there has 
ever existed a strong tendency toward the reduction of the 
number of faculties, the many lesser faculties being subordi- 
nated to a few ruling ones. The usual groupings have been 
either into two faculties — one passive and the other active, 
knowledge and desire or will; or into three — knowledge, feel- 
ing, and will. 

Such a division of mind is analogous to the traditional 
grouping of teachers in the universities into the great facul- 
ties of philosophy (or arts and sciences), law, medicine, and 
theology; each being further divisible into a number of lesser 
faculties — as natural science, history, literature, etc. Just as 
every teacher is a member of certain of these groups, and acts 
by their authority; so every psychical process was thought of 
as a product of some particular mental faculty, and considered 
to be explained when referred to the proper one. 

Of the two groupings, the active-passive division practically 
dominated the whole history of psychology until the time of 
Wolff, to whom reference has already been made, and who 
was the first to employ the term "faculty" and to formulate a 
systematic doctrine based on that principle. Following him, 
to John Nicolas Tetens (1736-1807) is due the introduction 
of the threefold division into intellect, feeling, and will — a 
third faculty, feeling, being added to the Wolffian two — 
which, further elaborated by Immanuel Kant, became the rul- 
ing psychological concept, on the continent at least, through- 
out the ensuing century. 

II. Criticism of Faculty Psychology. — Modern scientific 
psychology, however, has rejected absolutely the entire faculty 
conception of the mind and of mental science, and this, I 
think we can say, for three reasons — 

( I ) The division of the mind into faculties is an artificial. 



14 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

not a natural, division — a grouping of psychical processes for 
convenience in study and exposition, not an actual division in 
the substance or reality of the mind or soul. Modern psychol- 
ogists recognize that whatever the mind may in its essential 
nature be, it works, normally at least, as a unit, not as a col- 
lection of separate faculties; that every momentary state of 
consciousness is at the same time a knowing, feeling, and de- 
siring state, the difference between the three being one of 
phases of a single psychosis^ rather than of three distinct and 
separately acting psychical forces; that whenever there is ap- 
parent division in the mind, as in the phenomena of so-called 
dissociation (hypnosis, hysterical somnambulism, etc.) it is a 
division which actually cuts through all the so-called faculties, 
each temporary portion of mind being not restricted to one 
"faculty" but manifesting itself in all the ways that a com- 
plete and normal mind would do. 

(2) The reference of the various individual processes to 
the appropriate faculties merely classifies them, but does not 
explain them. It is a common fallacy to think that because 
we have found the name of a thing, and thereby the class to 
which it belongs, we have for that reason explained it; but 
this is far from the case, classification never being equivalent 
to explanation, but merely pointing the way toward the latter. 
Mental faculties are merely class-names, then, not causes or 
forces, and we have no more justification for thinking of the 
faculty of perception, for example, as causing or producing 
individual perceptions than we have for thinking of the idea 
of "man" as causing or producing individual men. 

(3) Finally, the whole conception of faculties as causes or 
forces is a confusion of the empirical point of view with the 
metaphysical. The faculty theory involves the thought that 
in some way or other the mental faculties are more real — more 
substantial or permanent — than the individual processes. It 

5 The term "psychosis" should be thought of in general psychology as 
indicating any single moment of consciousness taken as a whole, the 
whole state of the mind at any individual moment. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 15 

is a theory of what the mind really is — viz., a collection of 
faculties — formulated to explain the mental processes of every- 
day life. But an explanation of facts formulated in terms of 
metaphysical concepts is not the kind of explanation which 
science demands: hence the faculty view has no longer any 
standing in modern scientific psychology. 

b. Associationism 

12. About the middle of the eighteenth century there ap- 
peared in England a new school of empirical psychology known 
as Associationism, which was destined to play an important 
part in moulding the science as we know it today. The two 
concepts with which we are in the present stage of our investi- 
gations concerned — that of mental faculties and that of as- 
sociationism— are undoubtedly the most influential concepts 
ever proposed in explanation of the phenomena of mental 
life. 

But it is extremely important not to confuse this modem 
theory of associatiom^m with the familiar and long recognized 
fact of association on which that theory was founded. The 
fact of association as a phenomenon of mental life was recog- 
nized by Aristotle, and to him we owe the classic grouping of 
association-phenomena under the three heads of similarity, 
contrast, and contiguity or temporal succession. That we re- 
member things by associating them with other things, and 
that we are especially likely to associate objects that are much 
alike or strikingly different, and events which happen at the 
same time or in immediate succession, are commonplaces of 
experience and of empirical psychology throughout its history. 
It was left to David Hume ( 171 1 -1776) and David Hartley 
( 1 704-1 757), however, to raise this familiar fact into the ex- 
alted position of being the central and dominating principle of 
explanatory psychology, "the sufficient explanation of all con- 
scious experience,"^ and thus to establish a new school. As- 

6 Calkins, Introd., p. 439. 



i6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

sociationism as a doctrine is so called because it makes the 
fact of association the essential principle of mental life. 

Of the two British thinkers already named, Hume is to be 
thought of rather as the builder of the philosophical founda- 
tions of associationism/ Hartley as the actual creator of as- 
sociationism as a school of psychology.^ The central prin- 
ciple of Hume's philosophy was that the entire universe ma- 
terial as well as mental, is merely a collection (i.e., association) 
of what he termed in psychological language "impressions and 
ideas" — that that which we call the soul or self ("I") has no 
substantial reality, but is merely a "bundle" of impressions 
and ideas, and that the material universe is like the psychical 
in its constitution. Impressions and ideas are thus the ele- 
ments of all things, the things themselves being built up out of 
these elements through "association." These fundamental 
principles Hartley applies and develops in the more special field 
of empirical psychology and nerve physiology. 

Associationism is primarily and distinctively a British school 
of psychology, all English psychologists of the later eighteenth 
and most of the nineteenth centuries being influenced by it, 
of whom we may name as especially representative of this 
school three^ — ^James Mill, Alexander Bain, and Herbert 
Spencer; but a school of similar type and springing out of 
the ideas of the British associationists was founded in Ger- 
many by Johann Friedrich Herbart (i 776-1841), and has had 
quite as profound an influence on continental nineteenth cen- 
tury psychology as the theories of Hume and Hartley have had 
in Great Britain. In its philosophical foundations Herbart- 
ianism differs from Humianism in its acceptance of a soul- 
substance as the creator of ideas, but this is a metaphysical 
distinction and on the empirical side the similarities between 
the British and German schools are far more fundamental 
than the differences. 

''First in his Treatise of Human Nature (1739). 
^Observations on Man (1749). 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 17 

13. Principles of Associationism, — The tenets of the asso- 
ciationist school will become considerably clearer, however, if 
we sum them up under the three following propositions: 

( 1 ) Every idea^ is an independent, more or less permanent, 
and revivahle reality. Herbartianism, of course, would reject 
this proposition as a theoretical statement, but for all practical 
purposes Herbart accepts the principle. 

(2) Every idea is endowed with the power of association 
with other ideas; so that when one member of the group is 
"revived," the others are revived along with it. This is a 
statement of the fact of association, though psychologists to- 
day would not favor the use of the terms "power of associa- 
tion" and "revival"; which terms nevertheless accurately rep- 
resent, I think, the associationist view. 

(3) All complex mental processes are explicable on these 
principles of the permanent reality (Proposition i) and as- 
sociative power (Proposition 2) of ideas. This proposition 
represents the essential distinctive principle of the school that 
"association is the sufficient explanation of all conscious ex- 
periences." It is as characteristic of Herbartian as of British 
psychology, for according to Herbart all conscious experience 
is but the result of the constant activity and interaction of 
ideas which in the unconscious field of the mind come into 
conflict with one another, the stronger sometimes reen forcing 
and sometimes suppressing the weaker. Here we have a pure- 
ly mechanical, almost physical, conception of ideas as real 
forces in the universe of mental life — the consistent and 
logical conclusion of the three premises of associationism. 

14. Criticism of Associationism, — These three principles 
may be criticized, and must we believe be rejected, on the fol- 
lowing grounds: 

(i) The doctrine of associationism is a metaphysical, not a 
scientific, doctrine. From this point of view it has no ad- 

» I use the term "idea" here in John Locke's sense of It, as including all 
mental states or contents — perception, feelings, etc., as well as what mod- 
ern scientific psychology calls ideas. 



i8 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

vantage over the faculty-theory, in that it merely substitutes 
"ideas" for the older "faculties" as the units of mental re- 
ality, conceiving these ideas as forces which 'produce the 
phenomena of mental life. The metaphysical nature of the 
doctrine is also clearly brought out in the phrase "power of 
association," it being impossible to state in empirical terms 
the nature of such a "power." 

(2) On the empirical side, associationism entirely miscon- 
ceives the nature of ideas. Ideas are not permanent things, 
but passing phases of mental life. An idea is an event in 
time, "belongs to a given moment and cannot be revived at 
another time."^*' My idea of the character and policies of 
William II may be today in its significance precisely what it 
was ten years ago, or it may have changed completely, but in 
neither case is there any actual numerical identity between 
them. Today's experience of my postage stamp box may be 
the same as yesterday's, but today's experience is a part of 
today's stream of consciousness and yesterday's experience a 
part of yesterday's stream of consciousness; and though I 
may say the stamp box is today identically the same box as 
it was yesterday, yet is my experience of it today as a fact of 
consciousness a different fact from my experience of it yes- 
terday. 

(3) On another count is associationism empirically false, 
in that it reverses the true genetic order as between the indi- 
vidual ideas and their association. Ideas are not independent 
realities, existing first in isolation and afterwards combined 
after a mechanical fashion into groups: rather, ideas always 
come into the mind as members of complex groups, which 
may or may not afterward be analysed into their constituent 
factors. In other words, the relation among ideas is always 
an organic rather than a mechanical relation, the unit being 
not the individual idea but the total "stream of consciousness" 
of which the single ideas are but factors, and distinguishable 
from the rest only through analysis. 

^^ Calkins, Introd,, p. 441. Italics mine. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 19 

(4) Finally, contrary to the third proposition of associa- 
tionism, the principle of association is quite inadequate to ex- 
plain by itself all the complex phenomena of mental life. 

c. Modern Scientific Psychology 

15. Empirical psychology does not become truly scientific 
until it has divorced itself entirely from all metaphysical limi- 
tations and presuppositions. As a science, psychology is not 
interested in the nature of the soul, the reality of ideas, or the 
explanation of mental phenomena in terms of forces which 
can neither be experienced themselves nor inferred from what 
is experienced. Scientific psychology has for its problems 
solely the discovery of the facts of mental life, the careful 
description, analysis, and classification of those facts, and 
the determination so far as possible of the "laws" of their 
connection (i.e., the formulation of propositions summing up 
in brief form the facts as to their connection). 

It is impossible to name any exact date as marking the 
emancipation of psychology from metaphysics and the birth 
of psychological science. Suffice it to say that during the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century and the opening years 
of the twentieth an advance away from metaphysics has been 
made of a nature so striking that there can be no doubt what- 
ever that now we have a science of psychology whose right to 
be called a science in as real a sense as physics, chemistry, bi- 
ology and all the rest are so called is impregnable. 

16. Extreme Views of Scientific Psychology. — Two errors, 
however, are commonly made with regard to this position 
which must be referred to briefly and overruled before we 
pass on to more positive considerations :^^ one is that psychol- 
ogy is scientific only so far as it brings the facts of mental 
life into close and constant dependence upon the facts of 
nerve physiology, the other that psychology is scientific only 
so far as it uses the experimental methods of the laboratory. 
Neither of these positions may be admitted, however, and it is 

^^ V. Calkins ; Introd., pp. 442-444. 



20 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

one of the main purposes of this book to confute the first of 
them and insist that there is, and endeavor to demonstrate 
how there can be, a science of psychology which is quite as 
ihdependent of nerve physiology on the one hand as it is of 
metaphysics on the other — all this without denying for an in- 
stant the great importance of that science called physiological 
psychology which has for its subject-matter the relation be- 
tween mental processes and physiological processes. 

As to the claims of the laboratory psychologist, we admit the 
great value of the psychological laboratory, and that "the most 
obvious distinction of the present-day psychology is certainly 
its experimental methods" ;^^ and yet insist that after all intro- 
spection is the distinctive method of psychology, and that a 
psychological experiment can never be more than an arrange- 
ment of the conditions for more accurate and useful intro- 
spection, just as a chemical or biological experiment is merely 
an arrangement of the conditions for observation of its phe- 
nomena to the best advantage. The true laboratory of the 
psychologist is his own mind, which he carries about with 
him always, and the best equipped laboratory building is no 
more than an external aid to the observation of the workings 
of his own and other person's minds — just as the telescope is 
the external aid of the astronomer, or the microscope of the 
histologist. The difficulties of introspection are, of course 
obvious, but the claims of some that they are insuperable is, 
I think, unproven. The matter will be considered at length in 
the course of the following chapter. 

12 op. cit., p. 444. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 21 

TABLE I 
Historic Concepts of Psychology 

I. RATIONAL OR METAPHYSICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 

A. Dualism. 

1. Qimsi-Materialistic (primitive man) 

2. Spiritualistic: Plato, Aristotle, etc. 

a. Immanent (Aristotle) 

b. Transcendent (Descartes) 

B. Monism. 

1. Spirittuilistic: Spinoza, Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, etc. 

2. Materialism: Democritus, Hobbes, Diderot, Mole- 

schott, Biichner, Haeckel, etc. 

XL EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY: Plato, Aristotle, Locke, 
etc. 

A. Transitional Schools — 

1. Faculty-Psychology: Plato, Aristotle; Scholastic- 

ism; Wolff, Tetens, Kant. 

2. Associationism: Hume, Hartley; Mill, Bain, Spencer. 
a. German Form: Herbart, etc. 

B. Modern Scientific Psychology. 

REFERENCES 
General — 

Klemm, Part I. 

Villa, Chap. L 

Wundt, Outlines, Section 2. 

Calkins, Introd., Chap. XXVIII. 

Faculty-Psychology — 
Klemm, pp. 44-69. 

Associationism — 

Klemm, pp. 87-1 11. 
Calkins, Introd., pp. 438-442. 

Modern Scientific Psychology — 
Klemm, pp. 141-155- 
Calkins, Introd., pp. 442-444. 



CHAPTER II 

Current Concepts of Scientific Psychology 
I. Points of View in Psychology. 

17. Mental Process vs. Mental Content. — In every experi- 
ence we may distinguish between the act of experiencing and 
the object or "content" of that experience — in other words, 
between experience taken as process and experience taken as 
content. The word "experience" itself is ambiguous, and 
covers both these meanings. As between the two it will be 
recognized that the content of experience may be, and perhaps 
always is, extremely complex, and analyzable into a number of 
simpler components — as, for example, my experience of a 
symphony, a painting, the World War, or life in general : the 
act or process of experience, however, the experiencing of 
this content, is at every moment a single act of consciousness, 
a simple and unanalyzable fact.^ 

This distinction between process and content applies equally 
to experience taken as a whole, and to every individual type 
or instance of experience. For almost all classes of experi- 
ences there are at least two terms in common use, one — usu- 

^ V. Dunlap, A System of Psychology, pp. 12 f. {cf. also his "The Self 
and the Ego," Psych. Rev., 1914, xvi, 63). "It is often said that the con- 
tent is not complex, but is simple and unitary; and that the elements into 
which we apparently resolve it by analysis are really new content brought 
into existence by our analysis. In stricter language, this really means 
that while the content which you apprehend is complex, and may be re- 
solved into its elements, the apprehension or experience of the content 
[i.e., the processi is not itself a complex made up of the apprehensions 
of the different elements." For example, the percept of an orange is 
analyzable into sensations of color, odor, pressure and taste, but the ex- 
perience of perceiving the orange is not analyzable into an experience of 
seeing a color plus an experience of smelling an odor, etc. — rather the 
whole orange comes into consciousness in a single experience. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 23 

ally participial in form — indicating mental process, and the 
other — usually a noun^ — symbolizing content. Thus the terms 
"perceiving," "remembering," "thinking," "feeling," "will- 
ing," etc., refer to mental processes — the terms "percept," 
"image," "idea," etc., to mental contents. And so also with 
phrases — the expressions "I think so and so," for example, 
and "I have such and such an idea" being equivalent, the 
former expressing the process-side of the same experience 
and the latter the content-side. In many cases, indeed, there 
is a third indifferent term which covers both aspects of the 
experience — such terms as sensation, perception, memory, 
thought, feeling, and volition. 

In all this discrimination between process and content, how- 
ever, we must not allow ourselves to think of these as separable 
kinds of experience, but rather as merely discriminable aspects 
of experience, quite inseparable in fact. The terms do not in 
any particular instance refer to separate experiences, but to one 
identical experience, considered from different points of view.^ 
As Titchener expresses it,^ the term "mental content" refers 
to the qualitative aspect of experience — what kind of an ex- 
perience it is, whether of a color, a tone, an emotion or an 
idea; whereas the term "mental act" or "process" refers to 
the temporal course or dwrational aspect of the experience — 
the experience as a momentary phase in the mental life of the 
individual. 

But it would be equally an error to ignore, as many psychol- 
ogists do, the distinction we have been discussing. To many 
the distinction seems abstract, unreal, and valueless. I gladly 
admit the first characterization, though deny that it is an ob- 
jection, as all science must deal to some degree or other with 
abstractions. As to the second, it may or may not be true, but 

2 To make process and content distinct mental facts would be to fall 
into a similar error to that of the faculty psychologists, who divided the 
mind into distinct and separate parts. 

3 The Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes, p. 60. 



24 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

this makes no difference provided the distinction is useful.* 
To the third objection, that it is not useful I return a vigorous 
denial, and the remainder of this and the following divisions 
of this chapter are to be devoted to a defence of the necessity 
of the process-content distinction. In the meantime let me 
refer the reader in confirmation of my position to an article by 
Dr. E. Stanley Abbot,^ in which the distinction is shown to be 
both real and important by the fact that either content or pro- 
cess may to some extent be altered independently of the other. 
For example, a gradual increase in the intensity of a thermal 
stimulus applied to a definite point on the skin gives success- 
ively three qualitatively distinct (i.e., distinct in content) sen- 
sations— (i) of "warmth," (2) of "heat," and (3) of "pain" 
— ^although the same psychical process is involved throughout. 
18. The Structural and Functional Points of View in Psy- 
chology. — Corresponding to these aspects o£ experience there 
are two points of view either of which psychology may adopt 
in its general study of the mind — the structural and the func- 
tional points of view. This division of interest in the field of 
psychology corresponds again to a similar division of interest 
in the field of biology, represented by the customary division 
of the latter science into morphology — the study of the struc- 
ture of organisms, "structural biology" — ^and physiology — ^the 
study of the activities of the organism and the functions of 
their various organs, "functional biology." Psychologists too 
may be interested primarily either in the structural, "content" 
side of their science, or in its functional, "process" side. 
Structural psychology treats the mind statically, as if it were 
a fixed thing like the body which it inhabits :® functional psy- 
chology treats the mind dynamically, as continuously active 
and never fixed, or as a stream of constantly changing pro- 
cesses. 

* F. inf., Ch. IV. 

'^ "The Dynamic Value of Content," four. Phil., etc., Vol. xiv, pp. 
41 ff. (1917). 
^ I use this term figuratively, of course. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 25 

Now it must be admitted at once that the functional point 
of view in psychology is truer to the real inner nature of the 
mind than the structural point of view. The mind is certainly 
in no sense a fixed thing — there is no real "morphology of the 
mind," nothing in psychology to correspond literally to mor- 
phology as a biological science. And yet, if the distinction 
between process and content is a significant one, there must be 
a significance in the broader distinction between structural 
and functional psychology which is based upon that other 
one. And furthermore, as I shall proceed to demonstrate, 
both points of view are necessary to a thorough understand- 
ing of mental life, necessary if psychology is to be a complete 
science as in the Introduction we claimed it to be. 

19. Examples of Process and Content.' — The distinction be- 
tween process and content will be clearer, and the necessity of 
both the structural and functional points of view for a com- 
plete psychology more obvious if we illustrate. Let us take, 
then, examples of different types of experience and examine 
them as far as possible from the two points of view. 

( 1 ) When we use the term perception we may be thinking 
either of the process of "perceiving," or the "percept" as a 
content of consciousness to be distinguished, for example, from 
an idea or an emotion. Perception may be defined function- 
ally as the consciousness of particular material things at the 
time stimulating the sense-organs; or we may first define the 
percept, and then define perception as the process of forming 
percepts, this being the structural method of approach. From 
the latter point of view the percept is analyzable into two 
groups of elementary contents — sensations and memory- 
images;^ functionally, perception may be thought of as in- 
cluding the two subordinate processes of sensation and apper- 
ception, though this is not strictly speaking an analysis. 

(2) In the case of sensation there are not, unfortunately, 
two separate terms in common usage to mark the process- 

^ Or "primary" and "secondary sensations," according to Sidis (v. his 
Foundations, Chs. xix-xxiv) and others. 



26 



THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



content distinction, and the word "sensation" itself covers 
both aspects. It is, however, highly advisable that this dis- 
tinction should be preserved in the sensory field, and it is quite 
legitimate to use as many do, the verb "to sense" and the 
participial form "sensing" for the process side of sensation, 
and the term "sensum," "sense-datum," or "sensate" for the 
content side. Sensing includes seeing, hearing, smelling, etc., 
the corresponding sensates being lights and colors, noises and 
tones, odors, etc., respectively. 

(3) In the so-called higher cognitive experiences, we dis- 
tinguish in memory between the process of "remembering" 
and the "memory-image" as content; in imagination, between 
the "imagining" process and the "image of imagination" as 
content; in thought, between the "thinking" process and the 
"idea" or "concept" as content of thought. 

(4) It is unnecessary to continue our distinctions in any 
detail into the fields of affection and conation, where termin- 
ology is still less developed than in the cognitive field. We 
speak of "feeling" as a process, and "a- feeling" as content, 
and so of "emotion and "the emotions," etc. ; but whereas we 
have the functional verb "to feel," we have no corresponding 
term in the case of emotion. There is no structural noun to 
correspond to the functional "will" or "willing," but we may 
use the far better term "volition" in either sense, retaining 
the participial "willing" but rejecting the noun, which latter 
we may be content to leave, along with "the words "soul," 
"reason," "intellect," etc., to the philosopher. 

The following table may make the above discussion clearer : 

TABLE II.— EXPERIENCE AS PROCESS AND AS CONTENT 



ypes of Experience 


Perception 


Sensation 


Memory 


As Process 


Perceiving 


Sensing 


Remembering 


As Content 


Percept 


Sensate 


Memory-image 


ypes of Experience 


Imagination 


Thought 


Feeling 


As Process 


Imagining 


Thinking 


Feeling 


As Content 


Image of 


Concept 


Feeling 


' . 


Imagination 







THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 27 

Types of Experience Emotion Impulse Volition 

As Process Emotion Impulse Willing 

As Content Emotion Impulse Volition 

2. Structuralism and Functionalism as Schools of Psychology 

20. Insistence on either the structural or functional point 
of view to the exclusion or complete subordination of the 
other by different psychologists has led to the establishment 
of two opposing schools in contemporary psychology, known 
respectively as the structuralist and the functionalist schools. 
Beside these there are two other concepts of the science now 
in the field — the latest, Behaviorism, and an earlier view 
known as Self-Psychology. We shall proceed throughout the 
remainder of this chapter and the next to consider each of these 
existent theories of what psychology is, in the order named.^ 

21. Structuralism views the mind entirely from the stand- 
point of structure. Its typical definition would be, Psychol- 
ogy is the science of mental states or mental contents. Its 
method is to take some momentary psychosis or state of con- 
sciousness, analyze it into its elementary contents, and then 
show how these elements combine to form the more complex 
contents with which experience is ordinarily concerned.® The 
leading contemporary exponent of this school is Professor E. 
B. Titchener, other important recent and contemporary repre- 
sentatives being Wundt, Yerkes, and Miinsterberg. Professor 
Titchener's definition of psychology as "science of mental pro- 
cesses" is, however, inconsistent with structuralism, the term 
"process" being characteristically functional rather than struc- 
tural; but the use of this term is to a large extent justified on 
the ground that it makes explicit the fact that mental contents 
are not really "unchanging objects" but constantly changing. ^° 
The entire concept of mental content and the structural point 
of view in general are, of course, abstractions; but necessary 

8 Cf., through the ensuing discussion, Table IV at the end of the chapter. 
® Cf., for example, the analysis of percepts into sensations and after- 
images (19). 
10 Titchener, Text-Book of Psychology, pp. 15, 16. 



28 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

abstractions, for without them one important aspect of mental 
life would fail to receive scientific treatment. 

22. Functionalism views the mind entirely from the stand- 
point of function, its typical definition being, Psychology is 
the science of mental processes or functions. The concept of 
mental function is by no means clearly defined, or interpreted 
with any degree of unanimity by those who use it, but the 
underlying principle of the school seems to be that all mental 
processes should be thought of as different ways in which the 
entire psychophysical organism adjusts itself to the varying 
conditions of the environment according as they affect the 
life and well-being of the organism itself. "All our sensa- 
tions," says President Angell, the leading champion of this 
doctrine, "all our emotions and all our acts of will" must be 
regarded merely "as so many expressions of organic adapta- 
tions to our environment."^^ Functionalists generally deny 
the value of the distinction between process and content, and 
so of any structural analysis of the mind: each process is to 
be described in its wholeness, not analyzed into its constituent 
parts. Sensation, for example, is to be described by relating 
how the psychophysical organism — i.e., the individual as a 
single mind-body affair, not merely as mind — acts in the pro- 
cess of sensing a physical stimulus, as distinguished from its 
modus operandi in the process of judging, willing, or desir- 
ing, etc. Sensation is not so much a complex of elements as 
it is a way of acting on the part of the entire individual. 
Functionalism thus treats mental processes rather as phases of 
a single mental activity, than as complexes of simpler ele- 
ments, and in so doing, as has been admitted, is truer than 
structuralism to the real nature of mental life; but we still 
insist, and shall hope soon to demonstrate, that though a 
valuable and even essential method of treatment so far as it 
goes, it is nevertheless an incomplete method. 

The concept of mental function as mode of reaction to en- 
vironment has obvious biological relationships, if not a purely 

"^"^ Psychology, p. 7. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 29 

biological origin. Functionalists however, are insistent that 
their view by no means involves any admission that psychol- 
ogy is merely a branch of biology, as many of their critics have 
maintained. A psychophysical organism is more than a merely 
physical organism, and mind does make a difference to be- 
havior: it is the task of the psychologist, then, to show how 
the reactions of the individual to his environment differ from 
what they would be were he merely body and not both body 
and mind. 

The close relationship of functionalist psychology to bi- 
ology, however, has led many of the more radical followers 
of this general viewpoint (as Pillsbury and W. McDougalP^) 
to renounce all mental or subjective terms in their definition 
of the science and to prefer the simple statement that Psychol- 
ogy is the science of behavior. Pillsbury justifies this on the 
ground that all subjective definitions, as "science of mind'* or 
"science of consciousness," are meaningless until the terms 
"mind" and "consciousness" are further defined, whereas the 
definition "science of behavior" is self -explaining and ex- 
presses better than any other what psychology really means to 
the ordinary man. Such a definition. Professor Pillsbury 
thinks, does not involve in the least any change in the treat- 
ment of the subject-matter of the science: "by adopting the 
definition we change our description of the science, not the 
science itself." This last statement is undoubtedly true so far 
as Professor Pillsbury's own textbooks are concerned, but it 
is extremely doubtful that his definition really describes the 
science as he himself expounds it, as his chapters are con- 
cerned throughout with the phenomena of consciousness — 
sensation, perception, memory, feeling, and all the rest — and 
not with "behavior" in any distinct sense at all. The only 
consistent followers of this definition are the "behaviorists" 
who have thrown over all psychology in the older sense of the 
term, functional as well as structural; and of them we shall 
soon speak more fully. 

12 President Angell, in his recent Introduction to Psychology (1918), 
adopts the same position. 



30 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

23. Reconciliation of Structuralism and Functionalism. — ^A 
reconciliation between these two schools of psychology is to 
be found in a recognition of the importance and even necessity 
of both the structural and functional points of view for a 
complete understanding of mental life.^^ The functional 
method would seem prima facie to have the advantage be- 
cause of the admitted fact that it is undoubtedly a more natural 
and less artificial mode of treatment of mental problems, but 
a closer examination of its procedure and results will make it 
clear that a strict adherence to it to the exclusion of the struc- 
tural method would leave psychology maimed, impotent, and 
completely at the mercy of physiology. If psychology is to 
be a complete and independent science, both methods must be 
used to complement each other. 

My reasons for this assertion are as follows. So far as the 
so-called cognitive processes are concerned, they may all be 
described in either structural or functional terms — ^perceiving 
as a form of reaction on the part of the individual to present 
physical stimuli in the environment, or the percept as a com- 
bination of sensations and memory-images; memory as an at- 
titude of the mind toward past experience, or as a combination 
of images; judgment as an interpretation of present experience 
in terms of the past, or as a combination of concepts, etc. A 
complete description even in this field, it is true, would call 
forth both points of view in combination, but the phenomena 
may be described from either standpoint alone in purely psy- 
chological terms, and without passing beyond the legitimate 
bounds of a distinct and purely mental science. But when we 
come to the affective and conative processes the situation is 
quite different, for these cannot be described at all as mental 
processes except in structural terms. The physiological accom- 

^3 This requirement may, perhaps, best be met by dividing psychology into 
two branches — Psychostatics or structural psychology, and Psychodynani' 
ics or functional psychology (v. Thorndike, Elements of Psychology, 
Parts I and II). 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 31 

paniments of feeling and emotion^* may be described and the 
effects produced by the will in the physical world, but affec- 
tion and conation themselves in their psychological nature as 
mental processes cannot be described in any other way than 
by analyzing them into their elements. 

3. Behamorism. 

24. The year 1913 marks the birth of the most radical of all 
psychological concepts, that of "Behaviorism." This doctrine 
is an extreme, and yet perfectly logical, development of the 
functionalist position, and is far more consistent in its work- 
ing out than the intermediate "radical functionalism" (as we 
may call it) of Pillsbury and McDougall; for it not only ac- 
cepts the definition of these two writers theoretically, but 
vigorously puts this definition into practice. The Behaviorist 
movement was initiated and the doctrine founded by Profes- 
sor John B. Watson of the Johns Hopkins University in two 
articles in the Psychological Review and the Journal of Phi- 
losophy, later combined in the first chapter of the book Behav- 
ior (1914).^^ Others who have helped to elaborate the doc- 

i*For evidence that this is the case, v. Watson, Psychological Rev., 
XXVI, pp. i6s ff. (1919). 

15 Professor Watson has recently ( 1919) published a book entitled Psy- 
chology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, in which he carries out his 
program with reference to human psychology. One is rather amused in 
reading this book by the strenuous efforts made and the circumlocutions 
employed by the author to avoid the use of terminology involving con- 
sciousness {e.g., pp. 89, sentence beginning second line from bottom; 91, 
sentence beginning on last line). On one occasion, where the ordinary 
terms designative of the leading emotions seem involuntarily to slip out, 
the writer apologetically comments, "We use these terms which are cur- 
rent in psychology with a good deal of hesitation" (p. 199) ! Thought is 
merely "speech habits," implicit or laryngeal behavior; one does not 
introspect, he "gives a verbal report"; one is never conscious of white 
light when his optic nerve is stimulated by a mixture of complementary 
color waves, he "reacts to it as to a . . . white light"; the mental arith- 
metic of our childhood becomes "subvocal arithmetic"; etc. The very 
adjective with which he qualifies his new science of "objective psychol- 
ogy" is question-begging, in that all science, psychological as well as 
material, is by its very nature objective. 



32 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

trine or have promulgated similar views are Professors E. L. 
Thorndike, E. P. Frost, B. H. Bode, E. S. Abbot, and E. B. 
Holt. 

Behaviorism is characterized primarily by two fundamental 
principles, one as to the nature of the subject-matter of psy- 
chology, and one as to the nature of the method of that science. 
First, behaviorism insists, as does radical functionalism in 
theory, that the true subject-matter of psychology is not mind 
or consciousness but behavior — that consciousness cannot be 
studied scientifically, that the concept of consciousness is a 
metaphysical rather than a psychological concept, and that con- 
sequently all problems as to the mind or consciousness are for 
philosophy rather than psychology ("rational" rather than 
"empirical" psychology) to solve. Secondly, as to method, 
behaviorism, unlike radical functionalism in this point, rejects 
introspection as unscientific if not impossible, and makes ex- 
periment and observation of behavior the sole methods of psy- 
chological research. We must carefully consider each of these 
points in turn. 

a. Behavior vs. Consciousness 

25. The Behavioristic Program. — "Psychology as the be- 
haviorist views it," says Professor Watson," is a purely ob- 
jective experimental branch of natural science"^® — viz., of 
biology. "Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of 
behavior." The older view of psychology as the science of 
mind or of consciousness he thinks has been totally barren of 
results in the past, and is absolutely futile and hopeless for the 
future. "Psychology has failed signally during the fifty odd 
years of its existence as an experimental discipline to make 
its place in the world as an undisputed natural science."" 
Psychologists of the older schools still differ radically among 
themselves on some of the most fundamental problems, of 
their science, and there is no hope, so long as present methods 

'^^ Behavior, p. i. 
17 Op cit., p. 6. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 33 

are adhered to, that any greater uniformity will be attained in 
respect to these matters in the future. The time has come, 
then, "when psychology must discard all reference to con- 
sciousness"^^ and devote itself entirely to the purely objective 
study of behavior. The study of consciousness as a subjective 
phenomenon of the human individual may be a legitimate 
topic for the philosopher, but its problems are speculative and 
not open to scientific treatment. Thus the behaviorist does 
not necessarily deny mind or consciousness, or that conscious 
processes seem to be different from physiological processes, 
but only that consciousness can be studied scientifically. 

Pillsbury's position is recognized by Watson, and I think 
rightly, as an illogical compromise between the structural and 
the biological points of view. "It is possible to write a psy- 
chology, to define it as Pillsbury does (as the 'science of be- 
havior'), and never go back on the definition: never to use 
the terms consciousness, mental states, mind, content, will, 
imagery, and the like."^^ This is a thoroughgoing as distin- 
guished from a half-hearted "behavioristic program," which 
its originator has now developed in actuality in his textbooks 
of animaP^ and human^^ psychology. 

26. Kinds of Behavior. — I shall henceforth use the terms 
"mentalism" and "mentalists" for all schools of psychology 
and of psychologists that consider mind or consciousness the 
true subject-matter of the science, as opposed to the "behavior- 
ists" who deny that principle. "Mentalism" is, I think, less 
open to objection than the term "subjectivism" which is com- 
monly used in opposition to the "objectivism" of the behavior- 
ists. 

Now the mentalist — and the ordinary man who, in his 
terminology at least, is certainly always a mentalist — thinks 
the most important distinction of types of behavior or of 

18 Op. cit., p. 7. 

19 Op. cit., p. 9. 

20 Op. cit. 

21 V. our note 15 sup. 



34 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

motor activity is that which subsists between unconscious or 
mechanical behavior on the one hand and consciously con- 
trolled or psychomotor activity on the other. To him, me- 
chanical behavior is interesting only so far as it may develop 
later into, or may have degenerated from, psychomotor be- 
havior; and psychomotor behavior itself is interesting only so 
far as it is the expression of consciousness. Outwardly-— 
i.e. J from the point of view of the external observer — these 
two forms of behavior differ only in their relative complexity. 
When there is a single stimulus to action, or a group of stimuli 
all calling forth a similar reaction, the response itself is im- 
mediate and we have mechanical or "unconscious" behavior; 
but when there are a number of mutually interfering stimuli, 
each of which would if occurring alone lead to a different re- 
sponse from every other, there is a necessary interval of delay 
for the purpose of harmonizing the various possible responses, 
before any action can take place. In the latter instance we 
have "conscious" or psychomotor behavior — or behavior "after 
deliberation," in mentalistic terms : what the outside observer 
sees merely as a more or less unaccountable period of delay, 
the agent himself recognizes as a period of deliberation. 

This distinction may be made clearer in the light of the fol- 
lowing diagram. In the left-hand figure the arrow represents 
the immediate nerve process from stimulus (S) through the 
central portion of the nervous system (C) to motor reaction 
(M), the waved line through the circle C indicating the pos- 
sible circuitousness of the cortical portion of the nerve pro- 
cess. In the right hand figure we have three mutually inter- 
fering stimuli (Si, S2, S3) any of which if allowed to continue 
its course unhindered would produce an immediate response 
(Ml, M2, M3 respectively) : in this, for simplicity's sake, I 
have assumed that Si and S3 have both been thwarted, and S2 
alone allowed to continue itself through. 

So much for the mentalist's interpretation, but what says 
the behaviorist? That the period of delay can and must be 
interpreted in objective terms, not in terms of "conscious de- 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 35 

'Unconscioiis'^ Behavior ''Conscious'' Behavior 




liberation." The period of delay is merely one of adjustment 
and harmonization of the conflicting stimuli — not, as the 
mentalist tells us, also one of conscious deliberation. Both the 
described types of activity, — that in which the response is de- 
layed as well as that in which it is immediate — ^belong under 
the head of what Watson calls ''explicit behavior; but in the 
former case there is also another kind of not yet described 
behavior involved, which he denominates "implicit behavior. ^^ 
Explicit behavior consists in the visible activities of the larger 
muscles of the body, those activities which are "plainly ap- 
parent to direct observation," and may be either of the im- 
mediate or the delayed type : implicit behavior, which is called 
into being only when the response is delayed, consists in cer- 
tain imperceptible (to the outside observer, at least) internal 
muscular activities, "involving only the speech mechanisms" — 
especially, Watson thinks, the muscles of the larynx and the 
tongue. "Where explicit behavior is delayed (i.e., when de- 
liberation ensues), the intervening time between stimulus and 
response is given over to implicit behavior (to 'thought pro- 
cesses')." Up to the present time, it is true, experimentation 
and observation have reached only to the explicit type of be- 
havior, but it is the firm conviction of Dr. Watson that in 
course of time implicit behavior also will yield to the same 
"objective" methods of investigation. 

I attempt to indicate, in the subjoined table, Professor Wat- 
son's classification of types of behavior. The lines indicate 

22 v., op. cit., pp. 19 ff. 



36 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

that the mentalist's "unconscious" behavior is purely of the 
explicit type, but that the mentalist's "conscious" behavior in- 
cludes implicit and explicit activities. 

KINDS OF BEHAVIOR . 

Mentalist Behaviorist 

Classification Classification 

Unconscious or Mechanical Immediate Explicit 

Conscious or Psychomotor Delayed TmpHri> 

2y. Frosfs Behaviorism. — Professor Eliott P. Frost, for- 
merly of Yale University, has pronounced a behavioristic sys- 
tem of psychology, which, notwithstanding its unusually bar- 
barous terminology, is worthy of a brief description. His 
system actually antedates Watson's in its origin by a few 
months,^^ and is unique in that he still uses the terms "con- 
scious" and "awareness," though in a peculiar and purely 
physiological sense. 

"Any simple single sensorimotor path" through the nervous 
system from sense-organ to muscle Frost designates an 
"alpha-arc": such an arc is always aroused into activity by a 
peripheral stimulus and issues in some motor act or form of 
behavior (Watson's "immediate response"). "Whenever an 
alpha-arc functions so as to include the specific cortical struc- 
tures," additional nerve-cells are brought into activity, and 
"such a further arc, aroused by an alpha-arc rather than by a 
peripheral stimulus" (Watson's "delayed response") Frost 
calls a "beta-arc." "In brief, when a stimulus falls upon a 
sensitive neural mechanism, it will normally arouse an alpha- 
arc, and this alpha-arc may in turn arouse a beta-arc." 

To the functioning of either an alpha- or beta-arc the term 
"awareness" is applied, though in a pure physiological sense 
as noted above. We may speak of an alpha-arc as being 
"aware of the external stimulus" which initiated it, and of a 
beta-arc as "aware of the alpha-arc" which initiated it\ but 
no arc can be aware of "itself," and in no case does "aware- 
ness" involve "consciousness. 'J 
23 Psychological Review, May 1912. Watson's, same Review, March 1913. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 37 

Behavior is classified by Frost under the three categories of 
"preconsciousizing, consciousizing, and conseiousized be- 
havior." "Pre-consciousizing" behavior is the reflex, mechani- 
cal type; a "consciousizing process" is any nerve process 
which involves reference to some preceding nerve process 
rather than to some external stimulus; and "conseiousized" 
behavior is that which has become mechanical as the result of 
a number of "consciousizing" processes. A beta-arc-process 
is always a "consciousizing" process: an alpha-arc process is 
either "pre-consciousizing" (i.e., reflexes, alpha-arcs that have 
never become connected with beta-arcs) or "conseiousized" 
(i.e., habitual mechanisms, which originally involved beta- 
arcs also but no longer do). 

What the mentalist would call the experiencing of the color 
red is interpreted by Frost as follows : — The response of the 
retina to the ether vibrations produced by so-called red in- 
volves an alpha-arc, and gives the organism what may be 
called "red-awareness." "If this arc now an instant later 
arouses a consciousizing process (beta-arc) we get what we 
may call the 'sensation red'"; but what the mentalist calls 
"consciousness" is sufficiently accounted for in Frost's beha- 
vioristic system as merely beta-arc-functioning after the man- 
ner just described. 

The central problem of animal psychology, according to 
Frost, is not "are animals conscious? but, does their behavior 
indicate consciousizing"?; and the problems of human psy- 
chology become not, what kind of consciousness does such 
and such behavior express ? but, is such behavior pre-conscious- 
izing, consciousizing, or conseiousized? 

Except to note again the unfortunate complexity of this 
terminology, I shall say no more regarding the particular sys- 
tem of behaviorism formulated by Professor Frost, but pass 
at once to a general criticism of the behavioristic program. 

28. Criticism of the Behavioristic Program. — ^The mental- 
ist is usually quite willing to accept all that is really positive 
hi the behaviorist's program, but insists that nevertheless in 



38 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

addition to the proposed science of behavior there is also room 
for a science devoted to the study of mind or consciousness. 
There are undoubtedly persons whose temperament and tal- 
ents lead them naturally in the direction of the investigation 
of behavior as the most interesting field of inquiry, but there 
are as surely others "to whom mental process as mental pro- 
cess is the only fascinating and ultimately worthy subject 
of study" and who are therefore "not likely to rest content 
with any such program as that depicted" by Professor Wat- 
son and his followers. The mentalist "justly urges that to 
recognize and describe the external expressions of love, hate,, 
and anger," for example, "is as different from the actual 
experience of these thrilling emotions and from the descrip- 
tion of them as immediately felt, as is the inspection of a 
good meal from the consumption of the same." "Something 
corresponding to consciousness in its vague common meaning 
does exist," and if so there should be room for a science whose 
problems arise within the compass of such consciousness.^* 
The behaviorist may be satisfied, let us say, to understand the 
nerve processes which underlie and condition various forms of 
outward behavior in animals and men : the psychologist, how- 
ever, inevitably pushes his inquiry farther and asks, does the 
animal know that and why he is acting in such and such a 
way? does he remember having been in this particular place 
before? are human emotions merely organic sensations or 
something more? can / (not my nervous system with its 
"alpha" and "beta" arcs) be conscious of more than two or 
three objects at once? etc., etc. 

The first objection which the mentalist opposes to the be- 
haviorist's program, therefore, is that the concept of behavior 
— even that of "implicit behavior" — is inadequate to account 
for all that goes on between stimulus and reaction and to 
satisfy the scientific curiosity of mankind. Reflection inevita- 
bly shows that consciousness is different from behavior, that 
mental processes are different and distinguishable from their 

24Angell, Psychological Review, Vol. XX, pp. 267-269 (1913). 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 39 

physiological accompaniments and expressions and their ef- 
fects in the physical world ; and this being the case, there must 
inevitably be individuals in the world who' will wish to devote 
their entire attention to the study of those mental processes. 

In confirmation of the inadequacy of a purely materialistic 
program, Dr. Abbot has shown^^ the importance of mental 
content to behavior. Content, he tells us, "enters dynamically 
into the causal series of reactions that lead from sensation to 
behavior." Reaction to an optical stimulus, for example, dif- 
fers according to the content of the sensation, as when one is 
annoyed by the glare of a superfluous light in one's eyes and 
proceeds to put it out. In such a course of behavior the con- 
tent of the sensation (intense white light) determines the 
percept (that of an unnecessary and painfully glaring electric 
light shining into my eyes), the latter perceptual content de- 
termines the affection (a feeling of annoyance), the content 
of affection determines the impulse to put out the light, and 
the content of the impulse determines the action which fulfils 
it. 

Even biology, as we are reminded by Professor C. J. Her- 
rick,^® is an incomplete science with consciousness left out. 
"Possibly the new psychology may learn to get along without 
consciousness," he tells us, "but biology cannot do so." "The 
analysis of the behavior of both lower animals and men speaks 
unequivocally in favor of regarding consciousness as a positive 
biological factor in animal evolution." So long as there are 
biologists who believe in the reality and dynamic importance 
of consciousness, surely psychologists need not despair of the 
value and distinctiveness of their science ! 

One other point. Functionalism and behaviorism in psy- 
chology are both, from one point of view, the natural develop - 
ment of what is known as the "motor theory of conscious- 
ness," the central principle of which is that all consciousness is 
conditioned by motor activity — that consciousness is depen- 

25/owr. of PUl, Vol. XIV, pp. 41 ff. (1917)- 
26 /own of Phil, Vol. XII, pp. 543 ff. (1915). 



40 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

dent not only on the reception of some stimulus by a sense- 
organ and the conduction of the resultant nerve impulse on up 
to the brain, but on the further conduction of this impulse on 
to the muscle and its consequent response. A complete sen- 
sorimotor current through the nervous system is, according 
to this theory, essential to the appearance of consciousness, 
and if the motor channels are blocked there can be no con- 
sciousness. If this is so, it may well be that consciousness is 
merely a secondary by-product of nervous activity, and the 
distinctive study of mental phenomena quite superfluous and 
valueless. The theory is well criticised, however, by Profes- 
sor H. C. McComas,^^ who shows that there is no convincing 
experimental evidence for such a view, and that even the 
milder and quite innocuous but almost universally accepted 
dogma that all conscious processes express themselves in motor 
activity is far from proven. "No one will deny that there is 
a deep-seated tendency for the incoming impressions to go out 
into motor expressions ; but there is nothing more than a ten- 
dency/^ 

29. Behaviorism and the Mind-Body Problem. — I leave to 
the last the exposition and criticism of one of the most strik- 
ing arguments in favor of behaviorism and in derogation of 
consciousness as a separate factor in the life of the individual 
v/hich has yet appeared.^® The author is the same Dr. Abbot 
whose defence of the structural side of consciousness has al- 
ready twice been referred to (17, 28), and yet in this earlier 
published article of his we have what amounts to a modern 
adaptation of the materialism of a half-century ago. 

Mind, according to Dr. Abbot, is but a term for brain- 
functioning: as the function of the lungs is respiration, and 
the function of the legs is ambulation, so the function of the 
brain is cogitation. The individual thinks with his brain 
just as he walks with his legs, or breathes with his lungs. 
"We do not think of opposing or contrasting respiration or 

^''Psychological Reviem, Vol. XXIII, pp. 397 ff. (1916). 

28 Abbot, Psychological Review, Vol. XXIII, pp. 117 ff. (1916). 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 41 

running with lungs, legs, or body : neither should we" oppose 
or contrast mind with brain or body (dualism, 5). Nor, on 
the other hand, should we say that mind and brain are identi- 
cal, two aspects of the same reality (monism, 6), any more 
than we would say that respiration is identical with the lungs 
or running with the legs. Mind in short "is related to body as 
function or activity is related to structure." According to this 
view, then, instead of two kinds of psychology, structural and 
functional, psychology is the functional side of neurology and 
neurology the structural side of psychology. 

It would hardly be fair to call this materialism in the strict 
sense of that term, but its implications are certainly material- 
istic. In saying that thought is a function of the brain as 
respiration is a function of the lungs. Dr. Abbot is overlook- 
ing one important point. Respiration is a visible, audible, and 
even tangible activity, and the air respired a material sub- 
stance: both, therefore, are common objects of experience to 
all conscious beings, "objective" facts, observable with the 
senses, and therefore physical. Thought, on the contrary, is 
a purely individual, private, "subjective" phenomenon, and so 
not physical at all. The true "function" of the brain as neu- 
rology studies the latter is not thought or consciousness or 
"mind," but the coordination and central control of nerve- 
impulses from and to different parts of the nervous system, 
and these are as "objective" in their nature as breathing, run- 
ning, and all the rest. (Of. sects. 75-77, inf.) 

b. Behaviorism and Introspection 

30. It is customary to say that psychology uses the same 
method for the discovery of its facts as other sciences — 
namely, observation; but that psychological observation be- 
cause of the peculiar nature of metal facts is of two kinds, 
one distinctive of psychology — introspection, and the other an- 
alogous to the method used in the objective sciences — obser- 
vation of behavior, through which the underlying facts of 
consciousness are inferred. Furthermore, it is customary to 



42 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

add that observations in either form may be carried on under 
experimental conditions or non-experimentally, thus adding a 
third method, really preliminary to observation proper, — 
namely, experimentation. Of these three methods however, 
behaviorism rejects introspection as unscientific, and accepts 
only experiment and observation of behavior as the sole true 
psychological methods. Behaviorism's opposition to the 
mentalist view of psychology is really the result rather than 
the cause of its rejection of the introspective method: hence 
a critical study of that method, and an appreciation of its un- 
doubted difficulties, is essential to a thorough refutation of 
the behavioristic doctrine. 

31. The Nature of Introspection. — Introspection is most 
simply defined as the direct observation of one's own mental 
processes (Angell). It is direct observation (observation of 
the object of psychological interest directly) as opposed to the 
method of observation of behavior which is indirect as it is 
used by the psychologist. By this distinction I mean merely 
to emphasize the fact that when the biologist observes behavior 
he is interested in that behavior for its own sake, and the 
method is consequently for the biologist a method of direct 
observation ; but when the psychologist observes behavior he is 
doing so for the purpose of inferring therefrom the underlying 
mental conditions in which alone he is interested, hence for 
him introspection is the direct method of observing conscious- 
ness and observation of behavior is an indirect method of ob- 
serving (better, inferring) consciousness. 

The modern concept of introspection is the scientific suc- 
cessor of the historic pre-scientific doctrine of "the inner 
sense." According to this theory, which we shall meet with 
again in another connection (72) ^ just as there is an "outer 
sense," constituted of what we even today commonly call "the 
five senses," to make us aware of physical things, so there is 
also an "inner sense" by which we come to know the things of 
the mind. In this view, the world of knowledge falls into two 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 43 

distinct spheres, and the mind is endowed with two distinct 
organs by which to become conscious of them. 

That this doctrine of an inner sense added to the five outer 
senses is based upon a false though tempting analogy becomes 
evident, however, so soon as we inquire into the nature of such 
an interior faculty. To observe physical things we look at 
them, feel them, smell them, and in all possible ways bring 
them into contact with our bodily sense-organs — the objects 
are outside of me, and impress themselves upon me from 
without: in introspecting, on the contrary, the objects intro- 
spected are a part of myself — I think, / remember, I feel 
pleased, / will. There is in introspecting no intermediate 
organ between myself and the object of my knowledge, as in 
perceiving there is a sense-organ (the eye, the ear, etc.) be- 
tween myself and the physical object. The only resemblance 
between sense-perception and introspection, between "outer" 
and "inner sense," is that they both give us direct knowledge of 
their respective objects; but they do so in such different ways 
as to make the term "sense" entirely inapplicable to intro- 
spection. 

What, then, positively is introspection? It is a cognitive 
process of the form of thought or judgment — "reflection 
upon" experience. Cognition as a phase of consciousness in- 
cludes, let us say, both presentative (sensation and perception, 
"outer sense") and ideational processes; ideational processes 
are memory, imagination, and thought; thought includes the 
three logical or logic- ward processes of conception, judgment, 
and reasoning; one of the highest products of conception is 
the concept of the self, and one of the highest forms of think- 
ing that thinking about the self which we term self-conscious, 
ness. Without inquiring at this point into the nature of self- 
consciousness, we can at least recognize that without self- 
consciousness introspection is impossible: unless one has at- 
tained that step in intellectual development which we call 
self-consciousness, it is impossible for him to introspect. 

To introspect, then, is to reflect upon one's experience. To 



44 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

experience pain is to have impressed upon one's nervous sys- 
tem a stimulus of a specific nature : to introspect the sensation 
of pain is just to set that sensation in the foreground of con- 
sciousness, to recognize especially that it is a part of my ex- 
perience, to make this sensation something more than a sen- 
sation or presentation — namely, an object of judgment. To 
remember is to bring into consciousness some object or event 
which no longer exists in my actual experience, but which is 
recognized as having been at some previous time an object 
or event in my actual experience: to introspect a memory is 
to examine and analyze the image aroused in my mind by the 
act of recollection, and so to make this image not merely 
something experienced but something jtidged to be of such 
and such a nature. What I remember, then, is the object or 
event itself, but what I introspect is the image of that object 
or event in my present consciousness: just as in perception 
what I perceive is the physical object itself present in my en- 
vironment, but what I introspect is the experience produced 
in me by the presence of that object. 

Finally, in the affective and conative spheres the distinc- 
tion between having an experience and introspecting it is still 
more evident. Thus to *'have an emotion" is to "feel" angry, 
excited, pleased, or what not, while to introspect that emotion 
is to know J to "judge," that I have an emotion, and to inquire 
into the constitution of the emotional experience ; but to know 
that I have an emotion and to know what that involves is 
quite a different matter from merely experiencing emotion. 
In the same way to know that I am willing to perform a cer- 
tain action and to know what that willing-process involves is 
a quite different matter from the actual process of willing that 
action. In all these cases we have on the one hand, experience 
— conative, affective or cognitive — -and on the other hand, 
judgment about experience, which is as such always cognitive. 

Modern psychology substitutes for the old doctrine of two 
distinct organs of knowledge, one in the field of physical 
things and one in the field of psychology, the theory that the 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 45 

distinction between introspection and outward observation is 
one of point of view only. Introspection differs from ex- 
ternal observation, says Pillsbury,^^ only in the attitude of 
mind which we take toward the object of observation. When 
we observe a physical object, as a light, "the question in mind, 
expressed or implied, is as to what the object may be in itself 
or in relation to other objects. When we introspect, on the 
contrary, we ask what the experience means to us and what 
its relation may be to other mental processes. Exactly the 
same experience may, and usually does, furnish the starting- 
point for both." Thus, in the case of the light, if we are in- 
quiring what kind of a light it is, and what produces it, we are 
obser^ang objectively; but if we are interested in its effect 
upon us, or in knowing why we were attracted by it, the pro- 
cess is one of introspection. In the same way, we may add, 
with introspection of ideational, affective, and conative pro- 
cesses : so long as we are interested in the idea as true or false, 
in the emotional experience as needing expression, or the situ- 
ation which aroused the emotion as calling for an immediate 
response on the part of ourselves, or the willing as producing 
results in the outside world, introspection is lacking ; but when 
we become interested in the idea, the emotion, or the will-act 
as a phase of individual experience and in its relations to 
other experiences antecedent or consequent, the process be- 
comes by that very change of interest introspective. 

32. The Difficulties of Introspection. — From the very na- 
ture of introspection as thus educed certain serious difficulties 
inevitably follow, and it is chiefly on account of the apparent 
insuperability of these difficulties that behaviorists have been 
led to throw over the introspective method altogether. A 
closer examination of them will, however, it is hoped, show 
them to be after all not absolutely fatal — to be difficulties, in- 
deed, but by no means final obstacles to any use of introspec- 
tion or to the acceptance of consciousness as the legitimate 
subject-matter of psychology. 

29 Journal of Philosophy, I, 225-228. 



46 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(i) The chief objection offered to the method is that in- 
trospection being itself a mental process necessarily inter- 
feres with or alters the mental process which is being intro- 
spected. When I observe a physical phenomenon, as a bio- 
logical or chemical process, that process goes on quite inde- 
pendently of myself — I do not interfere with it, I merely 
watch it : in such a case there are two distinct processes going 
on in the world — the biological or chemical process in the 
outer object, and the observation and perception process in 
my own mind. When I introspect a mental process, on the 
contrary, as a memory or an emotion, there are two processes 
going on in my own experience — the mem^ory or the emotion 
itself, and the introspecting of that memory or emotion; and 
I cannot examine into such a process without by that very act 
interfering with, altering, or in some way modifying, that 
process. 

Many psychologists have called attention to this difficulty ;^*^ 
and unquestionably experience confirms their statements. As 
soon as I begin to ask myself "what am I doing when I per- 
ceive, remember, think, feel, or act," those processes are no 
longer what they were before. If I introspect memory or 
imagination, it is no longer memory or imagination only, but 
memory-thought-about or imagination-thought-about. In the 
affective and conative spheres, again, the difficulty becomes 
especially obvious : as soon as I begin to introspect an emotion 
or a volition, the emotion or volition tends at once to disap- 
pear. For example, if I am suddenly placed in a situation 
arousing an emotion of extreme terror, I am not likely to 
have presence of mind enough to stop and ejaculate — "See 
here! I am a psychologist, and as such am interested not in 
the object of my terror but in the terror experience itself. 
Now what is really going on in my mind as I pass through 
this singular and thrilling experience?" If I do so, the emo- 
tion itself will begin to die out as I start to examine it. So, 

30 F. Scripture, The New Psychology, 'Chap. I (especially pp. 8-10). 
Also almost any textbook of the "mentalist" schools. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 47 

if I am planning to carry out into action an important reso- 
lution, and stop to examine before the action takes place what 
is going on in my mind in the process of determining upon 
that action, the action itself will be delayed and the determin- 
ing-process come to an end. 

Another aspect of this same difficulty is brought out in the 
statement of Comte^^ that in introspection "the mental energy, 
instead of being concentrated is divided, and divided in two 
divergent directions. The state of mind observed, and the 
act of mind observing, are mutually in an inverse ratio; each 
tends to annihilate the other." "The mind in watching its 
own workings," says Stout,^^ "must necessarily have its atten- 
tion divided between two objects — on the one hand, the mental 
operation itself which is to be observed, and on the other, the 
object to which this mental operation is directed." 

The result of this is that "if the introspective effort is sus- 
tained and strenuous, it is apt to destroy the very object which 
it is examining. For, by concentrating attention on the sub- 
jective process, we withdraw it from the object of that process, 
and so arrest the process itself."^^ "In order to observe, your 
intellect must pause from activity; yet it is this very activity 
that you want to observe. If you cannot effect the pause, you 
cannot observe; if you do effect it, there is nothing to ob- 
serve."^* As James, in his usual graphic way, writes: "the 
attempt at introspective analysis" is "like seizing a spinning 
top to catch its motion, or trying to turn up the gas quick 
enough to see how the darkness looks. "^'^ 

The usual way of meeting this difficulty is to admit it and 
fall back upon what is called the "primary memory." We ob- 
serve mental processes, it is said, not at the instant they are 

3^ Quoted by Scripture, loc. cit. Comte's aspersions on introspective 
psychology in the first chapter of his Positive Philosophy, are singularly 
prophetic of recent behavioristic criticism. 

32 Manual of Psychology, pp. 44 f . 

33 Stout, loc. cit. 

3* Quoted from Comte, Scripture, loc. cit. 
35 Principles of Psychology, I, 243 f . 



48 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

going on, but immediately after, or just as the process is dy- 
ing away. The usual description of our consciousness of time 
helps us here: the moments of consciousness do not succeed 
one another as beads on a chain, or as drops of water falling 
from a poorly closed faucet (though James, in his later works, 
plainly intimates that they do)' — rather, the consciousness of 
passing time is a rhythmical succession of overlapping mo- 
ments, every new moment arising in consciousness while the 
preceding one is fading away. Thus moment B, the moment 
of the introspection process, observes moment A, the object of 
the introspection, before the latter has completely gone. 

It is often said that to adopt this explanation is to reject 
direct observation and substitute memory, or to identify intro- 
spection with retrospection, and so to subject our psychologi- 
cal knowledge to all the vagaries and defects of memory. 
"Unaided observation," says Scripture, "was crude enough; 
so-called 'reflection,' or introspection of memory, is still 
cruder." But the term "primary memory" which I have used 
in the above description is as much a misnomer as the term 
"after-image" : an after-image is not really an image at all, 
but a sensation persisting after the original stimulus has been 
removed, and should be properly termed an after-sensation — 
so "primary memory" is not really memory at all, but of the 
same nature as the "after-image" or after-sensation itself. To 
accept this explanation is not to deny that introspection has 
defects and is not always reliable, but merely to insist that 
this unreliability is not the unreliability of memory (which is 
notorious), but the lesser unreliability to which all observation, 
in physical as well as mental science, is subject. Most of the 
processes of physical nature can be observed while they are 
at their best, though this is not always the case, whereas it is 
an essential characteristic of psychological observation that 
the data can be observed only when they are fading away. 

Confirmation of this latter point is found in Pillsbury's de- 
fence of introspection.^^ It is obviously impossible, he says, 
^^ Loc. cit. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 49 

to maintain two opposite points of view at once — as, for ex- 
ample, that of introspection and that of external observa- 
tion. "You can no more introspect at the same time you [in 
the physical sense] observe than you can look at an animal at 
one and the same instant as a chemist and a biologist, or at a 
man as friend and as physician/' And this, he continues, "is 
all that can be meant when we say that it is impossible to 
introspect a process during its course," — the attitude of per- 
ceiving, feeling, etc., and the attitude of observing those pro- 
cesses, cannot be maintained at one and the same time. 

There is no harm, I think, in the common saying that intro- 
spection is always retrospection, provided we understand the 
term "retrospection" to include looking back upon what is 
passing away ("primary memory") as well as looking back 
upon what is past and has in the interval been forgotten (mem- 
ory in the true sense). If introspection were always of the 
latter type, we should have good cause perhaps to despair of 
its absolute value for science if not of its partial validity ;^^ 
whereas the fact that introspection is really retrospection in 
the first sense of the term gives us, on the contrary, excellent 
grounds for hope for the future of our science. 

As to the general objection we have been considering, that 
introspection as itself a mental process necessarily alters the 
facts which it observes, Scripture^^ has shown that the results 
of external observation are open to the same charge. "Intro- 
spection does distort things and lead to erroneous conclusions," 
he admits, "but so does all observation. The objections to in- 

37 Stout has shown (loc. cit.), furthermore, that even if introspection 
is always by means of memory in the strict sense of the term, we need 
not despair absolutely; for "by calling up a process in memory imme- 
diately after it is over" — or even, I should add, after a longer interval — 
"we are often able to notice much that escaped us when it was actually 
going on. In like manner the astronomer can call up in memory the 
image of a star which has just passed across his vision, and can then 
notice details which had escaped him at the moment of its actual appear- 
ance." 

38 Op. cit., pp. 10-12. 



50 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

trospection apply just as completely to physical or botanical 
observations as to psychological ones." In introspection we 
emphasize the process introspected, and thus distort it in rela- 
tion to everything else in the mind, but this is true also of ex- 
ternal observation: "whatever we pay attention to becomes a 
more prominent object than the rest of our experience." 'T 
observe the sparks from an electrical machine, or the flower in 
the field, and utterly overlook the machine itself, or the other 
plants in the field. — -If I wish to carefully observe the con- 
struction of the machine, I must neglect the spark; if I wish 
to study the tree, I neglect the flower. Likewise if I observe 
a memory, I overlook an emotion," and so give a more or less 
defective and distorted account of the former. But "these 
difliculties are inevitable in any science, they are necessary 
consequences of the method of observation," not restricted to 
the internal or introspective form of that method. 

(2) Two other objections to introspection remain to be 
briefly treated. The first of these, that introspection often 
leads to contradictory results, we need hardly but mention. 
Of course the same thing is true of external observation, 
unanimity among physical scientists beilng, only somewhat 
more common than among psychologists. Titchener names 
some interesting examples, and shows that the prospects for 
resolving present differences among psychologists as to some 
of the facts of their science are sufficient to bid us hope.^^ 
"No scientific method is infallible," and though the difficulties 
peculiar to the introspective method are more serious than 
those which mark the method of external observation, they 
are not fatal to the use of introspection altogether. 

(3) That which is superficially the most serious difficulty 
of all, however, — one which is chiefly responsible for the fre- 
quent contradictory results just referred to, and is essentially 
inherent in the very nature of introspection — has been stated 
most clearly by Watson and the behaviorists. It is the fact 
that introspection is essentially an individual method, and 

^^ American Journal of Psychology, XXIII, 436-439. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 51 

each psychologist can introspect only his own mental processes. 
Psychology, as it "is generally thought of/' says Professor 
Watson, "has something esoteric in its methods. If you fail 
to reproduce my findings it is not due to some fault in your 
apparatus or the control of your stimuli, but it is due to the 
fact that your introspection is untrained. The attack is made 
upon the observer, and not upon the experimental setting."*^ 

But the very statement of the difficulty contains within itself 
its own criticism. Professor Watson, being an experimental- 
ist solely, assumes that the only fit "apparatus" for a psycholo- 
gist is a laboratory apparatus ; but it has already been empha- 
sized (30) that experimentation, whether within or without 
a laboratory building, can never be anything more than a pre- 
liminary or assistant to observation, and that the true labora- 
tory of the psychologist is his own mind. Introspection is 
the psychologist's "apparatus," as his mind is his laboratory : 
"if you fail to reproduce my findings, it" is "due to some fault 
in your apparatus" (namely, in your introspection^ — or, of 
course, as is quite as likely to be the case, in mine). So, as 
tc the last sentence quoted, the observer's mind is the central 
object of experiment in psychology, and when an "attack is 
made upon the observer" it is made upon the central part of 
the experiment, whether or not the "setting" is also attacked. 

As to the charge of esotericism, it rests upon a confusion be- 
tween what is esoteric or secret and what is merely individual. 
The "esoteric" is that which is restricted to a select few, but 
introspection is a method open to all: the materials of intro- 
spection are individual, but the use of those materials is po- 
tentially universal. Of course, introspection of one individual 
mind by that same one individual would be quite useless — the 
findings of every individual introspector must be supplemented 
by collaboration with other introspectors. As Stout puts it, 
"introspection, to be effective for the advancement of science, 
must, like other modes of observation, be carried on by a 

*o Behavior, pp. 6 f . 



52 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

number of experts in cooperation. Each must communicate 
to the rest his own results, for confirmation or rejection."*^ 

Hence, in conclusion, we may state that whereas introspec- 
tion is undoubtedly full of difficulties, the difficulties are not 
after all so much greater than those that characterize the out- 
ward type of observation, and are in no sense insuperable: 
they justify the supplementation of introspection by other 
methods (as indirect observation through observation of be- 
havior), but not the rejection of the introspective method 
altogether as the behaviorists would insist.*^ Further and 
positive defence of introspection may well be left to another 
section. 

33. The Necessity and Limitations of Introspection. — Not- 
withstanding its difficulties, introspection is the only method 
by which mental processes can be observed, and if we are to 
have a psychology of consciousness as distinguished from a 
"psychology^" of behavior we must use that method, faulty 
as it is. The fact of its defectiveness adds to the difficulty of 
psychology, but does not make such a science impossible. 

Then the fact that "radical functionalists," who insist with 
the behaviorists that the true subject-matter of psychology is 
behavior and not consciousness, nevertheless accept the intro- 
spective method ; and that even biologists admit its usefulness ; 
affords the half -sceptical and half -believing mentalist con- 
siderable cheer. Thus Pillsbury tells us that "to give over 
introspection altogether is to abandon the method that has 
given much if not most of the body of knowledge that we have 
at present, and to insist that we use only a method that has 

41 op. cit., pp. 45 f • 

*2 Says Professor Stratton {Experimental Psychology and Culture, p. 
3, note) : The "fugitive character of many of our mental states has often 
been pointed to in proof of the impossibility of introspection. The truth 
of course is, that only by means of introspection do we know that our 
mental processes are changeable and elusive. It is curious that when 
critics make such short work of self-observation as a psychological 
method, they do not see that most of the facts they bring forth as evi- 
dence of its fundamental inadequacy are obtained only by this very self- 
observation." 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 53 

so far been little tried/' and which has in many eases "when 
tested proved relatively futile";*^ and Herrick assures us that 
"conscious processes are biological realities which cannot be 
ignored in a comprehensive scheme of things, and the biol- 
ogist can see no reason why they should not be observed in 
the only way open to him — namely, by introspection."** 

But to insist on the necessity of introspection is by no means 
to deny that the method has obvious limitations. ( i ) In the 
first place, it is purely a descriptive and in no sense an ex- 
planatory method. "Introspection can never give us a system 
of psychology. . . . Introspection is psychological observation; 
and observation is a way of getting facts, . . . data, materials of 
science."*^ "The data of introspection are never themselves 
explanatory; they tell us nothing of mental causation, or of 
physiological dependence, or of genetic derivation. The ideal 
introspective report is an accurate description, made in the in- 
terests of psychology, of some conscious process. Causation, 
dependence, development are then matters of inference."*® 

Titchener thinks, however, that introspection is still further 
limited — namely, to the structural facts — and has no func- 
tional value. "We cannot observe an experiencing; we are 
not called upon, in psychology, to observe an experienced; 
what we observe is experience."*^ Though Titchener does not 
in so many words limit introspection to structure as opposed 
to function, and though his terminology is ambiguous,*^ the 
limitation is there. Pillsbury, on the contrary, limits intro- 
spection to functional facts. "The real subject-matter of psy- 
chology is the fact that we attain conclusions, that we per- 
ceive distance, that we are prepared to act, rather than the 
imagery, or the movements that accompany, precede, or suc- 

^^ Science, XLI, 378 (1915). 

^^ Journal of Philosophy, XII, 547 (1915). 

*5 Titchener, op. cit., 447. 

*6 Op. cit, 486. 

47 Op. cit., 498. 

48 He uses the term "content-process" in a purely structural sense. 



54 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

ceed."*® In this sentence, Pillsbury rules out at once struc- 
turalism ("imagery") on the one hand and behaviorism 
("movements") on the other: what we discover through intro- 
spection, he thinks, is the facts that we perceive, attain con- 
clusions, etc., — and these are functional phenomena — not the 
structural products (percepts, conclusions, etc.) or motor ex- 
pressions of these processes. 

In reality, analysis of the introspective method as we have 
already attempted it gives no countenance to the theory that 
either structural or functional facts are the more difficult: if 
we avoid the errors and guard ourselves against the difficul- 
ties inherent in the nature of introspection as such, we will 
find mental structure and mental function — "experiencing," 
as well as "experience," images and percepts as well as reason- 
ing and perceiving — equally open to observation. And, fur- 
thermore, if we accept the program of reconciliation between 
structuralism and functionalism already set forth (23), ap- 
plication of the introspective method to both the structural 
and functional sides of mind becomes not merely valid but 
imperative. 

Introspection, then, is a purely descriptive method — a 
method of observation and discovery — ^but it is of universal 
applicability throughout the field of mental phenomena. There 
is a further limitation to the universality of introspection as a 
descriptive method, however: (2) introspection is unlimited in 
the scope of its applicability, within the field of description as 
distinguished from that of explanation, but within that field it 
is necessarily incomplete, in the sense that its findings must be 
supplemented- — not merely the findings of the individual intro- 
spector by the collaboration of other introspections, but the 
findings of all introspectors by use of the two auxiliary meth- 
ods of observation of behavior and experiment. Introspec- 
tion is the central and distinctive psychological method, but 
can only meet with well-deserved ridicule and scorn if it claims 
for itself a monopoly or insists on its all-sufficiency, to the ex- 

^^Loc. cit 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 55 

elusion of the other auxiliary methods. Between the exalta- 
tion of introspection and the contemptuous rejection of any 
assistance from the experimentalist and the biologist on the 
one hand, and the equally contemptuous rejection of introspec- 
tion altogether on the other, there is a happy middle course 
which consists in admitting the central and unique place of 
introspection as the psychological method, and yet recogniz- 
ing the auxiliary and supplementing value of external obser- 
vation and experimentation. 

"No one method is complete in itself," says Pillsbury,^^ and 
with his words we may conclude our lengthy study of intro- 
spection. Introspection must be supplemented by external ob- 
servation and experiment if description is to be complete, and 
description itself must be supplemented by explanation if 
scientific curiosity is to be completely satisfied, and the method 
of explanation in science is inductive inference. "To obser- 
vation, direct and indirect — we add induction as the necessary 
method of psychological science."^^ And in a complete science 
of psychology all four methods are used — introspection, ob- 
servation of behavior, experimentation, and inference — "no 
matter to what school the investigator belongs. "^^ 

c. Conclusions 

34. Reconciliation of Behaviorism and Mentalism. — In our 
criticisms of structuralism and functionalism we insisted that 
for a complete understanding of mental life a combination of 
both structural and functional points of view is essential: in 
the same way now, in criticism of the narrow behavioristic 
position, I should insist that if our understanding of human 
behavior is to be complete the "objective" and "subjective" 
points of view must be combined. To the behaviorist, as we 
have seen, behavior is a purely objective or physiological af- 

50 Op cit, 379. 

51 Ladd — Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 24 f. (Quoted by 
Titchener, op cit., 447.) 

52 Pillsbury, loc. cit, .^ 



56 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

fair; to the mentalist, consciousness is too often a self-sufficient 
object of interest in the human economy : a comprehensive view 
of human life, however, must find room for both conscious- 
ness and behavior — or, if you will, subjective and objective 
behavior. We criticise the behaviorist not merely for his 
scornful attitude toward the older psychology, but also for his 
narrow conception of behavior^ — for presuming to think that 
human life or behavior can be explained in purely objective 
or physiological terms. Mentalistic psychology does not, or at 
least should not, claim to be an all-sufficient science of human 
behavior, but only a science of that part of human nature 
which we call psychical; but behaviorism does make such a 
claim, and therein lies its error. 

In support of my general contention, I again quote Profes- 
sor Herrick. "It is a legitimate scientific procedure," he says, 
"to isolate for experimental purposes any phenomena from 
their setting, providing that in the end the corresponding syn- 
thesis is affected." So, "while it is possible and legitimate to 
neglect consciousness in any particular programme of the 
study of behavior, it is both inexpedient and unscientific to 
eliminate the introspective method from the behavioristic pro- 
gramme as a whole. On the other hand, it is equally mischie- 
vous to assume that because certain useful generalizations can 
be drawn from a purely introspective study of consciousness, 
therefore behavior can be neglected in the psychologist's pro- 
gramme as a whole." If psychology is to maintain its place 
among the sciences, it must not isolate itself from the rest of 
natural process by limiting its interest to pure introspection or 
to purely objective behavior."^* 

53 Herrick, op. cit., pp. 549-551. While indorsing these words in their 
main contention, I do believe, as it is one of the main objects of this work 
to demonstrate, that it is perfectly possible to have an "independent psy- 
chology" which ignores physiology and objective behavior, just as it is 
perfectly possible to have a physiology or a biology which ignores con- 
sciousness. Dr. Herrick's main point, I take it, is that either of these 
sciences is incomplete as a study of man as a whole, and in this I am 
heartily in agreement with him. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 57 

It makes no essential difference whether we consider con- 
sciousness a form of behavior — ''subjective," as distinguished 
irom "objective" or physiological, behavior; or whether, as 
seems to me generally better from the point of view of clear- 
ness of language, we restrict the term behavior to the objec- 
tive type as the expression of consciousness. Neither does it 
make any essential difference whether we restrict psychology 
entirely to the field of consciousness, and create a new science 
for the study of objective behavior, and a new one again for 
the study of human behavior in its unity as botfi mental and 
physiological; or whether we use the term psychology to 
cover the entire field. Professor Herrick would seem to favor 
the latter usage — behavior must not be neglected in the psy- 
chologist's programme, psychology must not limit its interest 
either to pure consciousness or to objective behavior. Pro- 
fessor Harvey Carr^* also urges this extension of the term, 
proposing ''the somewhat unorthodox view that the mental 
functions with which psychology concerns itself are in reality 
psychophysical, — and that psychology should study and at- 
tempt to comprehend these functions in their entirety," thus 
including "within its domain activities which lie outside the 
field of consciousness." Such a view, he thinks, "offers a 
mediating point of contact for the two extremes of subjectiv- 
ism and behaviorism." 

To the present writer, on the contrary, it would seem far 
better to follow the other terminology proposed above — 
namely, to make "psychology" mean what it says it does, "the 
science of mind," but to admit the need of a science of ob- 
jective behavior and also of a science of "behavior" in the 
broadest sense of that term (subjective and objective). The 
two sides of man's nature may be distinguished for the pur- 
pose of specialization, yielding the distinct special sciences of 
consciousness (psychology) and of behavior; but they must 
be united again for the purpose of comprehensiveness, and a 
science which will consider them in their mutual relations is 

^^Psychological Review, XXIV, 181 ff (1917). 



58 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

imperatively called for.^^ A consideration of the problem of 
the relations of these various sciences having to do with hu- 
man behavior to one another and to the biological sciences in 
general will be undertaken at this point. 

35. Behaviorism and the Biological Sciences. — Most critics 
of the behaviorist program will be willing, I think, to accept 
the statement that to deny behaviorism in psychology is not 
to deny that there is a perfectly valid place in the world for 
a new "science of behavior," but only to deny that such a 
science may probably be called psychology. To designate the 
proposed new science, the term "praxiology" has been sug- 
gested by Mercier and by Dunlap; and if we are interested in 
connecting the science of human behavior with the study of 
the behavior of the lower organisms, the term "tropology" 
might well be considered. In delimiting the field of psychol- 
ogy from that of physiology, McDougall asserts that "physi- 
ology investigates the processes of the parts or organs of 
which any organism is composed, while psychology investi- 
gates the activities of the organism as a whole — that is, those 
in which it operates as a whole or unit";"^ and substituting 
the term "praxiology," or any other agreed upon, for "psy- 
chology," we may indorse this statement in our delimitation 
of the new science of behavior. But wherein lies the distinc- 
tion between praxiology thus defined and the older science of 
biology? In answering this question we shall find it useful to 
distinguish "biology" proper from the "biological sciences" in 
general, first inquiring as to what the former term covers, 
and then into the relations between it and the other sciences 
of the general group. 

Biology, the science of life or of living things, is commonly 
divided in two ways : first into morphology, the science of the 
forms or structure of living things, and physiology, the science 
of the activities of living things and the functions of their 

55 C/., A. H. Jones, Journal of Philosophy, XII, 462 ff. (1915), espe- 
cially p. 471, 

56 Psychology the Science of Behavior, p. 35. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 59 

various parts; secondly, into botany, the science of plant life, 
and zoology, the science of animal life. A fifth division, 
hiogeny or genetics, has to do with the problems of the origin 
of life and the development of living things, and includes the 
two subdivisions — phylogeny, the science of the origin and 
development of species, and ontogeny^ the science of the ori- 
gin and development of individual organisms. 

In addition to these there are three other well-organized 
and highly important sciences whose relation to and intercon- 
nection with biology are so close as to make some general 
grouping inclusive of them all a desideratum — namely, an- 
thropology, psychology, and sociology. Anthropology is un- 
doubtedly a biological science, in that it has to do with that 
most highly developed of all "living things,'' man; and yet it 
is an extension rather than a division of biology. Psychology 
also is a biological science, for it has to do with mental life; 
and all that the mentalist insists upon in opposition to the bc- 
haviorist is that mental life is distinct from physical life, and 
therefore that psychology cannot fairly be regarded as a 
branch of biology in the strict sense of the latter term. Sociol- 
ogy, finally, is the science of social life, and so in the broadest 
sense a biological science, though not a branch of biology 
proper. Furthermore, whereas psychology, as we have been 
contending, is a purely mental science ; man being at the same 
time both mind and body, and society having at the same time 
mental and physical factors, anthropology and sociology have 
affiliations at once with psychology on the one hand and bi- 
ology on the other. 

And now, what is to be done with praxiology, our new 
science of behavior? Physiology was defined incidentally 
above as "the science of the activities of living things and the 
functions of their various parts," but an examination of the 
definition easily discloses its dual nature, although it is only 
recently, as a result of the agitation of the behaviorists, that 
this fact has been widely recognized. The definition, that is to 
say, includes two distinct subjects of investigation — (i) the 



6o THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

functions and activities of the various organs of an organism 
in their relation to one another, the subject-matter of physi- 
ology proper; and (2) the activities of the organism as a whole 
in its relation to its environment, the subject-matter of praxi- 
ology. This distinction is on the lines of that of Professor 
McDougall recorded above, and our only quarrel with him 
is with regard to his confusion of praxiology with psychology. 
Praxiology, then, is to be thought of as a third division of 
biology, according to the first principle of division of that 
science as cited above, and as such coordinate with morphol- 
ogy and physiology. 

But we are not yet quite through with our list of biological 
sciences. It was said above (34) that though the two sides 
of man's nature, mental and physical, may be studied sepa- 
rately, as by psychology and praxiology respectively, never- 
theless '*a science which will consider them in their mutual 
relations is imperatively called for." Such a science has al- 
ready been established and a journal devoted to its progress 
started, by Dunlap and others under the name of ''Psycho- 
biology"^'^ Psychobiology, therefore, is devoted to a compre- 
hensive study of behavior in all its aspects, and covers the 
grounds to which the sciences of psychology and biology 
(especially in its divisions of praxiology) separately devote 
themselves. 

Just one more word and I am through with this part of 
our subject. There may be some who will demur at our sharp 
separation of psychology as a purely mental science and prax- 
iology as a purely physical one, and will insist that any genu- 
ine study of behavior must include all its factors. But let any 
such consider the situation in other fields. The interrelation 
between mental and physical factors in behavior can hardly be 
closer than that between the chemical and the physiological 
processes involved in digestion, for example, and is certainly 
not less intimate than the relation which subsists throughout 

5'^ Now consolidated with another review under the name, Journal of 
Comparative Psychology. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 6i 

the organic world between the structure and the activities of 
organisms; and yet chemistry, and even morphology, are ad- 
mitted as sciences having an independent field from that of 
physiology. The distinction between structural and functional 
psychology is analogous to that between morphological and 
physiological biology, and the distinction between psychology 
and praxiology is analogous to that between physiology — or, 
still better, physics — and chemistry. Just as we have distinct 
sciences of physics and chemistry, and a compound science of 
physical chemistry to investigate the ground common to both ; 
and separate sciences of psychology and physiology, with their 
fields combined in physiological psychology; so we may fitly 
have separate and independent sciences of psychology and 
praxiology, and a compound science of psychobiology to study 
the complex behavior of the psychophysiological organism in 
all its phases. In all these cases, the distinctions are for the 
purpose of specialization and the combinations for this pur- 
pose of comprehensiveness, according to the principle asserted 
at the close of the preceding section (34). Behaviorists would 
admit praxiology only to the ranks of the sciences, and reject 
psychology, thus leaving no room for psychobiology; Profes- 
sor Carr (34) would identify psychology with psychobiology, 
thus denying to psychologists the right to specialize in the 
purely mental aspect of human behavior; the view we have 
been defending would give equal right to all phases of the 
general problem. 

In the appended table I have endeavored to summarize the 
above contentions as to the biological sciences and their rela- 
tionships {v. p. 62). 

36. Behaviorism and Psychology. — Now, in bringing to a 
close at last this lengthy, and I fear tedious, exposition and 
criticism of behaviorism, what final estimate are we to give as 
to its place in the world of scientific theory and its probable 
influence on the psychology of the future? Three things, 
I think :— 

( I ) In the first place, as was said in the beginning of the 



62 



THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



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THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 63 

previous section, however high an estimate we may place upon 
the new science of behavior, in any case it is not psychology. 
Scientific psychology as the mentalist views it may be impos- 
sible; but if so we shall have to give it up altogether — "prax- 
iology" is neither identical with it, nor yet an adequate substi- 
tute for it. 

It would be impossible to improve upon what Mr. Henry 
Rutgers Marshall has said upon this point,^® and I therefore 
quote from him at length without apology. "I am ready,** he 
says, "to agree most heartily that such men as Professor 
Thorndike and Professor Watson are engaged in founding a 
new science of behavior which not only promises important re- 
sults, but which is already giving us points of view which are 
most significant — I can readily see, also, that men of a cer- 
tain temperament who have begun as, and who still call them- 
selves, psychologists may become dissatisfied with the slow 
advance made in this field, and may itei it best to abandon it, 
and to undertake the investigation of behavior in which their 
special talents will yield more immediate effective result. But 
it seems to me that the identification of this study of be- 
havior with psychology involves an astounding confusion of 
thought. 

"The study of behavior is a thoroughly objective science; 
just as thoroughly objective as the studies of anatomy or 
physiology. That there are . . . existences of the mental order 
type . . . can, however, not be questioned ; nor can it be ques- 
tioned that it is quite natural, and presumably legitimate, to 
group these existences together in what we thus call the mental 
order. And this is what has been for a long time described as 
the study of psychology. 

"Now it is open to anyone to hold that this study is futile 
and unimportant. That is a matter of opinion ; which we can- 
not feel to be well-grounded, however, when we consider the 
long array of masterful thinkers who have not considered the 
study of psychology, as thus defined, to be either futile or 

^^ Journal of Philosophy, X, 715 (1913). 



64 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

unimportant. But to hold that the science of behavior is 
really what psychology ought to aim to develop seems to me 
to be a thoroughly unwarranted view, and one which must 
lead to serious loss to both psychology and the new, and very 
evidently valuable study of behavior." 

(2) My second and third points may be more briefly stated. 
And the former of these is that the behaviorist movement has 
a positive significance for psychology. As a refutation of the 
older concepts it is, I should insist, a failure^ — it has not suc- 
ceeded and will not succeed in destroying psychology, but it 
has succeeded in putting psychologists on the defensive. It 
has above all the value of a challenge to psychologists of the 
older schools to arouse themselves to stronger efforts in de- 
fense of their position. It has thus performed a real service — 
not only for biology, in showing that there is a need in the 
world for a new special science of behavior — ^but also for 
psychology, in forcing it to defend itself against the charge 
that it cannot be a true science so long as it takes mind rather 
than behavior for its field of investigation. Too long have 
psychologists taken for granted that the subjective phenomena 
of mental life could be studied scientifically as properly as the 
objective phenomena of behavior, but no longer may they as- 
sume this without apology; behaviorist criticism has shown 
that this claim is at least open to question, and has left to the 
mentalist the task of reviewing his forces and defending his 
position. And such a challenge and attack is sure to be of 
positive benefit to psychology. 

(3) After all, the underlying motive of the behaviorist 
movement is not so much a logical criticism of the foundations 
of the mentalist psychology as it is despair of its fruit fulness. 
Professor Watson warns us "that two hundred years from 
now, unless the introspection method is discarded, psychology 
will still be divided on the question as to whether auditory 
sensations have a quality of ^extension,' whether intensity is 
an attribute which can be applied to color, whether there is a 
difference in 'texture' between image and sensation; and upon 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 65 

hundreds of others of like character."^® Possible, we reply; 
but still we hope that long before that time many, if not all, 
of these problems will have found their solution. And this 
is our final point : we cannot rest our defense of mentalism on 
a priori grounds alone. Psychology is a new science, and the 
problems referred to above are among its newest problems, 
and yet the advance made through the despised introspective 
method in the last fifty years is in itself impressive and an 
earnest of hope for the future. We can, then, but go on un- 
waveringly, making the most of our imperfect methods be- 
cause we know that we can make no progress whatever with- 
out them, and having done this in a spirit of hope instead of 
despair, accept the issue. 

REFERENCES 

The Distinction of Content and Process 
Dunlap, System, pp. 7-14. 
Abbot, Jour, of Philosophy, etc.: XIV, 41 ff. (1917). 

Current Concepts — 

Calkins, First Book: pp. 273-276. 

" Jour, of Philosophy, etc.: IV, 673 ff. (1907). 

Relations of Structured and Functional Psychology — 

T'ltchener, Philosophical Rev.: VII, 449 if. (1898). (From 

the structural point of view.) 
Angell, Philosophical Rev.: XII, 243 ff . ; especially pp. 243- 
252 (1903). (From the functional point of view.) 

Structuralism — 

Caldwell, Psychological Rev.: V, 401 ff. (1898). 

" VI, 187 ff. (1899). 
Titchener, Philosophical Rev.: VIII, 290 ff. (1899). 
Calkins, Jour, of Philosophy, etc.: IV, 678-680 (1907). 
Calkins, First Book: pp. 273 f. 

FunctionaUsm — 

Calkins, First Bovk: pp. 274-276. 

Calkins, Jour, of Philosophy, etc.: IV, 680-683 (1907). 
Angell, Psychological Rev.: XIV, 63 ff. (1907). 
Herrick, Jour, of Philosophy, etc.: XII, 543 ff. (1915). 

^^ Behavior, p. 8. 



66 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Motor Theory of Consciousness 
Dewey, Psychological Rev.: Ill, 357 ff. (1896). 
Miinsterberg, Psych, and Life: pp. 35-99 ; especially pp. 93-99. 

" Psych. General and Applied: pp. 139-144. 

Criticism by McComas, Psychological Rev.: XXIII, 3075. 
(1916). 

Radical School 
Kirkpatrick, Jour, of Philosophy, etc.: IV, 542 if . (1907). 
Pillsbury, Science: XLI, 371 ff. (1915). 
Tawney, Jour, of Philosophy, etc.: XII, 29 ff. (1915). 

Behaviorism — 

Watson, Behavior: Ch. I, 

Psychological Rev.: XXIV, 329 S, (1917). 
Holt, The Freudian Wish: Ch. II, and Supplement. 
Sidis, Foundations: Ch. VI. 
Frost, Psychological Rev.: XIX, 246 ff. (1912). 

" Jour, of Philosophy, etc.: X, 716 ff. (1913). 

" Psychological Rev.: XXI, 204 ff. (1914). 
Bode, Psychological Rev. : XXI, 46 ff . ( 1914) . 

" Jour, of Philosophy: XIV, 288 ff. (1917). 
Bawden, Psychological Rev.: XXV, 171 ff. (1918). 
Bbbot, Psychological Rev.: XXIII, ii7ff. (1916). 
Weiss, Psychological Rev.: XXIV, 301 ff., 353 ff. (1917). 

Criticisms 
Yerkes, Jour, of Philosophy: VII, 113 ff. (criticism of the 

general biological point of view. 1910). 
Angell, Psychological Rev.: XX, 255 ff. (1913). 
Marshall, Jour, of Philosophy: X, 710 ff. (1913). 
" " " XV, 258ff. (1918). 

Reply by Bode: Op. cit., pp. 449 ff. 
" Weiss: Op. cit., pp. 631 ff. 
Mind: XXIII, 180 ff. (1914). 
Herrick, Jour, of Philosophy: XII, 543 ff. (1915). 
MeComas, Psychological Rev.: XXIII, 397 ff. (1916). 
Muscio, Monist, XXXI, pp. i82ff. (1921). 

Books and Articles on the Science of Human Behavior 
("Praxiology") 

Parmelee, The Science of Human Behavior. 

Meyer, Fundamental Laws of Human Behavior. 

Watson, Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist. 

Paton, Human Behavior. 

Yerkes, Science: XXXIX, 625 ff. (1914). 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY ^j 

Carr, Psychological Rev.: XXIV, i8i ff. (1917). 
Kantor, Psychological Rev.: XXVI, i ff. (1919). 

The Problem of Introspection — 

History 
Klemm: pp. 69-87, 212-215. 

Criticisms 
Watson, Behavior (especially, Ch. I). 
Dodge, Amer. Jour, of Psychology: XXIII, 214 ff. (1912). 
Dunlap, Psychological Rev.: XIX, 404 ff. (1912). 
Bode, Jour, of Philosophy: X, 85 ff. (1913). 

Defences 
Scripture, The New Psychology: Ch. I. 
Pillsbury, Jour, of Philosophy: I, 225 ff. (1904). 
Titchener, Amer. Jour, of Psychology: XXIII, 427 ff., 485 ff. 

(1912). 
Calkins, Amer. Jour, of Psychology: XXVI, 499-505 (1915). 
Pepper, Amer. Jour, of Psychology: XXIX, 208 ff. (1918). 
Laird, Mind: XXVIII, 385 ff. (1919). 



CHAPTER III 

Current Concepts of Psychology, Continued 

I. Self -Psychology 

a. Statement and Defence of the Principle 
37. At the opposite extreme from behaviorism are to be 
found those psychologists whose typical definition is that Psy- 
chology is the science of the self. This is the most conserva- 
tive school, since it represents the least possible divergence 
from the older and purely philosophical conception of psy- 
chology. The theologico-philosophical term "soul" is dis- 
carded, and the term "mind," together with all others which 
specifically limit psychology to the field of "mental processes" 
or "states," are regarded as inadequate. The doughtiest 
champion of this view is Professor Mary Whiton Calkins of 
Wellesley College, and I shall draw my summary of its prin- 
ciples entirely from her writings; but a similar general posi- 
tion has been defended also by many other psychologists — as 
Franz Brentano, G. F. Stout, J. M. Baldwin, Joseph Royce, 
James Ward, J. E. Creighton, and C. H. Judd. In fact, until 
the time of the differentiation of the various contemporary 
schools toward the close of the last century all psychologists 
were self -psychologists, and it is only in recent years that 
their position has been questioned at all. 

Over against the view "that the basal fact of psychology is 
the psychic event" — the mental process or content — and "that 
a self is a mere series or system of such psychic events," Miss 
Calkins insists that the basal fact of psychology is the con- 
scious self, meaning by self "what the plain man means by 
self, insofar as this does not involve the view that body con- 
stitutes part of a self."^ All experience, she observes, is the 
'^Psychological Review, XIII, 63 f. (1906). 

68 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 69 

experience of some self, and is meaningless apart from that 
self — or, as William James puts it, "every 'state' or 'thought' 
is part of a personal consciousness" :^ any attempt, therefore, 
to study experiences in abstraction from the self to which they 
properly belong is certain to result in a false or distorted 
psychology. 

Miss Calkins defends her position first negatively, by dem- 
onstrating the inadequacy of the structuralist and functional- 
ist concepts, and then on positive grounds; and we shall in 
what follows observe the same order. 

38. Inadequacy of Structuralism and Functionalism. — Miss 
Calkins denominjates structuralism "idea psychology," and 
criticises it on the ground that "it arbitrarily neglects a part 
of our immediate consciousness," and "offers an inadequate 
description of consciousness."^ "I cannot be conscious of an 
idea [i.e., of any mental content] except as idea of a self. . . . 
If, therefore, I define psychology as science of ideas, I raise 
the inevitable question, 'whose idea?' and then refuse arbi- 
trarily to answer the question." "The 'idea' is immediately 
experienced as idea of a self, or subject, mind, ego — call it 
as one will. To refuse to deal with this self is indeed theo- 
retically possible, but it is a needlessly abstract, an artificial, 
an incomplete procedure."* Hence the program of structural- 
ism is inadequate and must be rejected. 

So, too, with functionalism. "This doctrine is not so clearly 
cut nor so precisely formulated as that of idea-psychology, 
for the word 'function' is used with different shades of mean- 
ing by different writers of this group"; but "common to all 
'functional' theories is the conception of function as activity." 
I cannot, however, "study mental functions without at the 
same time studying the functioning self. For just as the study 
of ideas raises the unavoidable question, 'whose idea?' so the 
consideration of mental functions involves the question, 'func- 

^ Psychology, Briefer Course, 152. 
^ First Book in Psychology, 273 f. 
^Journal of Philosophy, etc., IV, 678. 



70 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

tions of whom?' To define psychology as science of mental 
functions without referring the functions to the functioning 
self, is therefore, an entirely artificial proceeding."^ 

39. Positive Considerations. — Miss Calkins rests her posi- 
tive defense of her doctrine of psychology on the testimony of 
introspection to the universality of self-consciousness.® "I 
cannot be conscious of an idea except as idea of a self; im- 
plicitly, if not explicitly, I am always conscious of a self, as 
having the idea or experience.'"' "There is no consciousness 
which is not self -consciousness." The self-consciousness of 
the baby, the sleepy adult, or the animal, to be sure, is a vague 
and unreflective sel f -consciousness ; "but anything less than 
self -consciousness would not be consciousness at all: to be 
conscious is to be conscious of a conscious self."^ Even the 
trained psychologists who deny consciousness of the self im- 
plicitly assert it, and "constantly describe and define conscious- 
ness in terms of the self or I."^ 

If all this is true, then, of course for psychologists to ignore 
the self is to leave their science incomplete and weakened at 
a vital point. 

40. The Nature of the Psychologist's Self. — But what does 
the psychologist mean by "the self as basal fact in psychology? 
Two answers have been offered to this question. "The first 
identifies the self — ^with the psychophysical organism — in a 
word, it conceives the self as mind-in-body or mind-plus-body : 
according to this view, body constitutes part of self. The sec- 
ond theory conceives of self as not inclusive of body : accord- 
ing to this view, body is not part of self, though it may well 
be regarded as closely related to self. On the basis of these 

5 First Book, 274 f . 

« op. cit., 278 f. 

7 Op. cit., 274. 

^Psychological Review, XIII, 67 f. 

^ First Book, 278. This claim that introspection inevitably bears wit- 
ness to the universality of self-consciousness Miss Calkins defends at 
length against the weight of psychologists who deny it, in The Ameri- 
can Journal of Psychology, XXVI, 505-524. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 71 

two theories of the psychologist's self, there are three dis- 
tinguishable forms of self-psychology, (i) In the first place, 
the self may be conceived as psychophysical organism, and psy- 
chology may be regarded as science of the processes or func- 
tions of the conscious body, the mind-and-body complex . . . 
(2) A second logically possible form of self -psychology would 
regard the self ... as mind-without-body, self unrelated to body. 
... (3) The third view. . .of the psychologist's self regards the 
self as distinct from body, but related to it."^*^ 

The first of these views of the self seems to be involved. 
Miss Calkins thinks, in "the practical procedure of most of our 
present-day functional psychologsts" ; and it is certainly in- 
volved in the procedure of those whom we studied in the di- 
vision of this chapter devoted to behaviorism, who refuse to 
separate even for purposes of specialization a mentalist psy- 
chology from a purely physiological praxiology, and insist 
upon always combining the two aspects of behavior in every 
study of the latter. Mind-plus-body may constitute the human 
individual, but the term self can have meaning only with ref- 
erence to the mind-factor. The study of mind-plus-body is, 
of course, psychohiolo gy (34-36). 

But to insist that "self is non-inclusive of body" is by no 
means to accept Miss Calkin's "second form of self -psychol- 
ogy" and to regard the self as pure mind unrelated to any 
body. Professor ^ Calkins rightly repudiates that doctrinie, 
which she quite properly insists no one really defends anyway, 
and accepts as her own view the third — that psychology "re- 
gards self as distinct from body, but related to it." Psychol- 
ogy, in other words, has to do purely and solely with the mind, 
and this is true whether or not we accept the teaching of the 
"self -psychologists" in to to; but common sense recognizes that 
mind as we know it is inevitably, in some way or other, bound 
up with body. 

41. Self-Psychology as Reconciliation of Striicturalism and 
Functionalism. — In an earlier section (23) I insisted on the 
"^^ Journal of Philosophy, etc., V, 13 f. 



^2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

importance of both the structural and functional points of 
view, and the necessity of combining them in any complete 
study of mental life. Miss Calkins, in her Presidential address 
before the American Psychological Association in 1905,^^ 
made these same points, and offered self-psychology as the 
reconciling concept between structuralism and functionalism. 
"Self -psychology," we read, ''the doctrine that the conscious 
self is the basal fact of psychology, harmonizes the essential 
doctrines of a structural and of a functional psychology" ; and 
this because "consciousness, which always implies a conscious 
self, is a complex alike of structural elements, and of rela- 
tions of self to environment."^^ 

First, as to functionalism, "The cardinal conception of a 
functional psychology, that of consciousness as involving in- 
ternal relations to environment, is," says Miss Calkins, "an 
integral factor of self-psychology."^^ "If the term 'function' 
be taken with the meaning 'reaction to environment,' and if 
the environment be then described, in Professor Angell's 
words, as 'social' and not merely 'physical,' it must follow 
that a 'function' is a social relation — in other words, a per- 
sonal attitude."^* "From all this it follows that functional 
psychology, rightly conceived, is a form of self -psychology, 
that its basal phenomenon is the psychologist's self, and that 
its significant contributions to psychology are, first, its doc- 
trine of the inherent relatedness of self to environment, and 
second, its insistence on the progressive efficiency or utility 
of these relations.^^ In briefer terms: functional psychology- 
defines consciousness in terms of reaction to environment; 
this environment is not merely physical but social; hence the 
relation between individual and environment is a social or 
personal relation, a relation of "selves" to one another, and 

^^ Psychological Review, XIII, 61-81. 

12 O/J. cit., 76. 

13 Op. cit, 73- 

^^ First Book, 275. 

^^ Psych. Rev. article, 75. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 73 

"functional psychology" becomes a form of "self -psychology'* 
without recognizing itself as such. 

Self-psychology, then, according to Miss Calkins, is func- 
tional psychology come to a realization of its own significance : 
functional psychology carried out to its logical conclusion is 
self -psychology. The relation between her own doctrine and 
structuralism is, however, conceived by Miss Calkins after a 
different fashion: the structural treatment of mental phe- 
nomena apart from the self is an abstract and artificial pro- 
cedure, but is recognized as a legitimate procedure if supple- 
mented by and subordinated to the broader treatment of those 
phenomena as expressions of the self. In her first textbook, 
An Introduction to Psychology (1901), Professor Calkins 
treated psychology as both "science of selves" amd "science of 
ideas" (contents) : in her later work, A First Book in Psy- 
chology (first edition, 1909), she "abandoned this double 
treatment, with the intent to simplify exposition, not," she 
says, "because I doubt the validity of psychology as study of 
ideas, but because I question the significance and the adequacy, 
and deprecate the abstractions, of the science thus conceived."^® 

"Every conscious expression," Miss Calkins avers, "may be 
studied from either point of view"^^ — ^that of structural an- 
alysis, or that of self -reference — though the former is incom- 
plete and artificial and the latter only the natural method of 
treatment. In her ''Introduction'' she distinguishes "two great 
classes of facts — Selves and Facts-for-the-selves," the latter 
being divisible again into "inner" or mental and "outer" or 
physical facts; and psychology is distinguished from the 
physical sciences, whose concern is with the last named "outer" 
facts, as having for its aim "the study of selves and of the 
inner facts-for-selves."^® "Atomistic" (structural) psychol- 
ogy studies the "inner facts-for-selves" (contents of con- 
sciousness) in their isolation: self -psychology studies them as 
referred to the self "for" which they are. 

16 First Book, Preface, p. vii. 

17 Psych. Rev., VII, 378. 

18 Op. cit., 6. Cf. also, Philosophical Rev., IX, 493 f ., 497-501. 



74 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

For example, perception may be described structurally as a 
complex of sensational elements, but in its fuller treatment 
is to be viewed as involving a consciousness of a real or pos- 
sible sharing of my experience with a number of other selves. 
Imagination, which has a similar structure, is distinguished by 
self -psychology from perception as involving a consciousness 
of being experienced by myself alone. An emotion is de- 
scribed structurally as a complex of sensational and affective 
elements, but more completely as a passive relation of the self 
to other selves or to other impersonal objects. Will has a 
similar structural composition to emotion, but is characterized 
by an active rather than a passive attitude of the self to the 
outside world. All mental processes are described in the In- 
troduction to Psychology in this twofold way. 

We may, I think, acknowledge the incompleteness of the 
structural method of description, as we have indeed already 
done (23), and yet insist that the functional treatment is a 
sufficient supplement to the other: in so doing we deny the 
compulsive force of the arguments for the explicit reference 
of all mental processes to the self. Criticism, however, we 
reserve for the next section, noting at this point in closing our 
exposition, merely the difference between Miss Calkins's "rec- 
onciliation of structuralism and functionalism'' and our own. 
In our treatment we accepted both structural and functional 
methods for what they are worth, and insisted only that they 
must be combined in any complete psychology: Miss Calkins, 
on the other hand, though accepting structuralism as a valuable 
but incomplete method, denies the value of the functional point 
of view altogether, except so far as it may be regarded as im- 
plicitly identical with the point of view of self -psychology. 

b. Criticism of Self -Psychology 

42. The Metaphysical Nature of Self -Psychology. — The 
leading objection to self -psychology is that it is a metaphysi- 
cal rather than a scientific psychology. To study mental pro- 
cesses in themselves, analyzing them, classifying them, and 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 75 

formulating the laws of their connection as the structuralist 
does, or describing them as varieties of reaction to environ- 
ment as the functionalist does, is undoubtedly a scientific pro- 
cedure; but to explain them as expressions of a permanent, 
underlying self is decidedly a philosophical procedure, with- 
out scientific value or justification. 

To assert this does not imply a denial that there is a scien- 
tific concept of the self with which psychology has a real con- 
cern, but merely that the concept of the self which Miss Cal- 
kins employs in her arguments is the metaphysical rather than 
the scientific "self." Her "self" is described as "relatively 
persistent," "complex," "unique," "related to objects" ;^^ the 
"I" which knows, rather than, in James's terminology, the 
"me" that is known and can be studied scientifically. It is a 
self to which all experiences must be referred, "whose" are 
the ideas of the structuralist and the functions of the function- 
alist.^'* But the "self" of scientific psychology is merely a 
convenient term for the sum-total or interrelated system of all 
the experiences of any given individual from birth to death; 
just as the term "nature" as used in the physical sciences 
stands for the sum-total or interrelated system of all physical 
phenomena, not for any "permanent" and "unique" reality 
underlying those phenomena. To go beyond this, and to 
speak of the Self or Nature as anything more than a sum- 
total of phenomena, is to leave the bounds of science and enter 
the realm of metaphysics. 

"The great objection to introducing the self as a means of 
psychological explanation," says Professor Stratton,^^ is that 
the ego is not a particular mental process among other pro- 
cesses; it is not an event in experience, out of which other 
events may flow. The older attempts to employ it in scientific 
explanation were very much like accounting for the climate of 
California by saying that nature causes it. . . . But nature is a 

^^ First Book, p. 3; and elsewhere in her writings. 

20 Op. cit., 274 and 275. Cf. sup., (38). 

21 Experimental Psychology and its Bearing upon Culture, 300 f. 



^(^ THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

collective system of occurrences, and to use it as a principle 
of explanation would be equivalent to saying that 'the Air 
does some particular thing." ''So it is in psychology. . . . The 
soul is not a particular mental phenomenon among other phe- 
nomena. It is, rather, the personal system within which any 
particular mental events occur. It bears the same relation to 
the particular mental facts of my mind that nature does to 
the events of the physical world." 

That the problem of the self -psychologist is metaphysical is 
also involved in the statement of Miss Calkins, adapting to 
herself one of Miinsterberg's doctrines, that the "primary in- 
terest" of self -psychology is "to understand — not to analyze 
into elements."^^ But the problem of understanding, or in- 
terpreting the meanings of, mental processes is, as we shall 
later demonstrate at length,^^ characteristically the metaphysi- 
cal problem concerning the self. "The problem of a science is 
to describe accurately the phenomena which it observes : self- 
psychology has an additional problem," "to understand, to ob- 
tain a fuller understanding of the relations of selves, and to 
acquire a deeper acquaintance with one's own nature";^* and 
this is decidedly a metaphysical problem. 

To these criticisms of the self -psychology concept, Professor 
Calkins replies that they are based upon an unwarranted con- 
fusion between the philosophical and psychological conceptions 
of the self, which are in reality quite distinct.^^ Philosophy 
studies "the ultimate nature of every phenomenon of science, 
. . . and it seeks not only to relate each phenomenon with every 
other, but to fit it into a complete scheme of reality. ... As op- 
posed to philosophy, on the other hand, psychology sturdily re- 
fuses to study the nature of the soul, its permanence or im- 
mortality and its relation to matter, and simply analyzes the 
forms of self -consciousness, or studies people in their social 

^^Philosophical Review, IX, 495 (1900). 
23/m/., Ch. IV. 

2* Curtis, American Journal of Psychology, XXVI, 01. 
25 First Book, 276. Cf. Phil. Rev., IX, 491 f ., and other references on 
this paragraph. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY ^'J 

relations."^® "Psychology does not reason about the place 
of its selves in total and ultimate reality, but simply accepts 
them on their face value as observed facts. "^^ "Obviously, 
therefore," Miss Calkins concludes, "the self cannot be 
drummed out of the psychologist's camp by arguments di- 
rected against one form or another of the philosophical con- 
ception."^^ 

But this defence, perfectly true as it is in itself, quite misses 
the point of the criticism. The critic himself insists upon this 
same distinction, but points out that the psychological concep- 
tion of the self is that of a mere "interrelated system of mental 
phenomena"; and that any deeper conception of something 
which "expresses itself through" or "has" ideas, feelings, 
sensations, etc., is necessarily a philosophical conception. We 
may define psychology as the "science of selves" in the same 
way that we may define physical science as the "science of 
nature," but neither is a very illuminating definition if we ad- 
here to the empirical conception of "self" and "nature"; 
whereas, if we go beyond that empirical conception in either 
case, we pass from science to metaphysics. It is better, then, 
for psychology to avoid such a term as "self" altogether in 
its general conception of its field of study. 

43. The Alleged Universality of Self -Consciousness. — Miss 
Calkins bases her conception positively on "the testimony of 
introspection,"^^ the alleged empirical fact that self -conscious- 
ness is always present, that "there is no consciousness which is 
not self -consciousness" (39). But the great mass of psychol- 
ogists deny this so-called "fact of introspection." If Miss 
Calkins claims, says Professor Titchener, for example, that 
"the self -attitude is introspectively discernable in every con- 
sciousness, then I can only say that her mind must differ from 
mine not specifically but generically. Self -consciousness is, 

^^Introduction, 5. 
^"^Psychological Review, XIIl, 67. 

28 First Book, 276. 

29 First Book, 278. 



78 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

certainly, part of the subject-matter of psychology; but it is 
I think, of comparatively rare occurrence. And it would seem 
more natural ... to treat it as one among the whole number of 
mental functions than to make it the differentia of a whole 
psychology."^^ In a very thorough, though modestly entitled, 
"systematic experimental introspective' ' study of the phe- 
nomenon of self-consciousness, published in The American 
Journal of Psychology,^^ the same critic has shown, from the 
reports of a number of graduate students and teachers of 
psychology, that "self-consciousness is, in many cases, an in- 
termittent and even a rare experience" and that descriptions 
of it when it does occur vary considerably. 

One instance of a definition of a mental process from the 
point of view of self -psychology will suffice, I think, to il- 
lustrate the failure of that point of view. Perception, says 
Professor Calkins, involves an awareness "that I am sharing 
the consciousness of other perceiving agents," as distinguished 
from imagination which lacks this awareness (41). But, 
objects Professor Margaret F. Washburn, this is simply not 
the case, v *'A perception never under ordinary circumstances 
involves a consciousness that other people share one's experi- 
ence. When I sit alone in my study and look at my bookcase, 
I have not the slightest reference to other minds in my mental 
attitude. Subsequent reflection assures me that other people 
would share the bookcase experience if they were here, but 
T do not distinguish the perceived bookcase from an imagined 
bookcase by consciously referring to other minds at all."^^ 
Reference to selves, then, is a matter of after-reflection rather 
than of immediate experience and consequently a logical or 
metaphysical rather than a psychological affair; and what is 
true of perception and self -psychology is true of all other 
mental phenomena. 

Now if self -psychology is to rest its defence on empirical 

30 Philosophical Review, XV, 91. 

31 XXII, 540-552. 

^^ Journal of Philosophy, etc., II, 715. 



THE DEFINITION OE PSYCHOLOGY 7^ 

considerations — and, of course, it must do so if it is not to 
forfeit its claim entirely — and if the alleged facts of intro- 
spection prove to be by no means universal, it would seem that 
there is nothing left for self -psychology to do but accept the 
inevitable. Professor Calkins, hov/ever, is not to be dismayed 
by the opposition of inconvenient facts.^^ "The self -psycholo- 
gist has no way of answering an opponent who asserts, *I have 
no consciousness of self/ In other words, psychology as 
science of selves can be studied only by one who believes, or 
assumes, that he is directly conscious of himself. But even 
to an opponent who denies the fact from which he starts, the 
self-psychologist can at least show the plausibility or respecta- 
bility of his position by pointing out, first that some or all of 
those who deny the existence of a self-for-psychology im- 
plicitly assume the existence of such a self; and second, that 
many psychologists of admitted worth explicitly adopt the 
conception. 

"To substantiate the first of these statements" Miss Cal- 
kins refers to the universal use of the term "I" by psycholo- 
gists of every school in describing conscious phenomena — as, 
"w^ find in our consciousness only ideas, feelings, etc."; "/ 
attend to a color," "/ perceive objects"; and insists that the 
opponent of self -psychology should avoid such terms in his 
descriptions. Well, we reply, so he does in his severest moods, 
and it is only to obviate the charge of pedantry or unnecessary 
circumlocution that he does not always do so. Just as the 
astronomer says for brevity, "Alpha Centauri crossed the mer- 
idian at lo"* 13"* 5"," so the psychologist says, "I perceive ob- 
jects" : when he is considering the general constitution of the 
sidereal universe, however, the astronomer exercises greater 
care in the use of his words, and so does the structural psy- 
chologist when he is analyzing a psychosis or conscious mo- 
ment most precisely. If one says at one time, "I perceive ob- 
jects," he will probably on another occasion remark that "a 
percept is made up of sensations and memory images," or some 
^^ First Book, 278-280. 



8o THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

such thing, without being conscious of any inconsistency be- 
tween the two statements, or of the former expression as be 
ing any truer or less true scientifically, or more significant, 
than the latter. And as to "assuming the existence of a self 
when making these assertions, this is far different from im- 
plying that every experience involves a consciousness of self : 
"one may 'assume the existence of a self without assuming 
that one is always conscious of that self"^* — ^the former is an 
assumption to be justified on philosophical grounds, the latter 
one to be verified or rejected on grounds of introspection. 

Finally, Miss Calkins claims in defence of her views not 
only the "some or all" of her opponents who ''implicitly as- 
sume the existence of" a self, but also the "many psychologists 
of admitted worth" who "explicitly adopt the conception"^^ — 
naming Professors Ward, Judd, and others. But an examina- 
tion of the references shows nothing more than occasional 
obiter dicta about psychology and the self in which the latter 
term hardly means more than "mind" or "sum-total of mental 
phenomena," and by no means the self which "expresses it- 
self through" those phenomena. The defence, therefore, falls 
through at all points. 

44. The Indefinability of the Self. — In a monograph writ- 
ten in German, and entitled "Der Doppelte Standpunkt in der 
Psychologic," Miss Calkins writes :^® "This I, the self or sub- 
ject, cannot, of course, be defined, for it is the most intimate, 
most fundamental thing that we know, and on that account 
cannot be reduced to other terms. This I is simply the I; 
everyone knows for himself what it is." 

Now it is perfectly possible to know a thing without being 
able to define it: everything individual Is indefinable just as 
far as it is individual, since to define means to relate the ob- 
ject defined to other objects of a similar nature already 
known. The unique, therefore, cannot be defined; and if, as 

3* Josephine N. Curtis, American Journal of Psychology, XXVI, 96. 

85 First Book, loc. cit 

36 P. 34 f . Quoted by Curtis, op. cit., 73. 



THE DEFINITION OE PSYCHOLOGY 8i 

Miss Calkins asserts/^ the self is unique, it is as such indefin- 
able. And yet the self — mine and yours — the individual, the 
unique, is perfectly knowable. But only the definable can be 
a fit object of scientific study: to define, to point out the es- 
sential characteristics of a thing, is a central problem of 
science, and what cannot be defined cannot be described or ex- 
plained in any systematic, scientific fashion. 

Professor Eleanor A. McC. Gamble, joining bravely in the 
defence of self -psychology against its critics, insists that we 
do not find the self ''hy introspection, but in introspection. 
Miss Curtis asks : What answer can Miss Calkins make to the 
person who says, "I do not know what the I is" ?' The retort 
is easy. Miss Calkins would ask, Who is this I who does not 
know what the I is?' The self is the introspector. When I 
can see my own eyes without a mirror, then I shall be able to 
find my own self by introspection."^® But the would-be cham- 
pion exactly gives away her claim by her admission. Intro- 
spection is the psychological method, and only that which can 
be an object of introspection can be "the basal fact of psychol- 
ogy." The self as "introspector," which can be found "not 
hy introspection but in introspection," is the "pure ego" of 
metaphysics, not the "empirical Me" of psychology; and we 
come back again, for the purposes of science, to the only em- 
pirical self there is, namely, "the sum-total of all mental 
phenomena." 

45. Self -Psychology as Reconciliation of Structuralism and 
Functionalism. — It will be remembered that Miss Calkins re- 
jects structuralism and functionalism as abstract and artificial, 
and offers her own view as a concrete reconciliation of the 
other two. This reconciliation is to be accomplished (i) by 
recognizing the functional point of view as at bottom and 
when carried to its logical conclusion identical with the point 
of view of self -psychology, and (2) by giving to the structural 
method of treatment a place alongside of but subordinate to 

^"^ First Book, 3; etc. 
^^Psychological Bulletin, XII, 196. 



82 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

the pro founder method which describes all mental processes 
as varying expressions of a self (38, 41). 

A study of the actual results produced by applying the prin- 
ciple of the "double standpoint" or twofold treatment of 
mental processes to the problems of mental life inevitably 
leaves the investigator, however, it is to be feared, with the 
impression of two distinct sciences rather than of a single 
science with two mutually dependent divisions. And this im- 
pression becomes more firmly fixed when we find that the self- 
psychology point of view is admitted to be of value only for 
descriptive purposes, and that the structural method alone 
gives a causal explanation of mental phenomena. But every 
true science should cover both the problems, and to distin- 
guish them thus sharply is virtually to divide psychology into 
two sciences. 

As to the abstract and artificial nature of structuralism and 
functionalism, that is no valid objection to them, since all 
science is as such abstract and artificial (inf., Chap. IV). 
Every science, in order to give its attention undisturbedly to 
one special group of phenomena, voluntarily excludes from 
its consideration certain questions which naturally arise but 
are outside its own field. To Miss Calkins's assertion that in 
conceiving psychology as science of ideas we inevitably raise 
the question, Whose idea? Miss Curtis pertinently replies 
that "many psychologists have conceived psychology as science 
of ideas without raising the question: indeed, these psycholo- 
gists see no more necessity for raising it than the physiologist 
sees for asking 'Whose muscle?' ".^® The question is there, 
perhaps, but it is a philosophically rather than a "scientifically 
relevant" question. 

Again, as to the claim that "psychology is most naturally" 
treated as self -psychology,*^ this is unfortunately one of the 
most serious arguments against that treatment. It is per- 
fectly true that it is most natural to describe mental processes 

39 0/>, cit, 70, n. II. 
*o First Book, v'n. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 83 

as expressions of a self, or as products of a faculty, but this 
is the very method of treatment which modem scientific psy- 
chology has been struggling to banish from the world. The 
most natural way of treating anything is to take it just as it 
is, uncritically and unreflectively, and this is the method of 
common sense which yields for us the casual knowledge of 
the "plain man"; the scientific way, on the contrary, is to 
analyze, to criticize, and to formalize the facts of everyday 
experience, and in doing so science is preeminently abstract 
and artificial, and not natural at all. "If, then, self -psychology 
is more 'natural' than other psychology, in the sense of stand- 
ing nearer to the view of the plain man, self-psychology loses 
thereby rather than gains; for the more 'natural' or common- 
sense-like it gets, the less scientific it becomes."*^ 

46. Self -Psychology and Sociology. — Just one more point 
before concluding. According to Miss Calkins, "the basal 
fact of psychology is the individual self in its relations, pri- 
marily social relations; the unit of sociology is the inter- 
related system of selves," "the social organism," "the com- 
munity."*^ The former portion of this sentence is what we 
have in the preceding paragraphs been engaged in confuting, 
the latter portion seems to express a truth provided we identify 
the word "unit" with the earlier term "basal fact." 

If, however, we substitute for the rejected statement, the 
following — "the basal fact of individual psychology is the in- 
dividual experience, the interrelated system of which experi- 
ences constitutes what we call the self" ; we may then assert 
that the basal fact of social psychology is that self as above 
defined, in its relations to other selves ; and that the basal fact 
of sociology is, as Miss Calkins tells us, "the interrelated sys- 
tem of selves" which constitutes "the social organism." We 
have, then, this hierarchy of "units" or "basal facts" — the in- 
dividual experience, the self as interrelated system of such 
experiences, and the community as interrelated system of 

*i Curtis, op. cit, g6 f. 
^^Psychological Review, XIII, 67. 



84 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

selves. In accepting this view we give credit to what is un- 
doubtedly valuable in "self -psychology" without admitting its 
claim in the field of individual psychology, and we can then 
indorse the statement of Miss Gamble that "self -psychology is 
worth while, not because it tells us anything worth knowing 
about the self in itself, that self which is not open to intro- 
spection [ — and is therefore not a psychological object at all, 
but a philosophical one — ] but because it gives standing ground 
for the scientific treatment of the relation of person to per- 
son."*« 

2. General Conclusions. 

47. The Relations of the Contemporary Schools.— -Seli- 
Psychology and Behaviorism, though both of them are more 
closely allied to functionalism than to structuralism, are at 
opposite extremes in their doctrine of what constitutes "the 
basal fact of psychology." Self -Psychology accepts both the 
concept of the Self and that of Consciousness as fit subjects 
for psychological investigation, though of course regarding 
the former as "basal" and the latter as secondary to it ; Behav- 
iorism rejects both concepts; the intermediate schools accept 
Consciousness, but reject the Self. The respective claims of 
each can be justified only by actual trial as to their usableness 
in scientific psychology, and we have been contending in the 
above pages that such a pragmatic test demonstrates that 
whereas Consciousness is a proper psychological concept, the 
Self as anything more than the sy stern of contents or processes 
is a metaphysical concept, and as such outside the field of 
scientific psychology. 

In a table which will be found at the bottom of page 85 I 
endeavor to illustrate concisely the relations of the various 
schools. 

48. The Definition of Psychology. — From our discussion 
and comparison of the various definitions and concepts of 
psychology now current, we should be able to derive a posi- 
es o/>. cit., 199. 



THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY 



85 



tive definition which shall avoid the errors of the individual 
schools and yet allow for the full intension of the concept. 
Such definitions in common use as "science of mental states," 
"of mental processes," "of consciousness" and the like, must 
be rejected as too narrow — the first because of its overempha- 
sis of the structural position, the second because of its over- 
emphasis of the functional position, and the third because it 
implies the non-existence of a subconscious field.** Each of 
the definitions, "science of mind" or "of the mind," "science 
of experience," "of mental phenomena," or "mental life" in- 
dicates briefly just what the subject-matter of psychology is. 
Of these, probably, "science of mental phenomena" is the most 
accurate, but as all sciences have to do with phenomena, the 
word is hardly necessary to the definition. "Science of mental 
life" allies psychology most closely with the biological sciences, 
and therefore has advantages from that point of view. "Sci- 
ence of experience" is perhaps a little too vague. The simplest 
definition is, after all, the most natural and common one, "the 
science of mind." This cannot be criticized as too broad, pro- 
vided the significance of the word "science" is appreciated 
and the term "mind" carefully defined ; and of course no defi- 
nition of any science can stand alone, or be thoroughly un- 
derstood until the terms it uses have been themselves further 
defined. 



Admits Consciousness 


Rejects Consciousness 


Admits Self 


Rejects Self 




Self-Psychology < 


Structuralism 
Functionalism 


-^ Behaviorism 



Mentalism 



(The arrows indicate that Behaviorism and Self -Psychology are both 
developments of Functionalism, but in opposite directions.) 



**This problem has not yet been touched, but will occupy all of the later 
chapters VII and VIII; and the point is important enough to be men- 
tioned, at least, in the present connection. 



86 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

TABLE IV 
The Current Concepts of Scientihc Psychology 



Schools and Leading Representatives 
Structuralism (Wundt, Miinsterberg, Titchener) 

Functionalism (Angell, Judd) 

Radical School (Pillsbury, McDougall) 
Behaviorism (Watson, Frost, Holt, Bode) 
Self -Psychology (Calkins, Baldwin, Royce, 
Ward, Stout, Brentano?) 



Typical Definitions 
Science of mental states 

or contents 
Science of mental pro- 
cesses or functions 
Science of behavior 
Science of behavior 
Science of the self 



REFERENCES 
Self-Psychology — 

Calkins, Introduction: Ch. I. 
" First Book: pp. 273-280. 
" Philosophical Rev.: IX, 490 fif. (1900). 
" Psychological Rev.: VII, 377 ff. (1900). 
" XIII, 61 ff. (1906). 
Jour, of Philosophy: IV, 676 f¥. ; V, 12 &. (1907-8). 
" Amer. Jour, of Psychology: XXVI, 495 ff. (1915). 
" Psychological Bulletin: XIII, 20 ff. (1916). (Bib- 
liography.) 
" and others, Psychological Rev.: XXIV, 278 ff. 
(1917); XXV, 164 ff. (1918). 
Thilly, Philosophical Rev.: XIX, 22 ff. (1910). 
Creighton, Philosophical Rev.: XXIII, 159 ff. (1914). 
Gamble, Psychological Bulletin: XII, 195 ff. (1915). 
Ward, Psychological Principles, pp. 29-41. 

Criticisms 
Washburn, Jour, of Philosophy: II, 713 ff. (1905). 
Titchener, Philosophical Rev.: XV, 93 ff. (1906). 
Pillsbury, Philosophical Rev.: XVI, 307 ff. (1907). 

Reply by Calkins, Psychological Bulletin: V, 27 ff. 

Rejoinder by Pillsbury, Psychological Bulletin: V, 60 ff. 
Tawney, Jour, of Philosophy: V, 459 ff. (1908). 

Reply by Calkins, Ibid., 634 ff. 
Titchener, Amer. Jour, of Psychology: XXII, 540 ff. (1911). 
Curtis, Amer. Jour, of Psychology: XXVI, 68 ff. (1915). 

Reply by Gamble, Psychological Bulletin: XII, 194 ff. 

(1915). 
McDougall, Psychological Rev.: XXIII, i ff. (1916). 



BOOK II 
THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 



CHAPTER IV 

Psychology and Metaphysics 

49. The Problem of the Basis of a Scientific Psychology. — 
We have now advanced to the point where we should be pre- 
pared to formulate and understand our problem, the problem 
upon the discussion and solution of which we shall be engaged 
throughout the remainder of this book. This problem is, in 
briefest terms, the problem of the basis of a scientific psychol- 
ogy, and may be stated most concisely in the form of a ques- 
tion, namely : What are the essential conditions of a complete, 
and at the same time independent, science of psychology — i.e., 
independent alike of metaphysics on the one hand, and of the 
various biological sciences on the other ? 

In answering this question we shall find that the determina- 
tion of the essential conditions of completeness depends upon 
the prior determination of the broader principles underlying 
the independence of scientific psychology, and the forward- 
ing of the latter endeavor involves in its turn two subsidiary 
problems: first, the differentiation of psychology from meta- 
physics; and, second, the differentiation of psychology — ^not 
from the biological sciences merely, for that has to a large 
extent been done already — ^but from the non-mental sciences 
in general. 

I . The Problem of Science. 

50. The General Problem, of Science. — All science^ has for 
its problem the systematic Description and Explanation of 
facts or phenomena. By a fact or phenomenon is meant any 
object of observation, or of direct and immediate (unmedia- 
ted) knowledge; or whatever conceivably might become such. 

II confine the ensuing discussion entirely to the field of "pure" as dis- 
tinguished from "applied" science. 

89 



go THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Facts or phenomena constitute the materials or data of all 
sciences, and the systematic description and explanation of 
those facts constitutes the twofold problem of science. Each 
individual science limits itself to the investigation of some 
particular group of facts — ^^psychology, to that group of facts 
known as "mental," whatever that term may later be defined 
to mean. 

51. Scientific Description is distinguished from ordinary or 
"commonsense" description in two ways — (i) in being ana- 
lytical, and (2) in being systematic.^ In other words, and in 
the first place, the ordinary unscientific "man in the street" 
describes the facts which come to his observation just as they 
are in their general outlines, whereas for the scientist this is 
only the first step in description, and must be supplemented by 
analysis of the phenomenon into its constituent parts, and 
finally into its ele^ments or those parts which cannot be. further 
analyzed ; for all phenomena, except those which can be shown 
to be elementary already, are in jthemselves complex and 
analyzable into constituents which are elementary. In the sec- 
ond place, science has for its ideal the arrangement of its 
facts, which ordinarily come to observation in no particular 
order and with no particular relation to one another, into an 
organized system, in which every fact has a place in relation 
to every other fact of its "class," and every class of facts has 
its proper relation to every other class. 

The problem of scientific description, therefore, is itself 
threefold: (i) Definition and General Description, in which 
so far, except for greater accuracy, science is hardly distin- 
guishable from commonsense; (2) Analysis, which continues 
until finally the elements, or further unanalyzable factors, of 

2 "By the description of an object" says Professor Titchener, "we mean 
an account so full and so definite that one to whom the object itself is 
unfamiliar can nevertheless, given skill and materials, reconstruct it from 
the verbal formula." (American Journal of Psychology, Vol. XXIII, p. 
165, 1912). This definition states the general nature and aim of descrip- 
tion, but does not discriminate scientific description from description of 
the ordinary type. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 91 

the phenomena studied have been disclosed; and (3) Classi- 
fication, or arrangement of the facts into classes and finally 
into a single organized system including all the phenomena of 
the groups studied by the particular science in question. If, 
then, psychology is to be a complete and independent science, 
it must have for its first main problem the description — 4.e., 
general description, analysis and classification — of mental phe- 
nomena. 

52. Scientific Explanation is the determination of the con- 
ditions under which the facts to be explained occur, and with- 
out which they do not occur. The procedure ordinarily con- 
sists ( I ) in the formulation of some ''law" summing up the 
various conditions and their results, and (2) in the applica- 
tion of this law to the fact to be explained, by showing the 
fact to be a special instance of the general law. A "law" in 
the scientific sense is merely a summary statement in general 
terms of certain observed uniformities in the order or rela- 
tions of phenomena — a brief statement "in mental shorthand 
of as wide a range as possible of the sequences of our sense- 
impressions."^ The fact is not explained by the law, but by 
the other facts (the "causes") which according to the state- 
ment of the law are conditions of the fact to be explained. 

For example, the law of gravitation is a brief statement of 
the uniform relation which subsists between the motions of 
various particles of matter in the universe. The fact that a 
book falls from my hand to the floor when the support of my 
hand is removed is not explained by the law of gravitation, 
but by the fact of the removal of the support of my hand (the 
"cause" of the fall) ; the whole sequence of events being one 
instance out of the numerous instances of the falls of things 
(and other allied phenomena) which occur constantly in the 
world, and which the "law of gravitation" sums up in one 
brief formula. 

53. The Concept of Causation: Scientific explanation is es- 
sentially causal in its nature, and the problem of scientific ex- 

3 Pearson, The Grammar of Science (Third Edition, 1911), Vol. I, p. 112. 



92 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

planation consists primarily in the determination of the causal 
connections between the facts that have been observed, de- 
scribed, analyzed, and classified. A fact (B) is held to be suffi- 
ciently "explained" for scientific purposes when it is shown to 
be the effect of some antecedent coMse (A) — i.e., when its ex- 
istence affords a special instance of the general principle that 
whenever A (the "cause") takes place, B (the "effect") takes 
place also. This is all that the concept of cause, the central 
concept of scientific explanation, connotes — viz., that event 
upon the occurrence of which a definite consequent event will, 
and without which that consequent event cannot, occur. The 
invariable and unconditionally present antecedent is the cause, 
the invariable consequent is the effect, and the presence of the 
cause sufficiently explains the presence of the effect for all 
scientific purposes. Of course, the presence of the cause may 
itself, and ultimately will, generate another problem of ex- 
planation ; but this problem is solved by treating this cause as 
effect, and searching for its antecedent cause, and so on as far 
as the needs of the particular problem may demand. But any 
further or deeper discussion of the phenomenon than this car- 
ries the investigator outside the realm of science altogether. 

An essential presupposition of all science is the so-called 
general principle of causation — vis., that every event has a 
cause, or that every event is the effect of some antecedent 
cause — and scientific explanation itself is the reference of 
facts to their causes. If, then, psychology is to be a complete 
and independent science, it must have for its second main 
problem that of explaining, or determining the causal rela- 
tions of, mental phenomena. 

54. The Native and Kinds of Scientific Hypotheses. — Any 
provisional, tentative explanation of phenomena, any sug- 
gested law which has not been thoroughly verified, is known 
in science as an "hypothesis." These are of two distinct 
kinds, one of which we may call "phenomenal" hypotheses or 
explanations, and the other "conceptual" hypotheses or ex- 
planations. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 93 

A phenomenal hypothesis is one which explains complex 
facts or phenomena in terms of simpler phenomena. If a 
phenomenon is defined, as above (50), as "any object of ob- 
servation, or of direct and immediate knowledge," then a 
phenomenal hypothesis is one which makes use of phenomenal 
terms. In the physical sciences, perception is the mental 
process used in observing, so that all phenomenal hypotheses 
in the physical sciences are stated in perceptual terms : in psy- 
chology, the method of observation is, of course, introspection. 
Explanations of the phenomenal type include the explanation 
of chemical reactions as the result of the combination of cer- 
tain chemical elements, of sound as the product of vibrations 
in the atmosphere, of memories as the revival of previous per- 
ceptual experiences, and the like. 

When a phenomenal explanation of any fact, however, is 
either impossible or incomplete, science resorts to the second 
type of hypothesis, namely, a conceptual one. A conceptual 
hypothesis is one which explains facts in terms of specially 
constructed concepts, which have no known phenomenal (per- 
ceptual or introspective) existence. In resorting to this type 
of explanation, the scientist leaves the world of observed facts 
altogether, and by an exercise of the scientific imagination pur- 
posely constructs a world of fictitious objects, which cannot be 
perceived by the senses and may have no phenomenal reality 
whatsoever. Such a procedure is, as was hinted above, fol- 
lowed in any case in which a phenomenal explanation is im- 
possible, and also to supplement phenomenal explanations when 
the latter are incomplete. 

For example, though the phenomenon of sound may be ex- 
plained in phenomenal terms as the product of vibrations of 
the atmosphere, which latter is itself a phenomenon that we 
may become directly conscious of in numerous other ways, the 
allied phenomenon of light cannot be so explained; hence the 
science of physics constructs in explanation of the latter the 
purely fictitious ether, and the purely conceptual theory that 
light is the result of vibrations in this ether. Again, the con- 



94 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

cepts of atoms and electrons have been constructed by scien- 
tists for the purpose of carrying the explanation of physical 
and chemical phenomena beyond the point to which purely 
phenomenal explanations would carry us. So in various other 
fields: nerve fibres are phenomena, nerve currents are con- 
cepts ; falling bodies are phenomena, the force of gravity is a 
concept; and so forth. 

Thus science does not merely occasionally resort to concep- 
tual hypotheses, but on the other hand deals largely with con- 
ceptual constructions which not only have no perceptual 
equivalents, but may even possess qualities contradictory of 
perceptual experience — as in the attribution of the properties 
of weightlessness and frictionlessness to the hypothetical ether. 
Mathematics makes unusually free use of such impossible and 
contradictory concepts — as, for instance, its notably contra- 
dictory concept of the square root of minus i, etc.; but these 
are absolutely essential to any advance in mathematical, or any 
physical, science. And if this is true of the physical sciences, 
psychology, if it is to be complete, must be at liberty also to 
make free use of conceptual as well as phenomenal hypotheses 
in explanation of its facts. 

55. The Validity of Conceptiml Hypotheses. — But the sci- 
entist must not be permitted to run amuck in the field of fic- 
titious concepts. It is not merely that a concept satisfies the 
scientist's vanity, or his love of creating something, which 
justifies the use of that concept. There are just two tests of 
the validity and raison d'etre of a conceptual hypothesis — a 
theoretical test and a practical test. ( i ) The theoretical test 
is that the hypothesis or concept in question does actually in- 
crease our understanding of the facts; and (2) the practical 
test is that by means of the proposed concept or hypothesis we 
are enabled to predict and prepare for future recurrences of 
those facts, and perhaps to produce or control them. If a con- 
ceptual hypothesis satisfies both of these tests it is fully justi- 
fied; if one of them, it is partially justified; if neither of them, 
it is not justified, and should be rejected. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 95 

56. Is Science purely Descriptive f — Many students of the 
subject of scientific method deny that science explains facts at 
all, and insist that its function is purely descriptive. Among 
these, two are especially prominent — Karl Pearson* and Louis 
T. More.^ According to Pearson, "the object of science is to 
describe in the fewest words the widest range of phenomena."^ 
"Science answers no why — it simply provides a shorthand de- 
scription of the how of our sense-impressions/'^ Scientific 
"laws simply describe, they never explain, the routine of our 
perceptions." The law of gravitation, for example, "is a brief 
description of how every particle of matter in the universe is 
altering its motion with reference to every other particle. It 
does not tell us why particles thus move."^ 

Of course, we may reply, this is largely a matter of defining 
what we mean by explanation, and what we shall mean by it 
in this present book we have already stated quite fully enough. 
If we mean by explaining, "explaining fully," then, of course, 
we must admit at once that science does not explain; but if 
we mean, as we do, merely the determination of the causal re- 
lations of things, in the sense of the term "cause" above de- 
fined (55) — the reference of facts to their causes — then we 
have a right to insist that explaining is one of the essential 
problems of science. Explanation, it is true, is hardly more 
than an especially comprehensive description ; and no scientific 
explanation is final, but at once arouses the question of how to 
explain the explanation; but notwithstanding all this, expla- 
nation is something more than merely analyzing and classify- 
ing, and should be treated as distinct from description. Con- 
ceptual explanation, moreover, is not in any sense descriptive, 
since we can only "describe" phenomena. 

Professor More's criticisms of scientific explanation are di- 

^The Grammar of Science, Vol. I (Third Edition, 1911). 
^The Limitations of Science (1915). 

6 Op. cit., p. 339. 

7 Op. cit., p. 333. 

8 Op. cit., p. 99. 



96 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

rected more particularly against the possible danger of con- 
fusing scientific explanation, especially when of the conceptual 
type, with metaphysics. "The domain of physics" he says, 
"is concerned with the discovery of phenomena and the for- 
mulation of natural laws based on postulates which are de- 
termined by experience and generally accepted as true; the 
causes of phenomena ... lie in the province of the meta- 
physician." The problems of the nature of the ether, the shape 
of atoms, etc., are metaphysical rather than scientific prob- 
lems. This would rule out of science all conceptual or non- 
phenomenal hypotheses. "This does not mean," he adds, "that 
such questions should not be discussed, but the method of this 
discussion and the results obtained are properly the method 
and results of metaphysics, and are not in the category of 
physical phenomena and laws."® Again, "men of science have 
two principal functions to perform; first, to observe the phe- 
nomena of the world, and when certain connections and dif- 
ferences are found in these phenomena, to classify them under 
laws." (Not, be it noted, to explain them by reference to 
laws). "But, allured by their great and legitimate success, 
they have also tried to discover the hidden causes of phe- 
nomena, with the result that a sort of fictitious world has been 
created by them, in which the laws of objective, or physical, 
phenomena are inextricably confounded with the deductions 
of subjective psychology. Science is metaphysical, and at the 
same time pretends to supplant metaphysics."" 

How far Professor More's strictures on the metaphysical 
tendency of modern science may be justified we shall be more 
competent to discuss after we have become familiar with the 
problem of metaphysics itself ;^^ but the writer's insistence 
that explanation and the determination of causes, and the use 
of conceptual hypotheses, are not scientific, we have already 
condemned in our previous discussion. 

® The Limitations of Science, pp. 113 f. 
10 Op. cit., pp. 187 f. 
iiC/.tn/. (60). 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 97 

TABLE V 
Stages of the Scientific Method 
I. THE ACQUISITION OF FACTS: Observation 

II. THE DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS 

1. Definition and General Description 

2. Analysis of the facts into their constituent parts or factors; ulti- 
mately into their Elements 

3. Classification: arrangement of the facts into Classes; ultimately, 
into a System of all the facts of the assigned group. 

III. THE EXPLANATION OF THE FACTS. 

1. Formulation of Laws: determination of Causes. 

2. Application of the Laws: reference of facts to their causes. 

2. The Problem of Metaphysics , and its Relation to Science, 

57. The General Problem of Metaphysics. — The keywords 
of the problem of science are Description and Explanation, the 
keyword of the problem of metaphysics is Interpretation. 
That is to say, metaphysics has for its problem the interpre- 
tation of phenomena. Now, to "interpret" anything is to de- 
termine its meaning. If the fundamental presupposition of 
all science, without accepting which no science would be pos- 
sible, is that every fact, every event, has a cause; the funda- 
mental presupposition of metaphysics is that every fact has 
a meaning, and its problem is to determine what are the mean- 
ings of facts — i. e., to interpret them. 

Again, philosophical interpretation is teleological — i.e., it 
has to do with the purposes or "ends" of things. Science has 
to do entirely with causes and ignores purposes: the aim of 
scientific explanation, as we have seen, is to discover the causal 
connections of phenomena. Philosophy, on the other hand, 
has to do entirely with purposes, and ignores causes : the aim 
of philosophical interpretation is to discover the purposes or 
teleological relations of phenomena. From the philosophical 
point of view, each fact is treated not as the effect of some 
antecedent cause, but as the expression of a Meaning or as 
the fulfilment of a Purpose. 

Once more : science, in its study of physical and mental phe- 



98 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

nomena, completely ignores the values of things — their utility 
to man, their beauty, or their eternal significance — but for the 
philosopher value is everything, the fact nothing except so 
far as it is a symbol of a value. From this point of view, the 
metaphysical problem may be defined as that of evaluation, 
determining the Values of phenomena. 

Science, then, tells us what the facts are, and how they have 
come to be: metaphysics attempts to determine for us their 
meanings, their purpose in the universe, and their eternal 
worth. This being the case, of course, science must, in its 
descriptive aspect, at least, precede metaphysics — we cannot 
know what facts mean until we already know what the facts 
are, we cannot interpret the facts until we have first described 
them. Scientific description, then, is as necessary a prelimi- 
nary to philosophical interpretation as it is to causal explana- 
tion, but whereas description is an end in itself to the sci- 
entist, as well as a means toward attaining the end of expla- 
nation, it is for the philosopher merely a means toward the 
true end of interpretation. 

The problem of rational or metaphysical psychology, as a 
branch of metaphysics or philosophy in general, is, therefore, 
the interpretation of mental phenomena in terms of Meaning, 
Purpose, and Value. 

58. The Artificiality of Science. — If it is true that science 
ignores value, then the artificiality of scientific method, the 
abstractness of its content, and the incompleteness of its point 
of view must be at once evident. For the obvious fact of our 
daily lives is that "we live in a world of values. "^^ "We," 
says Professor Titchener, "approve good manners; we avoid 
extravagance and display; we aim at efficiency; we try to be 
honest; we should like to be cultivated. Everywhere and al- 
ways our ordinary Hving implies this reference to values, to 
better and worse, desirable and undesirable, vulgar and re- 
fined." But all this merely emphasizes the fact "that ordinary 
living is not scientific. . . . For Science deals, not with values, 

12 Titchener, a Beginner's Psychology, p. i (1915). 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 99 

but with facts. There is no good or bad, sick or well, useful 
or useless, in science. When the results of science are taken 
over into everyday life, they are transformed into values; the 
telegraph becomes a business necessity, the telephone a house- 
hold convenience, the motor-car a means of recreation; the 
physician works to cure, the educator to fit for citizenship, the 
social reformer to correct abuses. Science itself, however, 
works simply to ascertain the truth, to discover the fact." 

"Again," continues Professor Titchener, "we live in a world 
whose centre is ourself." "This does not necessarily mean 
that we are all selfish," but that "we live in a universe which 
revolves about the Me." "And this, once more, is the same 
thing as saying that our ordinary living is not scientific. For 
science, which deals with facts, is on that account impersonal 
and disinterested." "Science aims at truth: it deals with facts, 
with the nature of things given, not with values or meanings 
or uses; and it deals with these materials impersonally and 
disinterestedly."^^ 

Professor Miinsterberg has on numerous occasions pointed 
out the same truth. "In our practical experience things have 
their meaning just through our attitude; their existence is 
bound up with our interest in them." But not so in the scien- 
tific realm. The standpoint of the scientist "is an artificial 
one; it involves certain abstractions. The world is in a way 
cut off from our life-attitudes, and has been made a mere ob- 
ject of awareness; but" — and here lies the justification for 
this abstractness and artificiality of science — "in this abstrac- 
tion lies at the same time its incomparable strength. It allows 
us to understand the processes in the world as results of laws, 
and thus to bring them into mathematical relations, and finally 
to master them and to put nature in harness."^* 

Again. "If the psychologist approaches mental life, he has 
no interest in asking whether the mental states are valuable 
or not. He does not care whether the will impulses in the 

13 op. cit., pp. 2-4. 

1* Miinsterberg, The Eternal Values, p. 13. 



loo THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

mind are good or bad, moral or immoral, whether the imagin- 
ings of the mind are beautiful or ugly, whether the thoughts in 
the mind are wise or foolish, whether the emotions of the mind 
are holy or sinful. The dissecting botanist is interested in the 
ugliest weed as much as in the beautiful flower, the chemist 
cares for the constitution of the deadly poison as much as for 
that of the helpful drug. In the same way the psychologist 
is surely interested in the analysis of the criminal act as much 
as in that of the heroic deed, in the babbling of the insane mind 
as much as in the reasoning of the thinker, in the silliest play 
of the infant as much as in the highest creative processes of 
the artistic mind. He remains the mental observer who un- 
derstands and explains mental events without forming a 
judgment on them. As soon as he begins to evaluate them he 
oversteps the boundaries of his realm, and is trespassing on 
the fields of logic, ethics, and aesthetics. "^^ 

The upshot of these considerations is : ( i ) That real life, 
the life of everyday practical experience, is dominated by ideas 
of values — good and bad, beautiful and ugly, useful and use- 
less, etc.; (2) that science entirely ignores values, and con- 
cerns itself disinterestedly with the facts as they are, regard- 
less of their values and uses; (3) that science is, therefore, 
characteristically abstract and artificial; but (4) that it is quite 
properly so, for by means of the strictly mechanistic method 
of science we are enabled not only to understand the forces of 
nature better, but to bring them under control for the benefit 
of mankind. And if all this is true of science in general, it 
is equally so of the specific science of psychology. 

59. Psychology and Meanings. — But at this conclusion one 
may naturally demur. All that has been said above we may 
freely admit so far as the physical sciences are concerned, and 
yet we may seriously hesitate to accept the distinction in its 
application to mental phenomena. Whatever the situation 
with regard to physical things, one may say, is it not true that 
the very essence of a mental process — an idea, a memory, a 
1^ Psychology, General and Applied, pp. 9 f . 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY loi 

perception — is its meaning, its import? But as a matter of 
fact the distinction applies as well to the mental world as to 
the physical, and the question must be answered in the nega- 
tive. The evidence that mental processes "may be treated 
scientifically as bare facts" and "are not intrinsically meaning- 
ful" is set forth by Titchener under six heads.^® 

In the first place (i) "meaning may be stripped from the 
mental process to which it normally belongs." {E.g., a word 
— "house," for instance — will lose all its significance and be- 
come a mere meaningless sound if repeated aloud to oneself 
several times). On the other hand, (2) an experience at first 
meaningless may later "take on a meaning" ; as, for example, 
when that which at first seems to be a mere tangle of lines 
turns out, on further investigation, to be, let us say, a meteor- 
ological record ; or when a series of meaningless marks comes 
later on to be interpreted and understood as a sentence in 
Greek or Hebrew. (3) "An experience and its meaning may 
be disjointed in time" ; as when one fails to see the point of a 
joke until sometime after hearing it, or in the reverse and 
very common situation in which one knows what one wishes 
to say and yet cannot for a while put the meaning into words. 
(4) "One and the same experience may have several mean- 
ings" or possible meanings; as a word, "a bit of bad hand- 
writing, a distant object, an obscure patch in a painting," etc. 
Or, (5), reversing the last-named distinction, "one and the 
same meaning may attach to several experiences" ; as when a 
word and a graphic symbol may represent the same idea (e.g., 
the word "triangle" and the mathematical symbol "A"). Fi- 
nally, (6) meaning and mental process are independent vari- 
ables; "richness and fullness of experience do not necessarily 
correspond with wealth of meaning," nor does "poverty of 
experience . . . necessarily mean loss or reduction of mean- 
ing." {E.g., complexity of style and theme certainly does not 
conduce toward clearness of understanding, nor does the sig- 
nificance of a word depend upon the number of its syllables). 

1^ Op. cit., pp. 26-30. 



I02 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

And yet, notwithstanding the incontestable truth of these 
distinctions, the critic may remain unconvinced. Do not, he 
may insist, all our experiences in their inmost nature mean 
something ? Is not a perception always a perception of some- 
thing, an idea an idea of something? Sensations in them- 
selves may be meaningless ; but do we as a matter of fact ever 
actually experience a "pure," "mere," "meaningless," sensa- 
tion? "We have no reason," admits Professor Titchener,^^ 
"to believe that mind began with meaningless sensations, and 
progressed to meaningful perceptions. On the contrary, we 
must suppose that mind was meaningful from the very out- 
set." "What, then, from the psychological point of view, is 
this meaning?" In other words, "What mental processes . . , 
are the scientific equivalents of what we know in everyday life 
as meaning?" Or, most briefly stated, "what processes carry 
the meaning ?"^^ 

The answer is, that from the psychological point of view 
meaning is context. To elucidate: — Every perception is 
analyzable into an associated group of sensations and images, 
of which the sensations constitute a central core and nucleus, 
and the associated images form as it were a context or "fringe" 
which binds together the whole and gives it a definite meaning. 
Thus, when I hear the sound of a bell, the sound sensations 
call into consciousness at once a number of associated visual, 
tactual, motor, and possibly further auditory, images derived 
from past experiences of this particular bell or of others more 
or less like it ; all these fusing together into a single experience 
which I call "the perception of a bell," and in which the sound 
sensations occupy the centre of attention, and the associated 
images constitute the fringe of meaning that makes the sensa- 
tions not "mere" sensations but symbols of a physical object. 
Likewise, in visually perceiving an orange, the sensations of 
color and brightness arouse contextual images of smell, taste, 

17^ Test Book of Psychology, p. 369. 
'^^A Beginner^s Psychology, pp. 117 f. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 103 

touch, which enable us to "recognize" the object — i.e., give a 
meaning to the sensations. 

Similarly, every idea has a core or nucleus of images, and 
a fringe of associated images and possibly also of sensations 
(kinaesthetic in most cases) which give meaning to the nuclear 
images. The most efficient nuclear symbol of the idea is the 
word, (as "triangle," "horse"), but a representative image 
(as the figure A, or the picture of some particular horse) may 
do as well, provided it is consciously accepted as a mere sym- 
bol of the concept and of no interest in itself. 

In all these cases, the meaning of the perception or idea is 
"carried" by the contextual images or sensations, and it is 
context which gives meaning to every experience, and yet it 
would be inaccurate to say that the meaning of a sensation or 
symbolic image is through and through nothing but its asso- 
ciated images or sensations, for this would be a violation of 
the principle that psychology is not concerned with meanings. 
All that is implied is that the meanings of our experiences are 
represented^^ in the realm of mental processes by "the fringe 
of related processes that gathers about the central group of 
sensations or images. "^° Psychologically, meaning is context, 
but logically and metaphysically meaning is much more than 
psychological context; or, to put it the other way around, 
whatever meaning may be, psychology is concerned with it 
only so far as it can be represented in terms of contextual 
imagery. 

19 Let no epistemologist from my use of this word jump to the con- 
clusion that I am here advocating or binding myself to a representative 
theory of knowledge. That is a philosophical question of the ultimate 
nature of the relation between ideas and reality, whereas we are con- 
cerned here merely with the principles of scientific method in psychology. 
The ordinary man knows (or thinks he knows) without introspection or 
argument that things are and that his ideas are true: the psychologist 
introspects his consciousness of meaning, and finds in his mind imagery 
which symbolizes or represents its object. The plain man does not, and 
perhaps the philosopher should not, dualize mind and world : the psycholo- 
gist and the physicist must do just that. (v. Chap. V.) 

^^ A Beginner^ s Psychology, p. 118. 



I04 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

That is to say, the true meaning of the percept of the bell 
is its reference to the real objective bell; but the bell is not in 
the mind, and consequently the reference to it cannot be a 
psychological datum, but is rather a logical or metaphysical 
problem ; this reference to an objective thing may be however, 
and is, represented in the mind by certain contextual images 
as above described, and these constitute its meaning "translated 
into the language of" psychology. So the true meaning of an 
idea lies in its logical reference to an objective system of 
ideas, but this may be represented subjectively by the contex- 
tual images or sensations. 

One more illustration, from the American Journal of Psy- 
chology article above referred to. To say that one is puzzled 
(e.g,) is to use terms not descriptive of psychological facts, 
but expressive of "the import of a practical situation." Per- 
plexity as a psychological condition is analyzable into verbal, 
organic, and kinaesthetic imagery, and an affective factor; 
but its primary interest consists in the fact that it is a condi- 
tion in which one is perplexed about something, and this is not 
a psychological fact but a logical one.^^ Psychology, then, is 
not concerned at all with the reality of our percepts or with 
the truth, falsity, or logical uncertainty of our ideas, any more 
than it is with the rightness or wrongness of our conduct, but 
only with the constitution of these.^^ 

21 Op. cit, p. i68. 

22 Professor Titchener works out the distinction between psychological 
constitution and logical meaning in various special fields very thoroughly 
though simply in his Beginner's Psychology. I append the page refer- 
ences. — 

Tactile-motor Sensations : pp. 45-48. 

Organic Sensations: pp. 64 f. 

Attention: pp. 90-93. 

Perception of Distance: pp. 129 f. 

Association: pp. 145-149, 162-165, i68f. (Cf. his Text Book, pp. 374- 
378). 

Memory: pp. 184-186. (A memory-image means past experience, but 
this meaning is represented in the present memory-experience by the as- 
sociated images which constitute the "recognition" feeling or "feeling of 
familiarity.") 

Thought and Language : pp. 267-275. (Cf. Text Book, pp. 517 f.) 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 105 

60. Must Metaphysics Be Rejected F — ^We have assigned to 
science the realm of facts or phenomena, and to metaphysics 
the realm of values. In this, metaphysics is an elaboration of 
commonsense, as both of these have for their world a world 
of values. 

Many critics, however, — as, for example, Pearson — would 
demur at this division of the spoils of experience between 
science and metaphysics. "The material of science," says 
Pearson, ''is coextensive with the whole life, physical and 
mental, of the universe. ... To say that there are certain 
fields — for example, metaphysics — from which science is ex- 
cluded, wherein its methods have no application, is merely to 
say that the rules of methodical observation and the laws of 
logical thought do not apply to the facts, if any, which lie 
within such fields. These fields, if indeed such exist, must lie 
outside any intelligible definition which can be given of the 
word knowledge. "^^ Science "claims that the whole range of 
phenomena, mental as well as physical — the entire universe — 
is its field. It asserts that the scientific method is the sole 
gateway to the whole region of knowledge."^* "There is no 
sphere of inquiry which lies outside the legitimate field of 
science. To draw a distinction between the scientific and 
philosophical fields is obscurantism. "^'^ 

L. T. More, on the other hand, takes an almost contrary 
position. "The domain of physics," he says, "is concerned 
with the discovery of phenomena and the formulation of nat- 
ural laws based on . . . experience . . .; the causes of phe- 
nomena and the discussion of the postulates of science lie in 
the province of the metaphysician. This does not mean that 
such questions should not be discussed, but the method of their 
discussion and the results obtained are properly the method 
and results of metaphysics, and are not in the category of 
physical phenomena and laws."^® "The limitations of science 

23 Op. cit, p. 15. 
2* Op. cit, p. 24. 
25 op. cit, p. 37' 
2« The Limitations of Science, pp. 13 f. Quoted also above (56). 



io6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

are due solely to the fact that there are, in addition to material 
forces, others of an essentially different kind which may be 
called, for lack of a better name, spiritual powers. And so 
long as men of science restrict their endeavor to the world of 
material substance and material force, they will find that their 
field is practically without limits. . . . And it should distress 
no one to discover that there are other fields of knowledge in 
which science is not concerned. "^^ 

Both Pearson and More agree, as we have already seen 
(56), that the problem of science is description only; but 
whereas More is willing to hand over to another discipline, 
metaphysics, the problem of explanation and hypothesis, 
Pearson denies that there can be any room for metaphysics in 
the thinker's universe. The reconciliation of the conflict be- 
tween these two writers is to be found, I think, in the accep- 
tance of Pearson's claim that the "material" or subject-matter 
of science is coextensive with the whole universe, physical and 
mental, and an insistence that the distinction between science 
and metaphysics is not one of subject-matter but of point of 
view, problem, and method. The value point of view and the 
problem of interpretation are metaphysical, whereas science 
abstracts from value and has for its problem description and 
explanation — meaning by explanation what has already been 
asserted of it (52-55) ; and in the admission of that latter 
problem we take a stand in opposition both to Pearson and to 
More. More is right, therefore, in distinguishing metaphysics 
from science and insisting on its right to exist, but wrong in 
assigning the problem of explanation to that discipline. No 
fact is outside the field of scientific investigation, but on the 
other hand a scientific study of the universe is incomplete un- 
less supplemented by a metaphysical interpretation of the 
truths which science has worked out. 

3. Psychology as Science and as Metaphysics. 

61. Aspects of Personality. — Persons may be regarded from 
either one of two quite opposite points of view— (i) as Ob- 

27 Ibid., pp. 260 f . 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 107 

jects of scientific investigation, or (2) as Subjects similar to 
myself to be understood and appreciated. I may, according 
to my own purpose at the moment, view another personality 
in either way : I may wish merely to enter into "personal re- 
lations" with him — to discover the meaning and purpose of his 
conversation and behavior {interpretation) , and thereby share 
those purposes and meanings with him {appreciation) ; or I 
may wish to study him scientifically, to discover what pro- 
cesses are going on in his mind — what perceptions, memories, 
ideas, emotions, desires, etc., are present in his consciousness 
{description) — and how they are related to one another and 
to his past experience {explanation) . 

As Miinsterberg puts it : *Tn the most trivial conversations 
or in the most momentous situations of life, the mind with 
which we are dealing may ... be to us either a self into 
whose purposes we enter, or a bundle of mental states which 
are linked together."^® "If I meet a friend and we enter into 
a talk, I try to understand his thoughts and to share his views. 
I agree or disagree with him; I sympathize with his feelings, 
I estimate his purposes. In short, he is for me a centre of 
aims and intentions which I interpret: he comes in question 
for me as a self which has its meaning and has its unity. . . 
His personality lies in his attitude towards the surroundings, 
towards the world." Here is one aspect of his personality and 
one way in which I may treat him. "Yet I may take an en- 
tirely different relation to the same man. I may ask myself 
what processes are going on in his mind, what are the real 
contents of his consciousness — that is, what perceptions and 
memory pictures and imaginative ideas and feelings and emo- 
tions and judgments and volitions are really present in his 
consciousness. I watch him to find out, I observe his mental 
states, I do not ask whether I agree or disagree. . . . What I 
now find is not a self which shows itself in its aims and pur- 
poses and attitudes, but a complex content of consciousness 
which is composed of numberless elements. I might say in 

^^ Psychology, General and Applied, p. 12. 



io8 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

the first place that my friend was to me a subject whom I 
tried to understand by interpreting his meaning; and in the 
second case, an object which I understand by describing its 
structure, its elements, and their connections."^^ "In one case 
T wanted to interpret the man, and finally to appreciate him; 
in the other case I wanted to describe his inner life, and 
finally to explain it. The man whose inner life I want to 
share I treat as a subject, the man whose inner life I want to 
describe and explain I treat as an object/'^^ 

And "this twofold way of looking into the neighbor's mind 
shows itself no less when we think of our own mental life. 
. . . Our love and hate, our likes and dislikes, our agreeing 
and disagreeing, our thinking of this and of that, are the acts 
which stand for our personal life. We live in those feelings 
and emotions, and thoughts; we ourselves are those inner 
activities. And yet we may consider this same inner life as 
if we were spectators looking on at that procession of inner 
events, observing the happenings of our own consciousness 
[introspection] . Then we give our attention to the structure 
of our memories and imaginative ideas, perceptions and 
thoughts; and even our feelings and emotions and volitions 
then lie before us like objects of which we become aware. 
. . . A greater contrast can hardly be imagined: on the one 
side the stream of life in which our will and feeling and 
thought are to us meaning and expression of our self, and on 
the other side the neutral taking account of the processes in 
our mind as if they were a spectacle which we are objectively 
watching. "^^ 

62. Psychology vs. Metaphysics. — "Both ways of looking 
on man," says Miinsterberg, "are constantly needed,"^^ both 
are necessary for a thorough and comprehensive understand- 
ing of our fellows. "We actually rely on both in every prac- 

^^ Psychotherapy, pp. 11 f. Italics mine. 
80 Op. cit., p. 13. Italics mine. 
* 81 Psychology, General and Applied, pp. 12 f . 
^^Psychotherapy, p. 12. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 109 

tical situation, and wherever we recognize the one at the ex- 
pense of the other, we neglect certain life interests. The 
teacher may look on the pupil in the schoolroom as a free re- 
sponsible individual and may understand him as a centre of 
meaning. But if this were all he would neglect the mechanism 
of that young mind ; he might fatigue its will power, overbur- 
den its memory mechanism, neglect the hygienic conditions of 
its working and interfere with the processes of assimilation. 
On the other hand, . . . the teacher may look on the child 
only as a mental mechanism, where every change must be un- 
derstood as an effect of psychophysical causes, and every 
thought and feeling be regarded as a content of consciousness. 
But if this were all, the best meaning of instruction would be 
lost. A naked calculation of causes and effects would intrude 
where personal sympathy and personal tact ought to control 
the intercourse. The ideal value of the instruction would be 
lost. The child would be to the teacher nothing but a case of 
psychophysical activity [a valueless object], instead of being 
a free individual [a purposeful subject] with growing re- 
sponsibility worthy of personal interest."^^ 

Now, "if these two tendencies of practical life," these two 
distinct ways of looking at personality, "are carried to their 
extreme systematic form, they lead to two developed systems 
of psychology, the causal and the purposive/'^* The causal 
attitude carried out systematically and applied to personality 
or consciousness in general becomes scientific psychology, the 
purposive attitude so carried out and applied becomes rational 
psychology or metaphysics^^ 

63. Corresponding Attitudes toward Nature. — But there is 
after all nothing unique about the fact that we may take either 
one of two quite distinct attitudes toward personality, for the 
same thing is true of our relations to the physical world about 
us, the world of nature. 

^^ Psychology, General and Applied, p. 294. 

3*0/>. cit., p. 295. Italics mine. 

35 Cf. Psychotherapy, pp. 13 f . ; The Eternal Values, pp. 16-18. 



no THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

"I see before me the ocean with its excited waves splashing 
against the rocks and shore, I see the boats tossed on the 
stormy sea, and I am fascinated by the new and ever new im- 
pulses of the tumultuous waves. The whole appears to me 
like one gigantic energy, like one great emotional expression, 
and I feel deeply how I understand this beautiful scenery in 
appreciating its unity and its meaning. Yet would I think 
that it is the only way to understand this turmoil of the waters 
before me? I know there is no unity and no emotion in the 
excited sea; each wave is composed of hundreds of thousands 
of single drops of water, and each drop composed of billions 
of atoms, and every movement results from mechanical laws 
under the influence of the pressing water and air. There is 
hydrogen and there is oxygen, and there is chloride of sodium, 
and the dark blue color is nothing but the reflection of bil- 
lions of ether vibrations. But have I really to choose between 
two statements concerning the waves, one of which is valu- 
able and the other not? On the contrary, both have funda- 
mental value. If I take the attitude of appreciation, it would 
be absurd to say that this wave is composed of chemical ele- 
ments which I do not see ; and if I take the attitude of physical 
explanation, it would be equally absurd to deny that such ele- 
ments are all of which the wave is made. From one stand- 
point, the ocean is really excited; from the other standpoint, 
the molecules are moving according to the laws of hydro- 
dynamics. If I want to understand the meaning of this scene, 
every reminiscence of physics will lead me astray; if I want 
to calculate the movement of my boat, physics alone can help 
me."^« 

The former attitude that we take toward the ocean, toward 
nature in general, and toward the world of art, is the aesthetic 
attitude, the attitude of appreciation and interpretation — the 
other attitude is scientific, the attitude of description and ex- 
planation ; and both are valid, both are true, both are valuable. 
Each must be kept separate from the other, because confusion 

^^ Psychology, pp. lof. Italics mine. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY in 

between them will ruin the usefulness of both. As a psycho- 
logical attitude toward one's friend jeopardizes friendship 
and a personal attitude toward mind in general makes a scien- 
tific study of mind impossible ; so physical analysis or dis- 
section of a beautiful flower or picture or musical composition 
will destroy its beauty, and a sentimental attitude toward 
either will render a study of it from the point of view of 
physics impossible. 

4. Psychology and Real Life. 

64. Psychology and the True Personality. — All experiences, 
then, to return to the mental world, are at the same time ( i ) 
compounds of sensations, affections, etc., or phases of the 
stream of consciousness; and (2) expressions of the purposes 
and inner meanings of the self — according to the point of 
view. But though this is true, it would be absurd to insist that 
the two attitudes are equally true to the real inner nature of 
the mind. 

"If you and I talk with each other, I not only take you as 
a subject whom I am to understand, but I feel myself as a 
subject who agrees and disagrees, who likes and dislikes what 
you say, and who wants his own opinion to be understood. 
It is quite improbable that I am watching my mental states as 
objects, while we are engaged in our conversation. But if I 
afterward begin to think about it, I may very well call back 
those ideas and emotions of mine and make them pass before 
my inner eye as mere mental happenings which come and go 
like the clouds and the sunshine and the landscape outside." 
There is no question, however, that "the first standpoint is the 
more natural one," and the "second a somewhat artificial" 
though often necessary one. In the same way, "it is more 
natural to drink water than to analyze it in the laboratory," 
though "if we want to understand what we can expect from 
the water, we must determine its constitution and examine its 
properties. "^^ 

37 Miinsterberg, Psychology General and Applied, pp. 13 f . 



112 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

The true personality, mental life as it is actually experi- 
enced by the individual himself, is certainly not a mere ag- 
gregate of sensations, ideas, feelings, etc., but a living unity, 
a system of purposes. Our various acts, feelings, and thoughts 
are partial phases or expressions of that unitary personality — 
not distinct entities — teleologically, not causally, intercon- 
nected. "We remain identical with ourselves in our inner 
personal life because every purpose is . . . bound up with the 
general purpose of ourselves." But if, as psychologists, we 
wish to study our own and other minds scientifically, we must 
take the more artificial causal attitude: "the purposive unity 
must transform itself into endless complexity, and our [true] 
self becomes a composite of . . . elements."^^ Thus any 
scientific study of the mind involves a "tremendous transfor- 
mation of reality,"^^ the real inner life of personality being 
transformed into a complex of distinct elements which are in 
themselves merely constructions of the scientific imagination. 

A single instance will help to clarify our point. "Let us 
take," says Professor Washburn, "the emotion of sympathetic 
joy. I can describe this as the attitude in which I [i.e., my 
true unitary personality] recognize and rejoice in the exis- 
tence of joy in another self. I can also describe it perfectly 
well in terms of process psychology. The emotion of joy in 
general may be structurally analyzed into the sensational ele- 
ments of the idea or ideas occasioning the emotion, the sen- 
sational elements resulting from the bodily changes involved, 
and the resultant affective tone derived from all these sen- 
sational components. When the emotion is one of sympathetic 
joy, the only modification that our structural analysis needs is 
this: the occasioning idea is, in such a case, an idea of the 
emotion, that is, a weakened reproduction of the emotion, as- 
sociated with certain ideas which mean to us the personality of 
another — ideas of his appearance and movements or words, 

38 Miinsterberg, Psychotherapy, p. 52. 

38 Miinsterberg, Psychology General and Applied, p. 289. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 113 

perhaps."*** Professor Calkins instances this*^ as an argument 
for "self-psychology," but the point of the quotation is rather 
to emphasize the inadequacy and artificiality of any scientific 
treatment of mental processes. 

65. Physical Science and the Real World. — Precisely the 
same situation exists with reference to the physical sciences. 
To criticize the psychologist because his treatment of mind as 
a complex of elements is untrue to the real nature of person- 
ality, says Miinsterberg, is as stupid as it would be "to cast 
up against the physicist that his moving atoms do not represent 
the physical world because they have no color and sound and 
smell. If they sounded and smelled, the physicist would not 
have fulfilled his purpose."*^ The world of psychology is 
not the world of real life, nor is the physicist's world the 
world of sensory experience. 

So, Titchener : "The world which is most familiar, and to 
which our response is most direct and certain," is a "world of 
things and people, of boats and trains, of relatives and stran- 
gers, of quarrels and reconciliations, of successes and fail- 
ures." Physics, however, "deals not with boats and trains, 
but with masses and distances and velocities; and psychology 
deals not with quarrels and successes, but with emotions and 
voluntary actions,"*^ affective elements and conative trends. 

Commonsense, we may add in explanation of the above, is 
interested in boats and trains because we can use them in our 
daily life, and is interested in our quarrels and successes be- 
cause they mean something for our future happiness or the 
reverse. Science, on the other hand, both physical and mental 
science, is interested in the constitution of these things and in 
the laws of their functioning, and in their external significance 
only so far as a knowledge of this may throw light on the im- 
mediately scientific problems. 

*^ Journal of Philosophy, etc., Vol. II, p. 715 (1905). 

^^ Journal of Philosophy, etc., Vol. V, pp. 121 f. (1908). 

^^ Atlantic Monthly, May, 1898, p. 613. 

^^ American Journal of Psychology, Vol. XXIII, p. 167 (1912). 



114 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

The concepts of physical science — such concepts, for ex- 
ample, as energy, atoms, electrons, ether, and even matter it- 
self — are as much constructions of the scientific imagination 
as the psychologist's concepts of mental elem_ents and of mind 
as a mere sum-total of such elements (54). To take the 
former as ultimately real is the metaphysical error of ma- 
terialism. Physical science considers the world as a mechan- 
ism, and for that reason transforms the reality of the physical 
world as we know it in our ordinary experience into a world 
which is not recognizable at all to the man of commonsense. 

"It puts in the place of perceivable objects imperceivable 
atoms which are merely products of mathematical construction 
quite unlike any known thing." "These atoms are scientific- 
ally true, as their construction is necessary for that special 
logical purpose" ; "but it is absurd to think, with the material- 
istic philosopher, that these atoms form a reality which is 
more real than the known things, or even the only reality." 
"The physical science of matter is true, and is true without 
limit, and without exception: materialism is wrong from be- 
ginning to end."** 

In the same way, to regard the mental contents and elements 
of structural psychology as ultimately real is the metaphysical 
error of psychologism. "Psychology is right, but the psychol- 
ogism which considers the psychological elements and their 
mechanism as reality is wrong from its root to its top, and 
... is not a bit better than materialism." "The psychical 
mechanism has no advantage over the physical one ; both mean 
a dead world without ends and values — laws, but no duties; 
effects, but no purposes; causes, but no ideals. There is no 
mental fact which the psychologist has not to metamorphose 
into psychical elements ; and as this transformation is logically 
valuable, his psychical elements and their associative and in- 
hibitory play are scientifically true. But a psychical element, 
and anything which is thought as combination of psychical 
elements and as working under the laws of these psychical 

** Miinsterberg, Psychology and Life, p. 20. Italics mine. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 115 

constructions, has as little reality as have the atoms of the 
physicist. Our body is not a heap of atoms; our inner life is 
still less a heap of ideas and feelings and emotions and voli- 
tions and judgments, if we take these mental things in the 
way the psychologist has to take them, as contents of con- 
sciousness made up from psychical elements."*^ 

The upshot of the whole matter is that mental and physical 
science are exactly on a par with reference to the reality of 
their concepts. "Neither physical objects nor psychical ob- 
jects represent reality, but both are ideal constructions of the 
subject"*® — transformations of reality made for the purposes 
of science, and so having scientific truth even though not in 
themselves objectively real. 

66. The Necessity of a Scientific Study of the Mind. — From 
our discussion of the problems and methods of science, and of 
the relations between psychology and real life, two comple- 
mentary truths with regard to the scientific method of study- 
ing the mind stand out sharply before us — (i) the incom- 
pleteness ^ one-sidedness, and even unreality, of the scientific 
view of the mind; and (2) its logical necessity and scientific 
truthfulness. We have seen that a real understanding of the 
mind of one's friend depends not so much upon an analysis 
of its contents as upon an appreciation of its meanings — an 
entering into and sympathizing with the feelings and attitudes 
of the friend, rather than an impersonal observation of his 
behavior and a critical examination into what lies beyond. 
And yet there is the complementary truth that this impersonal, 
critical, scientific method of studying the mind has neverthe- 
less an essential function to perform. Let us see why this is 
so, and what this function is. 

Philosophy, as we have seen, is concerned solely with ends 
or purposes, science with the means or instruments for the at- 
tainment of those ends. Physical science transforms the re- 
ality of the living universe into a mechanism of atoms and 

*^ Op. cit., pp. 20 f . 
*« Op. cit., p. 19. 



ii6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

electrons because it is only through an understanding of the 
constitution and laws of nature that man has been able to be- 
come master of nature and to conform its processes to the 
fulfilment of his own purposes. In the same way, the psy- 
chologist has transformed the reality of the living personality 
into a mechanism of sensations and affections because it is 
only through that means that he may become in some degree 
the master of his own nature and the fashioner of his own 
destiny. The psychologist wishes "to understand the inner life 
as a system of causes and effects, and to recognize every ex- 
perience as the necessary result of foregoing conditions, in 
order to foresee what will happen in the mind and to influence 
it. If this is the purpose, any reconstruction of the inner life 
which helps toward this goal must be welcomed as psychologi- 
cal truth."*^ 

It is an important ethical maxim that we should treat other 
persons always as ends, never as means, and as a rule of 
moral conduct this is an inviolable principle. But all minds — 
other people's as well as our own — are means sometimes, for 
certain specific momentary purposes. Just as we use material 
objects as instruments for the attainment of our own ends, 
so persons may become instruments for the attainment of 
one another's ends; consequently, an understanding of the 
mechanism of the mind is necessary if we are to use our own 
minds as instruments for the accomplishment of our purposes. 

The justification for the scientific treatment of the mind, 
then, is a twofold justification — theoretical and practical — a 
better understanding of the mind, and a greater ability to 
control its activity for the fulfilment of our purposes.*^ If 
the artificial methods of science are helpful in these two ways, 
they are justifiable; otherwise, not. Professor Creighton has 
well stated this point. "It is possible," he says, "and often 
necessary, to pass from the concrete to the abstract — i.e., to 
adopt abstract analysis as a means to further concrete intel- 

*7 Miinsterberg, Psychology, General and Applied, p. 291. 
*8 Cf. sect. 55, on the Validity of Conceptual Hypotheses. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 117 

ligibility; but . . . the transformation into abstract terms can 
never be an end in itself, it is justifiable only when the process 
of abstraction serves to promote an understanding [theoretical 
justification] and to facilitate control [practical justifica- 
tion]."*^ 

Truth for science, then, is always relative to the scientific 
purpose : it consists not so much in the conformity of scientific 
concepts to reality as in their practical utility. In other words, 
these concepts are true for the purposes of science if they are 
practically or theoretically necessary even though they have 
no ultimate truth for metaphysics. 

67. The Place of the Contemporary Schools of Psychol- 
ogy. — The view we have been considering throughout the 
present chapter should throw new light upon the subject-mat- 
ter of the preceding chapter, in that it offers a reconciliation 
of structuralism and functionalism, acknowledging the place 
of each of these theories as important aspects of scientific psy- 
chology and giving "self -psychology" entirely over to meta- 
physics. Structural psychology treats the mind as a complex 
of sensations, affections, etc., and so has to do primarily with 
the problem of description — general description, analysis, and 
classification. Functional psychology treats mental processes 
as phases of a continuous stream of consciousness, and so has 
its primary value in the field of explanation. Now both of 
these are legitimate and scientific aims, but so soon as we dis- 
cuss mental acts as expressions of the purposes of a self, we 
have passed entirely out of the field of science into that of 
metaphysics. 

5. Psychology and Other ''Mental Sciences.'' 

68. The Mental Sciences and the Fine Arts. — At this point 
an important problem arises, namely, as to the relation which 
psychology bears to the other sciences which have to do with 
the human mind — the historical sciences, the social sciences 
(sociology, economics, politics), the linguistic sciences (phi- 

^^ Philosophical Review, Vol. XXIII, p. 166 (1914). 



ii8 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

lology, grammar, rhetoric) the normative sciences (logic, 
ethics, aesthetics) ; and to the arts which are the products of 
the human mind — painting, literature, music, and the rest. 
Does psychology bear the same relation to these mental sciences 
that physics and chemistry bear to the material sciences ? Are 
these so-called "mental sciences" indeed sciences at all, in the 
sense in which psychology has been defined to be a science? 

The problem clears considerably if we adopt the distinction 
first proposed by Professor Max Dessoir, in his History of 
Psychology^ between three points of view from which the 
mind may be, and throughout the history of thought has been, 
studied. From the beginning, this writer tells us, man has 
had a threefold interest in the study of the mind — (i) a re- 
ligious interest in the destiny of the soul, (2) a scientific in- 
terest in the mind as guiding principle of the body, and (3) 
a practical interest in the understanding of individual char- 
acter. Out of the first of these has developed what Dessoir 
calls Psychosophy, which corresponds to what we have in the 
preceding pages described as metaphysical, rational, or pur- 
posive psychology; out of the second has come what we now 
know as empirical or scientific Psychology; while the third 
constitutes what Dessoir denominates Psychognosis, the un- 
derstanding of the individual mind. 

Most worthy of notice is the above relation between "psy- 
chosophy" and "psychognosis," in that both of them, as op- 
posed to psychology proper, approach the mind from the 
purposive rather than the causal point of view; both of them 
aim to understand and interpret, rather than to explain, their 
objects ; both are concerned rather with motives and meanings 
than with processes and contents. But along with this close 
similarity in point of view is to be noticed also this important 
distinction between them — that psychognosis is concerned en- 
tirely with individual minds, whereas psychosophy is inter- 
ested in the universal, the nature of the mind as such. From 
this distinction of Dessoir's as a base, we can start out more 
understandingly upon our task of correlating psychology with 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 119 

the other mental sciences and arts referred to at the beginning 
of this section. 

Let us note first of all that when any one of us wishes to 
behold a true picture of human life and character, it is never 
to the psychological textbooks nor to the publications of the 
experimental laboratories that he goes, but rather to the his- 
tory books, the biographies, the character-studies of the poets 
and novelists. Of whom do we most naturally think as the 
greatest portray ers of human character — of Plato and Aris- 
totle, Locke and Spencer, Herbart and Wundt? or, rather, of 
Shakespeare and Balzac, Xenophon and Macaulay, Plutarch 
and Vasari? Would Hartley or Reid have depicted the life 
and character of Samuel Johnson better than Bo swell has 
done ? No one would hesitate as to the correct answer to these 
inquiries, and for the simple reason that everyone knows that 
it is the purpose of the scientist to analyze and explain rather 
than to understand and appreciate, and that the historian and 
literateur understand human nature as it really is far better 
than the psychologist because they approach it from the pur- 
posive rather than the causal point of view.^^ And it is for 
precisely the same reason that we turn to Wordsworth and 
Corot rather than to Linnaeus and Darwin for a true appre- 
ciation and understanding of the soul of the nature which 
lies about us. 

In the same way, the "normative sciences" are concerned 
with the evaluation of mental life — its meanings, ideals, pur- 
poses — rather than with the description and causal explanation 
of the actual mental processes of reasoning, feeling, and con- 
duct. Logic, ethics, and aesthetics are regarded as branches 
of philosophy rather than independent sciences because of this 

50 It is interesting at this point to call attention to the now forgotten 
controversy of a half-century ago over Buckle's theory that human his- 
tory is subject to the same causal laws that govern the history of the 
earth and the physical universe. Today the purposive theory of history, 
however, holds the stage unchallenged, (v. Thayer, Atlantic Monthly, 
Vol. 122, pp. 635 ff., Nov. 1918.) 



I20 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

very fact that, like metaphysics, they view their subject-matter 
purposively rather than causally. 

Contrasted, however, with the historical and normative 
groups of sciences, and the fine arts including literature, as 
purposive in their outlook and interpretative in their aim, are 
the distinctly causal and explanatory sciences of the social and 
linguistic groups. There can be no doubt that the point of 
view, methods, and aims of such sciences as sociology, eco- 
nomics, and politics, philology, grammar and rhetoric are the 
same as those of psychology and the physical sciences. When 
we say that psychology is the central mental science, then, it is 
with reference to the above groups that we speak; just as when 
we say that physics and chemistry are the central physical 
sciences, we are referring to their relation to astronomy, ge- 
ology, biology, and the rest. 

69. The Classification of the Sciences. — ^We have now re- 
plied to the first of the two inquiries propounded in the open- 
ing paragraph of the preceding section, but what of the sec- 
ond question? Are the so-called "sciences" of the historical 
and normative groups really sciences at all? The apparent 
confusion is due to the ambiguous use in our language of the 
term "science." In its broadest and historic sense the term 
includes all systems of knowledge, whether of the causal or 
the purposive type: in the stricter and more technical sense, 
however, it is limited to knowledge systems of the causal 
type, and it is in this latter significance that we have above 
(50-56) discussed the problems, aims, and methods, of science 
as opposed to those of metaphysics. We may avoid all am- 
biguity by speaking of the mechanistic or causal or positive 
sciences when referring to the narrower group. 

In the light of what has been said we may approach the 
age-old problem of the classification of the sciences, in which 
expression the broader meaning of the term "science" is al- 
ways connoted. In making our classification we are con- 
cerned only with the larger groups, and need not consider 
the place of every individual science in the general scheme, 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 121 

since our immediate purpose is merely to discover the place 
which psychology and the other so-called "mental sciences" of 
the preceding section occupy therein. 

The main division will be between the sciences strictly so- 
called, in accordance with our analysis in the early pages of 
the present chapter — i.e., the mechanistic or causal sciences, 
whose problems are description and explanation ; and the teleo- 
logical or purposive sciences, whose problems are appreciation 
and interpretation. The mechanistic sciences will include in 
their turn the two great groups of the material and the mental 
sciences, the latter being further specialized into psychology 
and the linguistic and social sciences, in all of which the aim 
is a mechanistic one and the methods causal rather than pur- 
posive. The teleological disciplines will include the historical 
and the philosophical sciences, distinguished by virtue of the 
fact that the former (like the fine arts) are interested in indi- 
viduals, either singly (biography) or in groups (history), 
whereas philosophy has to do with universals (reality, and the 
"norms" of thought, feeling, etc.). 

TABLE VI 
The Classification of the Sciences 

I. THE MECHANISTIC SCIENCES. (Causal point of view. Prob- 

lems : Description and Explanation.) 

A. Material Sciences: Physics, Chemistry; Astronomy, Geology; Bi- 

ology, etc. 

B. Mental Sciences — 

1. Psychology. 

2. Linguistic Sciences: Philology, Grammar, Rhetoric. 

3. Social Sciences: Sociology, Economics, Politics. 

II. THE TELEOLOGICAL SCIENCES. (Purposive point of view. 

Problems: Interpretation and Appreciation.) 

A. Historical Sciences (Individuals). 

1. History ] ,,„ , . „ 

2. Biography! Psychognosis. ' 

B. Philosophical Sciences (Universals). 

1. Metaphysics (including Rational Psychology or "Psychosophy"). 

2. Epistemology. 

3. The Normative Sciences: Logic, Ethics, Aesthetics. 



122 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

70. Psychology and Religion. — Most important is it in clos- 
ing this part of our subject to keep clearly in mind the inde- 
pendence of psychology and religion. By this expression I 
mean to emphasize the point that the results of scientific in- 
vestigation into the inner activities of the human mind can 
never have any effect one way or the other in determining the 
truth or validity of those experiences of the human mind 
which seem to give evidence of a personal relationship be- 
tween man and God. The determination of this latter point 
is distinctly an epistemological or philosophical problem, not 
a scientific one. Psychology may discuss as freely the mental 
processes involved in religious experience as it does those 
concerned in our experience of physical things, but in neither 
case do its decisions affect in either direction the question of 
the meaning, validity, or truthfulness of those experiences. 
The question of the nature of the processes undergone by the 
human mind in any spheres of activity is a question of fact, 
calling for analytical description and explanation in causal 
terms: the problem of the validity or truth-value of these 
processes is a question of meaning, calling for interpretation 
and appreciation. 

William James, in his wonderful chapter on "Religion and 
Neurology" in his Varieties of Religious Experience, has put 
to scorn forever those who maintain that "an existential ac- 
count of the facts of mental history" can "decide in one way 
or another upon their spiritual significance,"^^ and insists 
that the latter "can only be ascertained by spiritual judgments 
based on our own immediate feeling primarily; and second- 
arily on what we can ascertain of their experimental rela- 
tions to our moral needs and to the rest of what we hold as 
true. Immediate luminousness, in short, philosophical reason- 
ahleness, and moral helpfulness are the only available 
criteria."^^ 

As literature, music, and the other fine arts are allied with 

51 P. 14. 

52 p. 18. Italics the author's. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 123 

the historical sciences in their teleological view of human be- 
havior, so religion is allied with the philosophical sciences for 
the same reason. The former together constitute the "psy- 
chognostic" view of man, the latter the *'psychosophic" view 
of him, to follow out Dessoir's analysis (68). 

REFERENCES 
The Problems of Science — 

Hoffman, F. S., The Sphere of Science (1908): especially, 

Chaps. Mil, VII, IX. 
Pearson, Karl, The Grammar of Science (Third Edition, 

Vol. I, 1911). 
More, P. L., The Limitations of Science (1915). 

Conceptual Hypotheses in Psychology — 

Hart, Bernard, in Subconscious Phenomena, by various 

authors. Chap. VI, especially pp. 111-122. 
Hart, Bernard, The Psychology of Insanity, Chap. II. 

The Artificiality of Science — 

Titchener, A Beginner's Psychology, Chap. I. 
Miinsterberg, Psychology, General and Applied, Chap. II. 

" The Eternal Values, Chap. I. 

" Science and Idealism. 

Psychology and Meaning — 

Titchener, A Beginner s Psychology, Chap. V. 

" Text Book of Psychology, pp. 103-106. 

" American Journal of Psychology, XXIII, i65ff . 

(1912). 
Cf. Dewey, Mind, Old Series Vol. XII. 382 ff. (1887). 
[What he calls "idea as existence" is subject-matter of 
psychology: what he calls "idea as meaning" is subject- 
matter of logic] 

Psychology and Metaphysics — 

Klemm, History of Psychology, pp. 155-159. 
Miinsterberg, Psychology and Life, pp. 1-34. 
" Psychotherapy, Chap. II. 

" Psychology, General and Applied, Chaps. II, 

XXI, XXII. 
" The Eternal Values, Chaps. I and II. 

" Psychological Review, V, 639 ff. (1898), VII, 

I ff. (1900). 
Scripture, Mind, O. S., XVI, 319-324 (1891). 



124 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

The True Personality — 

Miinsterberg, Psychology, General and Applied, Book H, 
especially Part I, and most particularly Chap. XXH. 
Psychology and the other ''Mental Sciences" — 
Scripture, Op. cit., pp. 315-319. 
Miinsterberg, Psychology and Life, pp. 179-228. 

" Psychological Review Monograph Supple- 

ments, IV, 641 ff. 
(Contrast Creighton, Philosophical Review, XXIII, 
159 ff. 1914). 

Psychology and Religion — 

James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, Chap. I. 

Galloway, The Philosophy of Religion, Chap. VI. 

Moore, J. S., The Journal of Philosophy, etc., XV, 76 ff. 

(1918). 



CHAPTER V 

Psychology and the Material Sciences 

I. Theories of their Differentiation. 

71. The Problem. — We have now marked off the field of 
psychology from that of metaphysics and of the other mental 
sciences. It remains to us in the present chapter to determine 
the essential distinction between psychology and the sciences 
which have to do with material things. 

Wundt describes for us two theories as to the nature of this 
distinction — the Inner Sense theory, as we may call the first 
of these, and the Immediate Experience theory.^ We shall 
consider these in turn. 

y2. The Inner Sense Theory. — According to this, the tra- 
ditional view of the relationship between psychology and the 
non-mental sciences, the distinction is primarily one of "sphere'* 
or subject-matter. Experience is distinguished into two 
"spheres" — called "outer" and "inner" experience, respectively 
— the former being the sphere of the material sciences, the 
latter of psychology. The methods of investigation in these 
two fields also are thought of as correspondingly different, 
the data of the material sciences being derived through sense- 
perception (the "outer senses"), and the data of psychology 
through introspection (the "inner sense," as it was called).^ 

The distinction may be traced back historically to the ancient 
and mediaeval periods of philosophy, during which the phe- 
nomena of sensation and perception were commonly referred 
to the "outer sense," and the phenomena of ideation (memory, 
imagination, and thought) to the "inner sense." Such a view, 

1 Outlines of Psychology, translated by Chas. Hubbard Judd, §1 ; and 
§ 2, Nos. 3 and 4. Pp. 1-6, 8-1 1. (Page references are to the Third Re- 
vised English Edition, 1907.) 

2 V. Wundt, op. cit., pp. 8 f. Klemm, History of Psychology, pp. 69 ff. 

125 



126 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

is, of course, merely one phase of the faculty theory of the 
mind. 

Beginning with Locke (1632-1704) the more modern con- 
ception of the ''inner" and "outer" senses appears, according 
to which each of these represents a source of experience quite 
independent of the other. The line of demarcation is no 
longer, as under the older theory, between sense-perception as 
"outer" and ideation as "inner," but between all physical phe- 
nomena as objects of outer sense alone and all mental phe- 
nomena as objects of inner sense alone. In Locke's own 
terminology, the sources of all knowledge are two — (i) sen- 
sation, or "outer perception" {i.e., the physical sense-organs, 
to interpret his doctrine in modern terms), which gives us our 
knowledge of the material world; and (2) reflection, or "in- 
ner perception" (what we today call "introspection"), which 
gives us quite independently a knowledge of the workings of 
our own minds. Reflection always, according to Locke, pre- 
supposes sensation, and in both of them the mind is merely 
passive; and yet Locke insists that reflection is an entirely in- 
dependent source of experience from sensation. The follow- 
ing table may make this distinction and relationship clearer : 

Locke's Theory of the Sources of Knowledge 

Experience Sources Objects Sciences 

Outer Sensation (Physical Senses) Material World Material Sciences 
Inner Reflection (Introspection) Mental Processes Psychology 

Psychology, then, according to this general doctrine, is the 
science of inner experience, having for its subject-matter the 
phenomena of the inner sense: the material sciences are sci- 
ences of outer experience having for their subject-matter the 
phenomena of the outer sense. The distinction is a perfectly 
simple one, and, if simplicity were the only criterion of truth, 
an acceptable one; but as a matter of fact it will not hold when 
viewed in the light of modern criticism. This criticism in- 
cludes three principal points. 

In the first place, there is the objection that the inner sense 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 127 

theory involves a false diMdism between the two sources of 
knowledge. Modern psychology refuses to admit any such 
sharp divisions of organs of knowledge or of spheres of ex- 
perience. Experience is one, and the difference between 
"inner" and "outer" merely a distinction in point of view."^ 

In the second place, the field of psychology is really inclusive 
of that of the material sciences, and even more extensive than 
the latter. It is true that there are some contents of experience 
which are open to investigation by psychological methods 
alone — the world of ideas, memories, feelings, etc. ; but, on the 
other hand, any physical phenomenon may become an object 
of psychological investigation also. Sensations, in other 
words, are both mental and material objects. "A stone, a 
plant, a tone, a ray of light, are, when tested as natural phe- 
nomena, objects of mineralogy, botany, physics, etc. In so 
far, however, as they are at the same time ideas [sensations] , 
they are objects of psychology. . . . There is, then, no such 
thing as an 'inner sense' which can be regarded as an organ 
of introspection, and so distinct from the outer senses, or or- 
gans of objective perception."* 

Finally, it is well to point out that the inner sense view of 
psychology inevitably gives rise to the necessity of showing the 
relation between the two kinds of experience and the two or- 
gans of knowledge assumed, and to do this is to call in meta- 
physical and epistemological presuppositions and hypotheses to 
the detriment of the purely scientific interests of psychology.** 
On all these grounds the subject-matter distinction between 
psychology and the natural sciences must be rejected. 

73. The Immediate Experience Theory of psychology in its 
relation to the material sciences, defended by Wundt, makes 
the distinction between them one of point of view rather than 
of subject-matter. It "recognizes no real difference between 
outer and inner experience, but finds the distinction only in 

3 Klemm, op. cit., p. 71. 

* Wundt, op. cit., p. 2. Cf. sect. 31, sup. 

5 Ibid., pp. 9 f , 



128 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

the different points of view from which unitary experience is 
considered in the two cases."® There are no longer two dis- 
tinct fields of experience, but one experience which may be 
studied in either of two ways. 

Wundt explains the basis of the distinction by reference to 
the two factors involved in every concrete experience, namely, 
(i) a content objectively presented to the mind — and (2) a 
subject ("mind") to whom this content is presented — in brief, 
an experienced object and an experienced subject. Every con- 
crete experience involves these two factors — that I as subject 
apprehend or experience some content objectively presented 
to me. 

Now, according to the theory of immediate experience, the 
natural sciences "concern themselves with the objects of ex- 
perience, thought of as independent of the subject," whereas 
psychology "investigates the whole content of experience in 
its relations to the subject."^ The distinction is, therefore, en- 
tirely one of point of view. "The point of view of natural 
science may be designated as that of mediate experience, since 
it is possible only after abstracting from the subjective factor 
present in all experience; the point of view of psychology, on 
the other hand, may be designated as that of immediate ex- 
perience, since it purposely does away with this abstraction."^ 

By "immediate" experience, therefore, Wundt means prac- 
tically experience "just as it comes," the total "content" in its 
relation to the experiencing subject; by "mediate" experience 
he means the purely objective factor, the objects of experience 
thought of as independent of the subject experiencing them. 
Psychology and the natural sciences may, according to this 
theory, and in conformity with the considerations brought 
forward in the preceding section, investigate precisely the same 
objects, the former from the "immediate" and the latter from 
the "mediate" point of view. Thus we may have on the one 
hand, physical experiments on light, sound, weight, etc., and 

^ Ibid., p. 9. 
7 Ibid., p. 3. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 129 

on the other hand psychological experiments on sight, hearing, 
weight-discrimination, etc. : in the former of these we are ab- 
stracting the objective factor and rejecting the subjective, 
studying the objects as they may exist independently of our- 
selves; and in the latter we are taking experience just as it 
comes to us, and without abstracting or rejecting any factor: 



PSYCHOLOGY 

(Science of "Immedi- 
ate Experience") 



Experience 



Subjective 
Factor 



Objective ) MATERIAL SCIENCES, 
Factor C (of "Mediate Experience") 



For this view of our problem Wundt claims two advantages 
especially® — (i) that it allows for the use of the same well- 
tested scientific methods in the study of both mental and ma- 
terial things; (2) that *'from this point of view, the meta- 
physical question of the relation between psychical and physi- 
cal objects disappears entirely," since these are no longer con- 
sidered as "different objects at all, but one and the same con- 
tent of experience," viewed now "after abstracting from the 
subject," and now in "its complete relation to the subject. All 
metaphysical hypotheses as to the relation of psychical and 
physical objects are, when viewed from this position, attempts 
to solve a problem which never would have existed if the case 
had been correctly stated," and so may be dispensed with 
altogether. 

74. Criticism and Concltmons. — Now, as between these two 
theories the school of Immediate Experience is undoubtedly 
right in overruling its opponent's division of the mind into 
two different organs and of experience into two separate 
spheres, and in making the distinction between psychology and 
the material sciences one purely of point of view. But if 
our contentions in the last chapter regarding the nature of 
science in general are worthy of support, a further point 
of the Immediate Experience theory is open to objection — 

8 Op, cit., pp. 10 f . 



I30 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

namely, the assertion of Wundt that psychology is a concrete 
science and that the natural sciences are by contrast abstract.^ 

The natural sciences do, as Wundt contends, abstract the 
objective factor of experience and disregard the subjective, 
but is it not just as true that psychology abstracts the sub- 
jective factor and disregards the objective? — at least, if by 
objective we mean, "that which is independent of the ex- 
periencing subject." To apply Wundt's own illustration (p. 
2), the natural sciences are interested in stones, plants, tones, 
rays of light, etc., as objects which exist whether anyone ob- 
serves them or not : as such, these sciences are abstract in their 
treatment of these objects, because they disregard the sub- 
jective factor which is involved when someone does observe 
them. On the other hand, psychology is interested in these 
same objects only so far as they are parts of the experience 
of some individual subject, and disregards all phenomena 
which take place in connection with those objects when some- 
one does not observe them. Psychology, for this reason, is 
just as "abstract" in its point of view as the material sciences, 
but the two groups of sciences are abstract in different direc- 
tions. 

All sciences, then, are, by their very nature as sciences, ab- 
stract in their point of view and artificial in their methods, and 
only Philosophy is absolutely and thoroughly concrete. Phi- 
losophy and science are alike empirical, in that they are all 
studies of experience; but whereas psychology abstracts the 
subjective factor of experience and the natural sciences the 
objective factor, philosophy, and philosophy alone, studies ex- 
perience as a concrete whole. This conclusion is symbolized 
in a table which will be found at the bottom of page 131, and 
which should for purposes of contrast be compared with the 
table symbolizing Wundt's theory in the preceding section. 

But though the conclusion above set forth may be said to 
afford a satisfactory explanation of the relation between psy- 
chology and the natural sciences so far as they have to do with 
9 Op. cit., pp. 3-5 (Nos. 3 and 3a). 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 131 

the same objects, it is defective in that it does not allow for 
that large group of contents of experience referred to above 
{y2) which we especially associate with psychology, and which 
cannot become objects of investigation by the material sciences 
at all — I mean, the so-called "world of ideas," of memories, 
feelings, desires, etc. So far the problem has been, ''How do 
psychology and the material sciences differ in their respective 
studies of those physical things which are also possible con- 
tents of experience?" The problem now becomes, ''What is 
there about ideas and things which make both of them con- 
tents of experience, and objects of psychological investigation, 
and removes the former entirely from investigation from the 
natural sciences without also removing the latter?" We seem 
to have three kinds of objects instead of two — (i) "things" 
as objects of investigation by the natural sciences, (2) "things" 
as objects of investigation by psychology, and (3) "ideas" as 
objects of investigation by psychology alone. Our previous 
discussion has taken care of the relation between the first two 
of these groups. What are we to say about the second and 
third groups in their relation to the first? 

Now we have a name for those things which are "objects 
of investigation by psychology" : we call them "mental con- 
tents" or "mental facts," and distinguish them from the "ma- 
terial facts" (group i, above) which the natural sciences 
study. All sciences, we say, have to do with facts, but there 
are two great groups of facts — mental facts, which psychol- 
ogy studies, and material facts, which are investigated by the 
natural sciences: our next task is to differentiate clearly be- 
tween these two great groups of facts. 



PHILOSOPHY 



Experience 



Subjective \ Psychology 
Factor 

Objective ^Material Sciences 

Factor J 



132 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

2. The Differentiation of Mental from Material Facts. 

75. The Non-Spatial Character of Mental Objects. — The 
most obvious distinction characteristic of mental objects is a 
purely negative one — namely, their non-spatial character. A 
comparison of mental objects with physical shows them to 
possess a variety of attributes in common — as quality, inten- 
sity, number, and the temporal or time attributes of duration, 
coexistence, succession, etc. ; but the spatial or space attributes 
which physical objects also possess — extension, weight, in- 
ertia, motion, position, etc. — are entirely inapplicable in the 
realm of mental phenomena. Ideas and feelings may be strong 
or weak, few or many, brief or of long duration, simultaneous 
or successive, just as physical things or events may be; but 
we cannot think of an idea as measuring so many cubic inches, 
weighing so many pounds, or moving from one place to an- 
other. "To realize this truth," says Dr. Sidis, "I think it a 
good preliminary psychological exercise for the reader to try 
to find how many grams or grains his idea of beauty weighs, 
how many millimeters long, wide, and high his feelings of 
love are; let him indulge in the fancy of conceiving an en- 
gineer building a bridge with mathematical formulae as links, 
and his feelings of virtue and patriotism as supports."^^ 

But though the distinction is a simple one to grasp in its 
main outlines, it is extremely difficult to comprehend in its full 
significance. One may freely admit the truth of the statement 
that mental objects do not exist in space and have no space 
characteristics, but when we come to apply this truth in specific 
instances we find it to be by no means easy to do so. Our in- 
terests are ordinarily so wrapped up in material things, our 
very language so permeated with spatial terminology and 
figures of speech, and our mental life itself so dependent on 
material sense-data and imagery, that it is quite inevitable 
that we should constantly fall into materialistic ways of think- 
ing when we make our mental processes themselves our ob- 
jects of study. How natural it is to speak and think of the 
10 The Foundation of Normal and Abnormal Psychology, p. 19. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 133 

mind as ''in the brain," or ''in the head" just as the brain is 
"in the head" ; or even to go so far as to identify mental pro- 
cesses with brain processes. The average person makes no dis- 
tinction whatever between an animal's or a man's "mind" and 
that same animal's or man's "brains," to employ the common 
pluralization of the latter term; and this confusion is sup- 
ported rather than cleared away by the too prevalent tendency 
among physiologists and others to identify mental with cere- 
bral processes. And yet the tendency is altogether a falla- 
cious one. As Dr. Sidis says again, "psychic life is no doubt 
the concomitant of nervous brain activity, and certain psychic 
processes may depend on definite local brain processes; but 
the given psychic process is not situated in a definite brain 
centre, nor for that matter is it situated anywhere in space."^^ 
It would be just as true, and just as false, for me to say, if I 
am thinking of a mountain in Japan, that my mind is in Japan, 
as to say that my mind is in my brain : as a matter of fact it 
is not, in the usual local significance of that preposition, in 
either place. The mind may be "in" the brain in the sense 
that the harmony is "in" the musical chord, or that the artist's 
soul is "in" his painting; but this does not involve any spatial 
relation between the one or the other in any case, but only a 
functional relation. 

And as it is with the attribute of location or position, so 
also is it as regards the attributes of size, weight, shape, etc. 
Although it is by no means so common to think of the mind 
as having a size, shape, or weight as it is to think of it as lo- 
cated in the brain or in the head, there is a common popular 
error which amounts in the end to the same spatializing of 
the mind as that which we have already observed and con- 
demned. Ask the average man who asserts that his mind is 
located in his brain how large or how heavy he thinks his 
mind to be, or whether it is spherical, cubical, conical, or what 
not, in shape; and he will probably admit the inappropriate- 
ness of the question, though as a matter of fact such a ques- 

11 Op. cit., pp. 24 f . Italics mine. 



134 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

tion is no more inappropriate than the question of location. 
But press him further as to what he means by denying size, 
weight, and shape to his mind, it is quite possible that he may 
reply that the mind is too small and too light to be measured 
or weighed, or may imply in his answer that such is his real 
view of the matter. But to reduce the size and weight of 
the mind to a minimum does not deprive it of spatiality alto- 
gether, and it is only by refusing to apply spatial notions to 
the mind at all that we can satisfy the demands of our nega- 
tive conception. 

76. Consciousness as Potential Energy. — Obvious as the 
above considered distinction between mental and physical facts 
seems to be, there are some who would deny its validity and 
insist that mental phenomena like physical ones have spatial 
attributes. Among these is Professor W. P. Montague, whose 
doctrine that consciousness is a form of potential physical 
energy I shall briefly consider in the present section.^^ 

In the first place, Professor Montague seeks to justify the 
plain man's belief that his consciousness is located in his head 
on the ground that in so believing he is merely applying to 
the series of mental processes ''a rule which has always proved 
valid for the location of every other series of events" — namely, 
that ''every invisible thing is in the same place as the visible 
thing which varies directly and immediately with it." For 
example, "electricity, though in itself invisible, is located in 
the battery and wires on which it is found to depend" ; gravi- 
tation is located in the masses which it seems to hold together, 
and in the space between them; etc. With equal right, says 
Professor Montague, "we locate the invisible mental processes 
of other persons in their visible bodies because . . . they vary 
directly and immediately with . . . the central nervous sys- 
tem of their owner."^^ 

This inference of the "plain man" is, of course, based on 

12 The Monist, XVIII, pp. 21 ff. (1908). Also, in "Essays Philosophical 
and Psychological in Honor of William James," same year, pp. 105 ff. 
'^^ Monist article, p. 22. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 135 

an identification of functional relationship with location. If 
two things vary together, we do naturally infer that there is 
some logical connection between them, but to infer their lo- 
cation one within the other on this ground alone is surely to 
advance beyond the evidence. And to extend an inference, 
which may be justified as regards the mutual relations of 
things recognized to be physical, beyond the physical to include 
the mutual relations of things and mental processes, is still 
more unwarranted. We have no right, then, to infer that the 
mind is located in the brain merely because mental and cerebral 
processes vary concomitantly; and this negative conclusion re- 
ceives positive confirmation when we pass to the second point 
of Professor Montague's doctrine. 

This second point is that though mental processes have lo- 
cation, they do not all (though some do) have size and shape. 
Objectors, he says,^* erroneously assume that to locate mental 
processes in space would be to attribute size and shape to 
them, but this is true only so far as visual and tactual ex- 
periences are concerned. Pains, odors, sounds, etc., are located 
in space, though they have no size or shape. "It is only with 
color, and to a less extent with solidity, that spatiality [size] 
and figure [shape] are indissolubly associated." 

But in this argument Professor Montague is at the same 
time confusing mental experience with the physical objects of 
that experience, and also drawing an invalid antithesis be- 
tween two groups of sensory experience. So far as pains, 
odors, sounds, etc., are qualities of physical things — our 
bodies, flowers, organ pipes, etc. — they do have size and shape 
as well as location. As sensations, however, in my mind, as 
parts of my mental experience, these pains, odors, and sounds 
have neither size, shape, nor location; but precisely the same 
things are true of colors and solids — as physical objects and 
qualities they have all these spatial attributes, as sensations 
or mental experiences they have none of them. The only valid 
basis of distinction between the two groups of sensory ex- 

^* Op. cit., p. 2Z- 



136 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

periences is the fact that visual and tactual experiences alone 
seem to give us our direct knowledge of space and its attri- 
butes, and that whatever knowledge of space we may have 
through smell, sound, and the other sensations seems to be 
indirect and indistinct ; but that the experiences themselves are 
non-spatial and the objects of those experiences spatial is true 
of both groups of sensations. 

Professor Montague sums up these ifirst two points of his 
argument in the statement that consciousness occupies space 
intensively — "as the force of gravity between two planets, or 
the stress in a watch spring" — rather than extensively. Con- 
sequently, and this is his third and constructive suggestion, 
consciousness is not a form of matter but of energy, and, more 
specifically, of potential energy. This accounts for the fact 
that mental processes cannot be perceived by an external ob- 
server. "Objects, in order to be perceived by us, must impress 
our sense organs with some kind of kinetic energy. Kinetic 
energy is a public fact, externally accessible to many observers ; 
but potential energy, which is admitted to be in space, can only 
be externally perceived by passing into a kinetic state — that is, 
by ceasing to be itself. To feel it as it is, we must participate 
in it. To perceive a stress, our muscles must undergo stress ; 
just as to perceive a pain or pleasure, we must be pained or 
pleased."^^ 

Consciousness, therefore, is identified by Montague with 
potential energy, though not with all potential energy, but only 
with some — namely, the potential energy of brain currents.^® 
It is a form of potential energy-— that form which is found in 

15 Op. cit., p. 25 and note. Italics mine. 

16 R. McDougall, however, thinks that the potential energy theory 
of consciousness involves the notion that "wherever latent energy appears, 
consciousness must be posited. It is thus," he adds, "made a character- 
istic not of nervous matter or of living substance, but of all grades of 
material organization, and may appear equally [i.e., with equal reality] 
in a stone and in a man"; though probably in different degrees of com- 
plexity in the various cases. (American Journal of Psychology, XXV, 
p. 491. 1914.) 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 137 

the nerve currents of the brain. The briefest comparison, 
however, of the results of introspection with those of neuro- 
logical investigation shows at once that mental processes and 
neural processes are not identical in themselves, even should 
they have an identical source. In fact Professor Montague 
himself gives away his entire point when he says: "what we 
know directly from within as the psychical or subjective side 
of experience may be the same as what we know indirectly 
from without as the potential energy of the nerve-currents of 
the brain."^^ And again, in another article published the same 
year: "what I, from within, would call my sensations are 
neither more nor less than what you, from without, would de- 
scribe as the forms of potential energy to which the kinetic 
energies of neural stimuli would necessarily give rise in pass- 
ing through my brain. "^® Here we have a distinction of 
aspects, which destroys the absolute identity of consciousness 
and potential energy, and admits all that the advocate of the 
non-spatial character of mental processes could desire. Con- 
sciousness may be correlated with the potential energy of the 
brain, may be the subjective aspect of the latter, but cannot be 
identified with it. This is what is known in philosophy as the 
"double aspect theory" of the relation between the mental and 
the physical,^^ and is practically the position which we shall 
adopt at the close of the present discussion (80) ; but to say 
that consciousness is the subjective aspect of the potential 
energy of the brain is not to say that "consciousness is in the 
brain'' in the local or spatial sense, but merely that con- 
sciousness is functionally related to the potential energy which 
is in the brain. 

We adhere, then, to our first characterization of mental facts 

^"^ Monist article, p. 27. Italics mine. 

^^ Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James, 
p. 128. Whole passage is in italics in original. 

19 C/. Warren, Psychological Review, XXI, pp. 79 ff. (1914). Espe- 
cially, p. 83: "if Professor Montague regards consciousness as the inner 
aspect of potential energy, then he merely adds a limiting clause to the 
double aspect theory." 



138 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

as non-spatial. This is a merely negative definition, however : 
it tells us what mental facts are not, but not v/hat they are. 
The essential positive characteristic of mental facts is their 
privacy, to the discussion of which we shall now turn. 

yy. The Privacy of Mental Facts vs. the Comnmnity of Ma- 
terial Facts. — The essential characteristic of physical or ma- 
terial facts is that they are common objects of experience for 
all experiencers : the essential characteristic of psychical or 
mental facts is that they are private objects of experience for 
one experiencer only. Physical facts are by their very na- 
ture facts which may be experienced by any number of experi- 
encers together: mental facts are by their very nature facts 
which may be experienced by only one experimencer. This 
is the distinction between mental and physical that meets 
with the approval of the greatest number of modern investi- 
gators of the problem — such psychologists, for example, as 
Miinsterberg, Royce, Calkins, Titchener, Stout, etc. I shall 
quote at length from the writings of two of these. 

When we examine, says Professor Calkins, the contrast be- 
tween the so-called "inner phenomena" of perception, feeling, 
memory, etc., and the things and events of the so-called "out- 
side world," "we find two reasons for it. In the first place, 
the inner facts — the memories, emotions, and all the rest — are 
realized as private, unshared experiences belonging to me 
alone; whereas the things or events are public, shared facts, 
common property, as it were. My fear or delight is my own 
private experience; and so, for that matter, is my perception, 
for I have my own particular way of looking at everything, 
which I share with no one else. But the beast who frightens 
me, the spring day which delights me, the sunset of which I 
have my own particular perception — all these are public facts 
shared with an unlimited number of other selves, facts which 
no longer bear the stamp of my individuality." This is the 
first and essential distinction, but "close upon [it] follows 
another. Just because the shared or public facts are not re- 
ferred to any particular self, they tend to seem independent of 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 139 

all selves, and to become externalized; whereas the private 
facts continue to be referred to a self, and in this way, also, 
are contrasted with events or things which seem to us quite 
cut off from selves. "^° To this secondary and subsidiary dis- 
tinction we shall return in the next section. 

As Professor Royce has stated it : "By our mental life, as 
opposed to our physical life, we mean a certain collection of 
states and of processes with which, from moment to moment, 
each one of us is, in his own case, very directly and imme- 
diately acquainted; while, on the other hand, it is impossible 
that anyone else besides the original observer, whose mental 
life this is, should ever get this immediate sort of acquaintance 
with just this collection of states and processes. Herein, then, 
lies the essential characteristic of our mental life. Others may 
learn, from observing our acts and our words, a great deal 
about this, our own mental life, but each one of us is the only 
being capable of becoming directly aware of his own mental 
states. On the other hand, however, our physical life, in its 
external manifestations, may be observed by anyone who gets 
the opportunity. . . . Thus physical facts are usually con- 
ceived as 'public property,' patent to all properly equipped ob- 
servers. All such observers, according to our customary view, 
see the same physical facts. But psychical facts are essentially 
'private property,' existent for one alone. "^^ 

The objection which may be offered that our inner physio- 
logical processes also are "private" and open to our observa- 
tion alone, and yet are not therefore considered to be mental, 
is commented on by Royce as follows : "The fact that other 
observers cannot directly watch our inner physiological pro- 
cesses is itself something relatively accidental, dependent upon 
the limitations of the sense organs, or upon the defective in- 
strumental devices, of those who watch us. But the fact that 
our mental states are incapable of observation by anybody but 
ourselves seems to be not accidental, but an essential character 
of these mental states. Were physiologists better endowed 

20 Introduction to Psychology, p. 6. 

21 Outlines of Psychology, pp. i f . 



I40 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

with sense organs and with instruments of exact observation, 
we can, if we choose, conceive them as, by some unknown de- 
vice, coming to watch the very molecules of our brains; but 
we cannot conceive them, in any possible case, as observing 
from without our pains or our thoughts in the sense in which 
physical facts are observable. "^^ 

Several critics have denied the validity of this distinction, 
which seems so fundamental to those who uphold it, just as 
the non-spatial theory of mental phenomena is rejected by 
many. I shall quote from four of these criticisms, comm.ent- 
ing upon each of them. 

"It is so far from self-evident," says one, "that each man's 
mental state is his own indisputable possession, that no one 
hesitates to confess at times that his neighbor has read him 
better than he has read himself, nor at other times to claim 
that he knows his neighbor's state of mind more truly than the 
neighbor himself knows it."^^ Of course, we reply; but this is 
inference, the "knowledge about" lof which Royce speaks 
above, not direct "knowledge of observation." The very term 
used (to "read") shows this; for to read, here, means to in- 
terpret behavior, not to observe directly. I, only, am con- 
scious of my own mental states; but others may understand 
them much better than I do. 

Professor Bawden objects^* that if psychology is "concerned 
with what is common to many or to all human minds,"^^ and 
if only that which is physical is "common," then psychology 
cannot deal with the "psychical" at all. We must, then, either 
accept Professor Baldwin's distinction between the "psychical" 
and the "psychological,"^® or else give a different meaning to 

22 op. cit., p. 4. Italics mine. 

23 Singer, /own of Philosophy, etc., VIII, p. 180 (1911). 
^^Philosophical Rev., XIII, pp. 315-321 (1904). 

25 Royce, Outline of Psychology, p. 17. 

26 In his Development and Evolution (pp. 4 f.). Professor Baldwin de- 
fines the "psychological" as the mental "viewed from the outside" — i.e., 
objectively, as that which is common to all minds; and the "psychical" as 
the mental as experienced by some individual mind — i.e., as subjective. 
This difficulty will be returned to in Division 3 of the present chapter. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 141 

the former. But though the Baldwin terminology has its un- 
doubted uses, it is quite unnecessary to press it into service in 
this connection; and Professor Bawden's objection is otP 
viously grounded in an ambiguous interpretation of the word 
"common." Mental facts may be "private'* or "not-common" 
objects so far as observation is concerned, and yet the facts 
about mental life may be "common" to all normal minds; just 
as what is in the usual sense "my property" (money, land, etc.) 
is most certainly not "common property," although there are 
laws which apply to all "private property," and so are "com- 
mon" principles governing "private property" in general. 
Psychology, then, has to do with the "common" principles of 
that "private" thing which we call mental life. 

But the most complete and searching criticism of the privacy 
theory of mental contents is that of Professor Perry.^^ "It is 
characteristic of content of mind, such as perceptions and 
ideas, to belong to individual minds," he admits. "My idea 
is mine; and in some sense, then, falls within my mind. . . . 
But it does not follow,^' he insists, ''that my idea may not also 
he your idea. ... It will doubtless remain true that my idea 
simply, and your idea of my idea, will differ through the ac- 
cession of the last cognitive relationship;^® and that in this 
sense my idea cannot be completely identicaP^ with your idea. 
But it is impossible even to state this trivial proposition with- 
out granting that you may know^^ my idea, which is the point 
at issue."'^ 

Is this, however, the tru;e "point at issue"? Certainly, no 
one can deny the "trivial proposition" and its underlying as- 
sumption referred to. All would cheerfully agree that my 
idea may in some perfectly valid sense be the same as your 
idea, but are they by that fact one identical idea ? That is the 
real point at issue: can one identical idea be in two different 

^"^ Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 286-298. 

28 That is to say, "will differ by virtue of the fact that *my idea* is 
mine and 'your idea of my idea' yours." 

29 Italics mine. 

30 Op. cit., pp. 286 f . 



142 THE FOUNDATIONSrOF PSYCHOLOGY 

minds? To this question, Professor Perry practically admits 
the negative reply which we also are defending. The essence 
of an "idea," as we see it, is that it can be only in one mind; 
but one mind may certainly know an idea in another mind — 
whether directly or indirectly (v. Perry's p. 290) is indifferent. 

The essence of the doctrine we are defending, in its relation 
to Professor Perry's criticism, is stated by Professor Rogers, 
in a reply to Perry, as follows : "I can say plausibly that my 
idea, and my neighbor's idea which it knows, are the *same' 
idea, because usually in such a statement I am concerned with 
content^ and not with psychological existence'' — or, as I should 
rather put it, "because in such a statement I am concerned 
with meaning, and not with psychological content/' "But it 
is not so plausible to affirm that my idea of his emotion, and 
the emotion itself, are the same. And it is of course on the 
side of existence that the imperviousness of minds is intended 
to be understood. ''^^ 

Compare also the following words of Miinsterberg: "The 
star which I see is conceived as the same star which you see." 
But "my visual impression of the star, that is, my optical per- 
ception, is a content of my own consciousness only, and your 
impression of the star can be a content of your consciousness 
only. We both may mean the same by our ideas, but I can 
never have your perception and you can never have my per- 
ception. My ideas are enclosed in my mind. I may awaken 
in your mind ideas which have the same purpose and mean- 
ing, but they are new copies in your mind. We both may be 
angry, but your anger can never be my anger, and your voli- 
tions can never enter my mind."^^ 

This, then, in brief, is our position: as psychological con- 
tent or "existence," ideas in two different minds are by that 
very fact two ideas, though in their logical meaning they may 
be the same idea. 

78. Sidis's Doctrine of Mental vs. Physical. — Dr. Sidis sub- 

^^Jour. of Philosophy, etc., XIII, pp. 169 ff. (1916). 
32 Psychotherapy, pp. 18 f . Italics mine. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 143 

stitutes for the prevailing Privacy-Community distinction be- 
tween mental and physical facts a distinction of Internality vs. 
Externality.^^ Physical facts, he says, are (i) external and 
(2) independent of consciousness: mental facts are (i) in- 
ternal and (2) dependent on consciousness. Of these, the first 
is taken as the primary distinction, and the other is added at 
the close of his chapter on the subject as further definitive of 
the primary distinction. 

"Psychologically considered, the characteristic trait of a 
physical object is not that it is common, but that it is external" 
we are told. "The tree yonder is to me a physical object, not 
because it is common to many minds, but because I perceive it 
as external, the sensory elements of the perception carry with 
them external objectivity."^* "It is true that community of 
object is one of the criteria of external reality, but it is cer- 
tainly not true that the community of the object gives rise to 
the perception of externality. It may, on the contrary, be 
claimed, and possibly with far greater reason, that it is the 
object's externality that gives rise to its community."^^ In 
other words, the physical universe , genetically regarded, is ex- 
ternal not heccmse it is common, hut it is common because it 
is external."^^ Externality is the original criterion: com- 
munity, the derived criterion. 

Criticism of this position involves three points: (i) the 
genetic question raised by Sidis, as to whether community or 
externality is the original subjective or mental criterion of 
objective or physical reaHty; (2) the question of fact, as to 
whether externality is per se a sufficient psychological cri- 
terion of the physical; and (3) the question of definition, as 
to whether the internality-externality distinction is a logically 
defensible one. 

The first question is not an important one for our discus- 

^^ Foundations of Normal and Abnormal Psychology, Chap. III. 

34 Op. cif., p. 26. 

35 op. cit., p. 27. 

36 Op. cit., pp. 28 £ 



144 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

sion, and the evidence, it must be admitted, is largely on his 
side. Perception does undoubtedly carry with it, normally 
speaking, a vague something which may be called for want of 
a better term an original (i.e., underived) mark of "extern- 
ality"; while imagination — normally speaking, again — lacks 
both these marks. But in the case of an illusion or hallucina- 
tion, there may be a very vivid feeling of "externality," not- 
withstanding the fact that an illusion is largely and an halluci- 
nation wholly mental. 

Dr. Sidis himself is rather inconsistent on this point. In 
Chapter III he writes as follows : "Had my perception of the 
house yonder been a hallucination, I would have still seen it 
as external and therefore regarded [it] as a physical object."^^ 
But this statement involves an admission that gives away his 
entire point. I might indeed, in the case cited, ''regard'' the 
hallucinatory house as physical, but it would be psychical, just 
the same. This view is somewhat modified for the better in 
a later chapter in which the whole question of externality is 
under discussion.^® "Psychologically regarded," it is there 
asserted, "the percept is as much a private experience as the 
image is. In fact, every psychic state has the privacy ascribed 
to the image, and as such is unshared by other selves. "^^ Here 
we have the commonly approved "privacy" or "unshared"-ness 
criterion of the psychical for which we have been arguing. 
All psychic states, percepts as well as images, are private and 
unshared; but percepts have reference to physical {i.e., public 
or common) objects, while images do not, and it is this "ref- 
erence to" the physical which gives the former their mark of 
"externality." 

The various questions thus aroused by the doctrine of the 
externality of the physical seem to leave that doctrine in an 
unenviable position of vagueness. Percepts do carry with 
them a feeling of externality, but so also do hallucinations: 

37 op. cit., p. 27. 

38 Chap. XXIV. 

39 P. 172. Italics mine. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 145 

externality, therefore, is not a sufficient criterion of the physi- 
cal. Even if the internal-external distinction, then, be, as it 
probably is, the first distinction to be made between the mental 
and physical reality, its inadequacy soon forces us into a 
search for a truer one; and in the privacy-community theory 
our problem seems to find its best solution. 

It should also be noted, in answer to our third question pro- 
pounded above,**^ that there is also a serious logical objection 
to Dr. Sidis's doctrine — namely, that the internal-external dis- 
tinction is in its very terminology spatial, and so contradicts 
the spatial vs. non-spatial distinction between the physical and 
the psychical formulated in an earlier section (75). Dr. Sidis 
draws a line in space between the mental as "internaF* (i.e., 
** within" something, presumably mind or brain) and the physi- 
cal as "external" (i.e., "outside" the mind or brain) — a pro- 
cedure which is vitiated throughout by its attribution of spatial 
terminology to that which is in its essential nature non-spatial. 

Before leaving Dr. Sidis, we must say a word or two about 
his second distinction between the mental and the physical re- 
ferred to above. "I think it is best," he says, "to define the 
physical phenomenon as the object or process conceived as be- 
ing independent of consciousness, while the psychic object or 
process is one that is conceived as being directly dependent on 
consciousness."*^ These definitions, however, do not, it is to 
be feared, throw any light upon, or add anything to, the defi- 
nition of the mental as internal and the material as external : 
rather do they beg the very question at issue, namely, what is 
it that characterizes dependence upon consciousness and in- 
dependence of consciousness respectively? 

Our criticism of Sidis's doctrine, then, is threefold: (i) 
that the internal-external distinction is a spatial one, and so 
ruled out by our previous characterization of the mental as 
non-spatial; (2) that the conscious dependence-independence 
distinction begs the question at issue; and (3) that both these 

^0 P. 143. 

*i Op. cit, p. 30. 



146 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

distinctions are, as Miss Calkins treats them {v. previous sec- 
tion, yy), subsidiary to the privacy-community distinction, and 
logically inadequate until explained in terms of the latter,*^ 
The internal-external distinction may be genetically prior, in 
the history of the individual consciousness, to the private-public 
distinction; but it is logically based upon the latter. Things 
may first seem external and only then be explained as com- 
mon or public, but it is the latter fact which makes the former 
true. Or, once more, and making use of an ancient philosophi- 
cal expression: externality is the ratio cognoscendi of com- 
munity, but community is the ratio essendi of externality. 

79. Various Secondary Characteristics of Mental Phenom- 
ena. — We have now established the two primary distinctive 
characteristics, one negative and one positive, of mental phe- 
nomena. There are a number of other secondary character- 
istics, however, which it is desirable to note. William James 
has summed these up in his Principles of Psychology under 
the expression, "the five characters of thought."*^ These "five 
characters'' are: 

"i) Every thought tends to be part of a personal conscious- 
ness. 

2) Within each personal consciousness, thought is always 

changing. 

3) Within each personal consciousness, thought is sensibly 

continuous. 

4) It always appears to deal with objects independent of 

itself. 

5 ) It is interested in some parts of these objects to the ex- 

clusion of others, and welcomes or rejects — chooses 

from among them, in a word — all the while." 

In his later abridgment of his great work, known as the 

Briefer Psychology f"^ James alters his terminology somewhat, 

and reduces his "five characters" to four by the omission of 

*2 V. also next section for further dscussion of this characteristic. 
*3 Op. cit.. Vol. I, Chap. IX. The summary quoted is on p. 225. 
**Chap. XL Summary on p. 152. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 147 

No. 4 of the original list. By ^'thought," it should be said, 
he means what we have called "content," or, as he puts it in 
his second list, mental "states." The fifth character is the fact 
of interest or attention, and though a basic mental activity, 
it is specific rather than general, and may be disregarded by 
us in this connection. The fourth proposition asserts the close 
concern which consciousness has with things beyond itself, the 
intimate relation of the mental with the physical; but was 
wisely omitted in the revision in the Briefer Psychology, and 
may wisely also be disregarded by us here. Omitting these 
leaves us with three secondary characteristics of the psychical 
which will occupy our attention in the ensuing paragraphs — 
Introspectiveness, Transitoriness, and Continuity, as we shall 
call them. 

(i) Introspectiveness. James's first proposition asserts in 
different, and, perhaps, more familiar language, the private 
character of mental phenomena. "Every thought ['state,' *con- 
tent'] tends to be [rather, is'] part of a personal consciousness" : 
that is to say, it is a fundamental truth about psychical as dis- 
tinguished from physical phenomena that they are personal, 
intimate, individual, "private," "unshared," parts of a personal 
"stream," objects of which same "I" is "conscious" — and that 
apart from such characteristics they can have no existence. 
This being "part of a personal consciousness" is what Sidis 
calls the "dependence" of mental facts upon consciousness, 
and from it follows directly what he designates as the "in- 
ternality" of mental objects' — i.e., as I have put it above, their 
introspectiveness. Psychical phenomena, in other words, are 
characteristically such as can be experienced only by introspec- 
tion, not through the physical senses.*^ 

(2) Transitoriness. "Within each personal consciousness, 
thought is always changing." In the physical world we may 
always distinguish between the things in the world, and the 
processes which those things undergo. "Living things," ani- 
mals and plants, undergo the processes of generation, growth, 
*5 Cf. Klemm, History of Psychology, p. 84. 



148 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

decay, and death; and science may be interested either in the 
structure of these things (morphology, anatomy), or in their 
activities (physiology, "praxiology"). So manufactured arti- 
cles — houses, tables, cabinets, machines — ^undergo the pro- 
cesses of construction, function, and decay, and we separate 
easily in our minds the structure of the finished product from 
the processes involved in the making and using of that pro- 
duct. But in the psychical world this distinction is in any 
literal sense invalid: all mental phenomena are of the nature 
of processes, there are no ^fixed things ;*® and the distinction 
which we have freely drawn between structural and functional 
psychology is, as was pointed out when the distinction was 
under investigation, an artificial one, made for the purpose of 
a more thorough scientific understanding of mental life, and 
does not correspond to any real distinction in the mental world. 
(3) Continuity. Notwithstanding the transitoriness of tKe 
individual mental process, personal consciousness ("thought") 
as a whole is "sensibly continuous." Consciousness "flows" : 
the individual states are not isolated from one another, like 
the films of a. moving picture, but flow into one another, as the 
films seem to do when projected on to a screen by a cinemeto- 
graph. Hence comes James's powerful and often used figure 
of "the stream of consciousness." And even when the stream 
of consciousness is broken into — as it regularly is by our 
nightly periods of sleep, and sometimes is in the abnormal 
disturbances known as periods of amnesia or loss of memory 
— the personality seems to attach the first moment of waking 
directly on to the last moment before losing consciousness, so 
that the gap is filled and the continuity of actual consciousness 
preserved. 

80. The Interpretation of the Mental-Physical Distinction. 
— We have been concerned so far in making the line of sepa- 
ration between mental and physical phenomena as sharp and 
clear as possible for the purpose of delimiting the field of psy- 
chology and dispelling the too prevalent confusion between 
*^ Cf. Titchener, Primer of Psychology, pp. 6 f. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 149 

psychology and the material sciences. We should not wish it 
thought, however, that in so doing we are desiring to advance 
any dualistic conception of the relation between the psychical 
and the material. It is perfectly possible to interpret our dis- 
tinction dualistically, and it is also perfectly possible to in- 
terpret it monistically.*^ The view we have been defending 
does not necessarily imply two distinct sets of facts, but is 
completely satisfied by the assertion of two standpoints from 
which a single fact may be viewed. 

Which of these two possible interpretations is to be ac- 
cepted is entirely a metaphysical question, whereas we are con- 
cerned here solely with the question of fact.*^ It may be 
noted, however, that the Inner Sense theory discussed and 
refuted above (72) leads most naturally to a dualistic inter- 
pretation of the mental-physical distinction; whereas the Im- 
mediate Experience theory (73), and the modification thereof 
which we have adopted (74), as naturally point to a monistic 
interpretation. 

81. Conclusion. — In thus completing our inquiry into the 
nature of mental as distinguished from material phenomena, 

*7 By a dualistic interpretation is meant one which would regard mental 
phenomena and physical phenomena as separate entities or realities: by 
a monistic interpretation is meant one which would regard mental and 
physical as two aspects of the same phenomenon or reality (4-6). 

*8An interesting monistic interpretation of the relation between mental 
and physical is the context theory of that relationship, or, as it is more 
commonly called, the relational theory of consciousness. According to 
this view, the same phenomenon is physical so far as its space context 
is concerned, and mental so far as it is connected with the context of my 
own personal past and future experience. For example, the table is physi- 
cal in its relation to the room and the other furniture therein, and mental 
in its relation to preceding and succeeding moments of my own experience. 
See James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (especially Chaps. I, II, VIII) ; 
The Meaning of Truth, Chap. Ill (especially pp. 46-50) ; Perry, Present 
Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 306-313. Cf. also Montague: "What we 
know directly from within as the psychical or subjective side of ex- 
perience may be the same as what we know indirectly from without as 
the potential energy of the nerve currents of the brain" (Monist, XVIII, 
p. 27. Italics mine). 



I50 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

we have also brought to a solution the problem of the differ- 
entiation of the fields of those sciences which take these two 
sets of phenomena for their respective subject-matter — namely, 
psychology, and the material sciences. Psychology is the 
science of mental phenomena as above defined: the material 
sciences are sciences of material phenomena as also above de- 
fined. The fact of the privacy of mental phenomena, how- 
ever, generates another serious problem — namely, How is it 
possible (if description involves, as it seems to do, communi- 
cation of facts from one individual to another) to describe 
phenomena which can be known directly by only one indi- 
vidual? This question must be answered; for if we cannot 
describe mental phenomena, a science of psychology is im- 
possible. 

3. Conditions of Psychological Description. 

82. General Conditions of a Scientific Psychology. — We 
have learned (51, 53, etc.) that psychology has for its prob- 
lem (i) the description of mental phenomena, and (2) the 
determination of their causal relations. The conditions which 
make causal explanation in psychology possible will be con- 
sidered in a later connection,*^ and we shall concern ourselves 
at this point only with the conditions of a scientific description 
of mental facts. 

83. Milnsterh erg's Theory. — Description involves a com- 
munication by the observer to some one else of the facts which 
he has observed. This is a perfectly simple matter in the 
physical sciences, because physical facts are common objects 
of experience to many experiencers ; but in psychology, whose 
objects {i.e., mental facts) are by their very nature private and 
individual experiences, direct description or communication of 
facts from one mind to another is impossible. "We cannot 
communicate a psychical object directly, as it lies in the nature 
of the psychical state to be exclusively the property of one in- 
dividual." The physical world, on the other hand, "is public 

*9 V. especially Chap. VI, Division 3. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 151 

property which any two subjects share with each other and 
about which a direct communication, a common taking hold, 
is possible. We can therefore communicate a mental state 
only indirectly, and only insofar as it is necessarily linked 
with a part of the outer world."^^ 

Psychological description, then, is possible only if we can 
link our mental contents, which in themselves are private and 
so not directly communicable, with physical facts which by 
their common or public nature are directly communicable. But 
such a necessary linkage is found only in the case of percepts , 
which refer to existing objects in the physical world, and 
ideas, which are composed of the same elements ("sensa- 
tions") of which percepts themselves are composed. *'The 
idea means the thing, and any sensation in the idea means a 
feature of the thing. The tone, the smell, the color as sensa- 
tion can thus be communicated indirectly by reference to the 
sounding, smelling, luminous physical object, and any degree 
of exactness can be reached by the increasingly accurate de- 
scription of the physical side."^^ Percepts, ideas, and their 
elements can thus be scientifically, though indirectly, described. 

Other mental states, however, — feelings, emotions, volitions, 
etc., — are in a different situation. *'We understand what we 
mean by the words fear, or shock, or joy, because we have 
learned to use the words for those mental states which are 
connected with special physical occurrences" — their "forego- 
ing causes or following effects." But this is not strictly speak- 
ing "a description, because the constitution and the elements 
of the state are not communicable at all."^^ These mental 
states (affective and conative) may, then, be described only 
if they can be reduced to the same elements (mz,, "sensations") 
as those out of which percepts and ideas are composed. "An 
emotion or volition is never an idea, but their elements may 
be the same, just as the organic and inorganic substances in 

50 Miinsterberg, Psychological Review, VII, pp. 3 f . (1900). 

51 Psychology and Life, p. 50. 

52 Op. cit., p. 49- 



152 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

nature are composed of the same chemical elements."^^ Care- 
ful analysis, Miinsterberg thinks, shows this supposition to be 
well-founded, and establishes the describability of affective and 
conative as well as of cognitive contents. 

Such is Miinsterberg's doctrine of the nature and conditions 
of psychological description. "The aim of the psychologist is 
to describe mental facts: he must, therefore, presuppose that 
all mental facts are describable, and, since only elements of 
ideas can be described, that every content of consciousness is 
in reality a combination of sensations."^* Introspective analy 
sis confirms this presupposition, and guarantees the fulfilment 
of the ideal of scientific description in psychology. 

84. Criticism of Miinsterberg s Doctrine. — The theory may 
be stated in the form of the following six propositions: (i) 
that description involves communication of the facts observed, 
by the observer to some other mind; (2) that mental as dis- 
tinguished from physical facts are by their very nature private, 
and so not directly communicable; (3) that mental facts may 
be communicated indirectly so far as they may be "necessarily 
linked with a part of the material world"; (4) that percepts 
and ideas and their elements ("sensations") can be correlated 
with physical things, and so described ; ( 5 ) that emotions and 
volitions cannot be correlated with physical things, and so 
cannot be described unless they can be analyzed into the same 
elements {viz., "sensations") as those of which percepts and 
ideas are composed; but (6) that emotions and volitions can 
thus be analyzed into sensations, and consequently can be de- 
scribed. 

It is undoubtedly true that the inherently private and in- 
communicable nature of mental facts offers a serious theoreti- 
cal difficulty to the scientific description of them, and yet it is 
equally undeniable that we do as a matter of fact manage to 
describe our inner experiences to one another with a sure con - 

53 op. cit., p. 51. 

54 Op. cit., p. 53. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 153 

fidence that the hearer will understand what we are talking 
about. How do we do this? 

The medium oi this description is always a physical medium 
— speech, writing, gesture, facial expression, etc. — the de- 
scriber transforming his mental content into such physical 
terms as these, and the recipient of the description interpret- 
ing those physical expressions into mental terms again. Our 
knowledge of the contents of other persons' minds, therefore, 
is ordinarily acquired by the method of analogy, through the 
interpretation of those persons' behavior. But such a pro- 
cedure does not satisfy the more rigorous and analytical de- 
mands of science, and for scientific purposes a more accurate 
procedure is resorted to — vis., the method of analysis, whereby 
complex mental contents are analyzed into their elements, 
these being correlated with physical phenomena and so ren- 
dered standard media of exchange from mind to mind. The 
psychologist, then, describes mental phenomena simply by an- 
alyzing them into their elements, which elements must have 
previously been accepted as standards of communication be- 
cause of their necessary linkage with the common or public 
objects of the physical world. 

So far we follow Miinsterberg, our exposition in the pre- 
ceding paragraph paralleling his first four propositions. But 
the fifth and sixth propositions suggest two queries — -(i) do 
emotions and volitions really stand on such a different ground 
from percepts and ideas as Miinsterberg insists? and (2) must 
emotions and volitions, if they are to be described, be analyz- 
able into "sensations only" ? Miinsterberg tells us that "emo- 
tions link themselves with physical causes or effects, and every- 
thing in respect to them is dependent upon doubtful observa- 
tions and interpretations; ideas, on the other hand, stand in a 
relation to physical things which is anchored in philosophical 
ground and independent of chance observation."^^ Again, "if 
there were mental states which are composed of other elements 
than sensations, they would necessarily remain indescribable; 

^^ Psychology and Life, p. 50. 



154 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

we could not grasp them because they would not have any 
definite relation to the common physical world. We might 
say, for instance, that our mental content is made up of sen- 
sations and feelings, but if such feelings were really entirely 
different from sensations, they would have to remain for all 
time mysterious and unknown. We could not compare notes. 
The feeling which I call joy may feel just like the one which 
you call despair/'^^ But "modern psychology has recognized 
that volitions and emotions and feelings and judgments, and 
the whole stream of inner life, are made up of sensations,"^^ 
and the difficulty is therefore overcome. 

Now, is this sharp distinction between ideational and non- 
ideational content in the matter of their relative describability 
a valid distinction, and is the reduction of emotions and voli- 
tions to sensational elements only essential for the overcoming 
of the difficulty of describing non-ideational contents? The 
theory of psychical analysis to which Miinsterberg subscribes 
is called "sensationism," the doctrine that all mental contents 
are analyzable into sensations. The merits of this doctrine we 
cannot at present discuss: suffice it to say that the majority 
of psychologists accept also a second type of element — the 
affective element, or the "simple feeling" — and many of them 
three or more types. For our present purpose we do not need 
to solve the problem of the existence of affective elements, 
but merely to inquire whether Miinsterberg is correct when 
he says that if feelings ("affections") were different from 
sensations we could never communicate them to one another. 

Now it is certain that I find no more difficulty in practice in 
describing or talking about an emotion, or differentiating be- 
tween another's joy and another's despair, than I find in de- 
scribing a red sensation or differentiating another's experience 
of red from his experience of yellow; and in reality I seem 
to find much less difficulty in the former case than in the lat- 
ter. I do not see that the linkage of emotions with their 

^6 Psychotherapy, p. 23. Italics mine. 
^'^ Ibid., p. 24. 



THE FIELD OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY 155 

physiological (i.e., physical, or mental) accompaniments or 
expressions is any weaker or less ''philosophically grounded," 
or any more "dependent on chance observation," than the 
linkage of sensations and percepts with their corresponding 
stimuli and physical objects : in fact, the usual modern psycho- 
logical theory of emotion links mental emotion and physiologi- 
cal accompaniment in the very closest possible bonds, so that 
it is often doubtful whether an emotion should be called pri- 
marily a mental content or primarily a physiological condi- 
tion. The description of emotion by analogy, i.e., by the in- 
terpretation of its outward expressions, therefore, seems to 
offer absolutely no difficulty. 

As to the more accurate method of description by analysis, 
what effect would the recognition of a non-sensational element 
have upon that method? None whatever. The affective ele- 
ments as usually enumerated by those who recognize them at 
all are two — pleasantness and unpleasantness. Pleasantness 
is an indication that the individual wants more of the object 
or experience producing it, and leads to an approach to the 
object or a retention of it if there is danger of loss, or to a 
prolongation of the experience: unpleasantness has the oppo- 
site characteristics. It is plain, then, that in the case of pleas- 
antness and unpleasantness, as in the case of sensations, there 
is a very definite "linkage to the physical world," and no pos- 
sibility of doubting the presence of either when it is present, 
or of confusing the two types. Miinsterberg's difficulties on 
this point, therefore, fall to the ground, and we conclude that 
all mental contents, non-ideational as well as ideational, are 
describable by analysis into elements which are linked neces- 
sarily with events in the physical world. 

REFERENCES 

Psychology and the Material Sciences — 

Klemm, A History of Psychology, pp. 69-86, 159-165. 

Villa, Contemporary Psychology, Chap. 11. 

Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, § i ; § 2, Nos. 3 and 4. 



156 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Mental vs. Physical Phenomena — 

Sidis, Foundations of Normal am^d Abnormal Psychology, 

Chaps. n-IV. 
Royce, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 1-4. 

" Studies of Good and Evil (Essay entitled, "Self- 
Consciousness, Social Consciousness, and Nature") 
Montague, Monist, XVHI, pp. 21 ff. (1908). 

" Consciousness a Form of Energy (in Essays 

Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of 
William James). 
Moore, G. E., Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, X, pp. 

36 ff. (1909-10). 
Sellars, Critical Realism, Chap. IX. 
James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, Chap. IX. 

" Psychology, Briefer Course, Chap. XI. 
Laird, Monist: XXXI, pp. 161 ff. (1921). 

Conditions of Psychological Description — 

Miinsterberg, Psychology and Life, pp. 44-53, 191-194. 
" Psychotherapy, pp. 19-26. 

" Psychological Review, V, pp. 643-645 (1908). 

Criticism by Thorndike, Do., pp. 645 f. 
" Psychological Review, VII, pp. 1-4 (1900). 

Titchener, American Journal of Psychology, XXIII, pp. 
165 ff. (1912). 



BOOK III 
THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 



CHAPTER VI 

The Postulates in General 

I. The Statement of the Postulates. 

85. Every science is based on postulates, that is to say, upon 
certain fundamental and essential presuppositions without 
which the science in question would be impossible. Science 
accepts such postulates as true, leaving to metaphysics the 
task of inquiring into the validity of that assumption, and 
into the nature and reality of the thing assumed. What, then, 
are the postulates of the science of psychology? What must 
psychology postulate if it is to be a complete and independent 
science? We shall find, I think, four of such indispensable 
presuppositions. 

I. The first of these is a postulate held in common by psy- 
chology and the material sciences — namely, the Existence of 
the Material World. "With all other sciences," says Dr. 
Sidis, "psychology must postulate the existence of an external 
material world of space, time, and objects. Psychology does 
not inquire into the nature of these objects, as to what they 
are in themselves. This, as we have pointed out, is the busi- 
ness of metaphysics, not of science. Psychology, however, 
does ask how we come to know the outside world; it inquires 
as to the process by which external reality comes to be pre- 
sented in consciousness."^ In other words, the psychologist is 
as such not interested in the nature or laws of the material 
world, but he is interested in that world so far as it may be- 
come an object of knowledge. 

II. The second postulate is peculiar to, and distinctive of, 
psychology — namely, the Existence of Consciousness.^ Con- 

^ Foundations, p. 106. For a superficially different but fundamentally 
similar position, v. Bichowsky, Jour, of Philosophy, XVIII, 295 ff. (1921). 
^Ibid., pp. 14-16, 106 f. 

159 



i6o THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

sciousness itself is the subject-matter of psychology: hence 
there can be no science of psychology unless the existence of 
consciousness is assumed. But the question of the nature of 
consciousness is handed over by the psychologist to the meta- 
physician. 

HI. The third postulate is more complex, combining as it 
does the truths of the first two. This is the postulate of the 
Interrelation of Consciousness and the Material World. "Psy- 
chology, we said, deals with states of consciousness ; but these 
states are not independent, floating in the air, so to say. They 
are in connection with some material existences; and not di- 
rectly with physical reality as a whole, but with some definite 
individual body."^ This postulate involves two subordinate 
ones: (i) that consciousness can be studied only so far as it 
is connected with some definite human organism; and (2) 
that the interrelation between consciousness and the world 
beyond the body is always through the medium of the indi- 
vidual body — especially of the nervous system, and most par- 
ticularly of the brain. The interrelation itself, therefore, is 
twofold — a psychophysical and a psychophysiological inter- 
relation; and each of the latter is also in its turn twofold, as 
we shall see. 

A. The Psychophysical Interrelation is that between con- 
sciousness and external objects {i.e., objects beyond the 
body),* and is of two types — (i) the perceptual or knowledge 
relation, the relation by which external objects become known 
to consciousness through the bodily senses; and (2) the co- 
native or action relation (which Sidis strangely omits), or the 
relation by which consciousness impresses itself upon the ex- 
ternal world through the muscular system of the body. Psy- 
chology must postulate these two things — a true knowledge of 
the material world by the mind (which becomes in philosophy 
the "epistemological problem"), and an effective power of the 
mind ("the will," as we commonly call it) to make changes in 

3 Op. cit., p. 36. 

* v., op. cit., pp. 107-9. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY i6i 

the material world (giving rise to the philosophical problem 

of "freewill"). 

But, as the above postulates themselves inform us, the in- 
terrelation between consciousness and the external world is 
not direct, but mediated by the nervous and muscular systems 
of the body.^ Hence — 

B. The Psychophysiological Interrelation, or that between 
consciousness and the individual organism. Numerous facts 
of common knowledge, and of experimental and pathological 
science, which it is unnecessary to enumerate here,® show the 
dependence of many of our mental processes upon certain 
physiological conditions of one sort or another, chiefly cere- 
bral; and the fact that the behavior of the organism is or 
may be the expression of consciousness is also a commonplace. 
So strong is this evidence that psychologists are impelled to 
go beyond the exact boundary of the evidence itself, and make 
two universal assumptions as presuppositions of all their in- 
vestigations : ( I ) that all mental processes have physiological 
conditions; and (2) that all mental processes tend to express 
themselves physiologically — either (a) internally only, in the 
brain, vital organs, and internal muscles (Watson's "implicit 
behavior" : 27) ; or (b) externally also, in motor activity 
(Watson's "explicit behavior").^ Of these two aspects of 
the psychophysiological interrelation, the first gives rise to an 
extremely important principle of modern psychology, which 
will occupy us at greater length in the next section — namely, 
the Principle of Psycho cerebral Parallelism. 

IV. The fourth postulate of psychology is that of the Uni- 
formity of Mental Life. "Uniformity of relations among 
phenomena must be postulated if science is to be at all." By 
uniformity is meant the principle that "under similar condi- 

^ v., op. cit., pp. 107 f • 

® v., op. cit.. Chap. XII. Also, Miinsterberg, Psychology, General and 
Applied, pp. 34-39; and Psychotherapy, pp. 34-40. 

^ Note the subordinate adverbs. Consciousness always expresses itself 
in internal behavior: it may also express itself outwardly. 



i62 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

tions like results follow." But ''if under the same conditions 
different results follow, science would be an impossibility." 
Now psychology, like other sciences, must assume uniformity : 
''it assumes that there exist constant uniform types of mental 
activity with definite relations that can be formulated into 
psychological laws."^ But the psychologist's postulate of uni- 
formity is necessarily more complex than that of the natural 
scientist, since psychology must not only postulate for itself 
the uniformity of m<entai phenomena, but must also join with 
the material sciences in their assertion of the uniformity of 
natural phenomena, since the world of natural phenomena is 
the object of consciousness (v. the First Postulate). And this 
is not all, for if psychology postulates the interrelation of 
mental and physiological phenomena, and the uniformity of 
each of these, it must also postulate as a corollary of the above 
the uniformity of psychophysiological relations. "Definite 
physical processes must be concomitant with certain well de- 
fined psychic states. Were this otherwise, the two series, the 
mental and the physical, would be out of joint."® 

The postulate of uniformity leads to a second great prin- 
ciple of modern psychology, though one not so widely ac- 
cepted as that of parallelism — namely, the Principle of Inde- 
pendent Psychical Causation. To the discussion of this prin- 
ciple I shall devote a later division of this chapter. I append a 
summary of the postulates herein defined. 

TABLE VII 

Summary of the Postulates 
First Postulate: The Existence of the Material World. 
Second Postulate: The Existence of Consciousness. 
Third Postulate: The Interrelation of Consciousness and the Material 
World. 
A. The Psychophysical Interrelation; between Consciousness and Ex- 
ternal Objects. 

1. The Perceptual or Knowledge Relation. 

2. The Conative or Action Relation. 

^Foundations, p. i6. Author's italics reduced to Roman type. 
^Op. cit., p. III. Author's italics reduced. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 163 

B. The Psychophysiological Interrelation; between Consciousness 
and the Individual Organism. 

1. The Dependence of Consciousness on the Body: — 

The Principle of Psychocerehral Parallelism. 

2. The Expression of Consciousness in Behavior: either— 

a. Internally only; or 

b. Externally also. 

Fourth Postulate: The Uniformity of Mental Life. 

Corollary: The Uniformity of Psychophysiological Relations. 
The Principle of Independent Psychical Causation. 



2. The Principle of Psychocerehral Parallelism. 

86. The expression "psychophysical parallelism" is one 
which occurs frequently in metaphysical and metaphysico- 
psychological discussion; and yet when we examine into its 
meaning we find that it actually covers three distinct principles, 
to only one of which is it in the strictest sense applicable.^^ 

( I ) In the first place, the expression is often used to stand 
for the inductive generalization, noted under the head of HI 
B I in the preceding section, that "all mental processes have 
physiological conditions." This principle, together with its 
associated principle that "all mental processes tend to express 
themselves physiologically," constitutes what we have called 
the Postulate of Psychophysiological Interrelation — a "postu- 
late" because presupposed in all psychological investigation. 
The term "psychophysiological" is better than "psychophysi- 
cal" here, because it states explicitly what part of the "physi- 
cal" world is most directly associated with consciousness; and 
since the nervous system is that part of the body upon which 
consciousness principally depends, it is possible to narrow down 
our general principle to the statement that "all mental pro- 
cesses have neural conditions." Furthermore, since it is the 
brain, or more properly the cerebrum, which investigation has 
shown us to be the true "organ" or instrument of conscious- 
ness, we can still further reduce our formula to the proposi- 

10 Ward, article on "Psychology," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. XXII 
pp. 600 f. (The reference is to the eleventh edition.) 



i64 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

tion that "all mental processes have cerebral conditions." Both 
of these formulae, however, involve a certain idea of depen- 
dence of consciousness on nervous system or brain which goes 
beyond the actual evidence, since all that we need to postulate 
is a correspondence or concomitance between consciousness on 
the one hand and cerebral or neural process on the other. 
Hence the former of these two principles is often expressed 
in the formula, "No psychosis without neurosis" — that is to 
say, in positive terms, "every state of consciousness is ac- 
companied by some distinctive condition of the nervous sys- 
tem" ; and the latter will find itself most naturally expressed in 
the proposition that "every mental process is accompanied 
by some distinctive brain process." The former I call the 
"principle of psycho-neural concomitance," the latter the Prin- 
ciple of Psycho cerebral Concomitance}^ 

(2) The expression "psychophysical parallelism" is also 
sometimes used with reference to a certain methodological 
principle based upon, but in its significance extending far be- 
yond, the above generalization — the principle, namely, that in 
both psychological and physiological investigations the con- 
cepts of psychology and of physiology must be kept distinct, 
and the facts of each science be explained only in the terms of 
that science ; that physiological terms and concepts must not be 
introduced into investigations of mental life, nor psychological 
terms and concepts into investigations of bodily activities; 
that psychological facts should be explained in purely psycho- 
logical terms, and physiological facts in purely physiological 
terms. This principle does not preclude psychophysiological 
investigations as such — investigations in the field of what is 
commonly known as "physiological psychology," or of the in- 
terrelations which actually exist, according to our former 
principle, between mental and physiological processes—but 
merely to assert that there is an independent field of "pure psy- 
chology" into which physiological concepts are not permitted 
to intrude, just as there is a field of pure physiology into which 

1^ v., Miinsterberg, Psychology General and Applied, pp. 39 f. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 165 

psychological concepts are not permitted to intrude. This 
principle can perhaps best be designated, the Principle of Psy- 
chological and Physiological Independence,^^ 

(3) Finally, there is included in the same general expres- 
sion a metaphysical principle to which, and to which alone, the 
term Psychophysical Parallelism is properly applicable — name- 
ly the principle that the interrelation between mind and body, 
and between the mind and the outside world, is not a causal 
interrelation, but merely one of concomitance/^ This prin- 
ciple is opposed to that of psychophysical interactionism, which 
accepts the causal interpretation of the interrelation between 
mental and physical. With this question of interpretation, 
however, we are not here concerned. The fact of interrelation 
or concomitance, as formulated above in our first principles, 
we must accept because experience shows it to be true ; and we 
find it convenient to accept also the methodological principle 
of independence as expressed in our second formula; but the 
question of the interpretation of this interrelation, whether it is 
or is not causal, the psychologist gladly leaves to the meta- 
physician.^* 

12 v.. Note at close of this section. 

13 The term "parallelism" is intended to emphasize the fact, not only 
that there is something physical corresponding to or concomitant with 
every mental process, but that this is a mere correspondence or concomi- 
tance; that mental processes and their concomitant physical or physio- 
logical processes go on side by side — in "parallel" lines, as it were — 
without interfering with or causally affecting each other. The concept 
of parallelism, therefore, involves more than that of concomitance, and 
is in fact a combination of the concepts of concomitance and of inde- 
pendence. 

^*Many psychologists, as Sidis, seem to find it necessary to deny dog- 
matically the causal interpretation (v. Foundations, pp. 78-81), but in 
doing so they are advancing beyond the demands of science. I accept 
as heartily as they the non-causal interpretation, but I do so on meta- 
physical grounds which do not concern even the theoretical psychologist. 
The relation between the nervous system and the external world is of 
course a causal one (v. Sidis, op. cit., p. no) ; but all that we need to 
assume as to the interrelation of nervous and mental processes is their 
coexistence or concomitance, which may or may not be a causal con- 
comitance, according as metaphysical considerations may determine. 



i66 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Disregarding, then, this third principle, we may combine the 
first two, which alone concern us here, under the term, the 
Principle of Psycho cerebral Pa/rcdlelism, formulating the same 
as follows: Every mental process is accompanied by some 
distinctive brain process, but in the description and explanation 
of the form^er only psychological concepts and terms may be 
employed. 

Note on the Principle of Independence 

It seems well to add in a note a few words quoted from the 
writings of Dr. Bernard Hart concerning the importance of 
the Principle of Independence. "It is of the utmost impor- 
tance," he says, "that in the final 'laws' obtained by either 
[psychological or physiological methods] there should be no 
mixing of terms. The physiological laws must contain no 
psychological terms, and the psychological laws must contain 
no physiological terms. Nothing but hopeless confusion can 
result from the mixture of 'brain cells" and 'ideas.' "^^ 

Again : "The physiologist must not introduce psychological 
conceptions into his chain of cause and effect, nor must the 
psychologist fill up the gaps in his reasoning with cells and 
nerve currents."^^ "The various elements entering into a con- 
ceptual construction must all be of the same mode: they may 
be either physical or psychical, but cannot consist in a mixture 
of the two.'"' 

Dr. Hart seems to think the psychologist is much the more 
frequent offender against this principle than the psychologist. 
"No physiologist," he says, "would consent to admit 'ideas' 
as active elements in the sequence of changes which take 
place in the nervous system. He simply points out that he has 
no use for such a conception, and that, so far from helping 
him in his explanation of phenomena, it vitiates his reasoning, 
and destroys the validity of all his former concepts. The 

'^^ Psychology of Insanity, p. i8. 

16 Article in Subconscious Phenomena, p. ii8. 

^"^ Ibid., p. 122. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 167 

psychologist, on the other hand, is a weaker vessel. "^^ Pro- 
fessor Fullerton, however, has shown, in a careful study of 
Foster's Textbook of Physiology, taken as a sample of text- 
books of that science, that physiologists are by no means free 
from this error/^ "Exact knowledge of the antecedents of 
any bodily movement does not exist," says Professor Fuller- 
ton, "and in its absence the physiologist is forced to give such 
fragmentary explanations as he can, often even overstepping 
the limits of his own science and using concepts which are out 
of place in it, but which he seems to be compelled to use." 
This may be necessary "in the existing state of the science of 
physiology," but "a completed science of physiology" would 
be "wholly independent of psychology, and a book on physi- 
ology would have no excuse for containing psychology." In- 
dependence, then, is accepted by Professor Fullerton as an 
ideal, but an ideal which, he says, "smiles at us from a hope- 
less distance." 

Personally, and as regards the science of psychology, I do 
not view the matter quite so "hopelessly," and I do feel the 
principle of independence to be a valuable guiding principle in 
all psychological investigation, and that any psychological in- 
vestigation which violates this principle is "vitiated" and ren- 
dered unscientific by that very failure. And should any feel 
that strict adherence to the demands of this principle would 
involve the psychologist in useless pedantry, let him take heart 
from Professor Titchener's words that "for all practical pur- 
poses" we may continue to speak of our mental grief as the 
cause of our physical tears [or as the effect of the words of 
a physical telegram], just as "the astronomer does not scruple 
to talk, with the rest of us, about sunrise and sunset." "What 
we have to guard against is not the phrasing of these state- 
ments, but their popular interpretation." The scientist must 
explain physical tears in physical (physiological) terms, and 
mental grief in mental terms {v. next division of this chapter) ; 

-^^lUd., pp. 118 f. 

-^^Psychological Rev., Ill, pp. iff. (1896). 



i68 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

but he is quite at liberty in ordinary discourse to ^'explain" 
either in terms of the other. 

3. The Principle of Independent Psychical Causation. 
a. The Problem of Psychological Explanation. 

87. The aim of scientific explanation in any field is the de- 
termination of the causal relations which subsist among the 
various phenomena contained within that field (52, 53). The 
aim of psychological explanation, therefore, must be the de- 
termination of the causal relations which subsist among mental 
phenomena. H psychology is to be a complete and inde- 
pendent science, it must postulate that every mental phenome- 
non has a mental cause. Such a principle of independent psy- 
chical causation, as it may be called, would seem to be an es- 
sential condition of a complete and independent science of 
psychology. 

Certain obvious and pressing difficulties, however, in the ap- 
plication of the causal concept to mental phenomena have led 
many to deny the possibility of a distinct psychical causation, 
and to affirm that mental processes can be causally explained 
only in terms of the accompanying brain processes. Hence 
we have as a matter of fact two opposing 

Theories of Psychical Causation 

1. The Independence Theory , represented by such psycholo- 
gists as Wundt, Yerkes, etc., that mental phenomena are 
scientifically explicable in purely psychical terms. 

2. The Cerebral Theory, represented by Miinsterberg, Sidis, 
and others, that mental phenomena are scientifically explicable 
only in terms of the accompanying brain processes. 

All the psychologists named above are advocates of meta- 
physical parallelism; but whereas Wundt and Yerkes accept 
also the methodological principle of independence, Muunster- 
berg and Sidis reject this. On the basis of our combined 
postulate of psychocerebral parallelism we assert also the above 
formulated principle of independent psychical causation as a 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 169 

necessary consequence of the former when taken in connection 
with the postulate of uniformity defended in section 85. Our 
first task at this point will be to take account of the objections 
which may be offered to the principle of independent psychical 
causation, our second to consider the cerebral theory which 
has been proposed as an alternative to the independent prin- 
ciple, and our third to defend the independent theory against 
its critics. 

b. The Difficulties of Independent Psychical Causation. 

88. The Laws of Psychology. — It is impressive to note how 
few are the "scientific laws" which psychology has up to the 
present time developed when compared with the enormous 
number of such laws which refer to the realm of physical na- 
ture. And yet this discrepancy is rather the fault of the writ- 
ers of psychological textbooks than the defect of psychologi- 
cal science. Professor Yerkes has taken cognizance of this 
unfortunate condition of affairs, and has devoted the entire 
P'ourth Part of his Introduction to Psychology to a specifica- 
tion of the various laws or generalizations which psychological 
research has actually achieved. "It is rather because of the 
youth of the science as science," he thinks, "than because of 
the character of its materials, that psychology has not accumu- 
lated a larger body of generalizations, and that the textbooks 
do not more frequently contain the word law."^*^ And yet 
even Yerkes has been able to accumulate but eighty or so gen- 
eralizations in his chapters devoted to the subject, and many 
of these are psychophysical rather than psychological in the 
strict sense. As examples, the following may be cited — 

The Low of After-Images: "Under certain conditions, a 
sensation is uniformly followed by an after sensation which 
bears a definite qualitative and intensive relation to the origi- 
nal sensation."^^ 

20 Op. cit, p. 250. 

21 P. 264. 



I70 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

The Law of the Relation of Affections to Sensations: 
"Every sensation is accompanied by an affection. "^^ 

The Law of the Relation of the Intensity of an Emotion to 
its Duration: "The more intense an emotion, the shorter its 
duration."^^ 

The Law of the Relation of Repetition to Clearness: "The 
repetition of an experience tends at first to increase its clear- 
ness, but beyond a certain Hmit it tends rather to diminish it."^* 

And most important of all, the General Law of Association: 
"When two sensations, affections, or other experiences, occur 
together or successively, they tend to form a whole, and are 
said to be associated. Later the appearance in consciousness 
of one of the experiences tends to be followed by the appear- 
ance of the other. "^^ 

Let us inquire into the reason for the paucity of psycho- 
logical laws.^^ 

89. Causation in the Physical and Mental Realms. — "The 
concept of causality," says Dr. Sidis, "cannot be worked in 
psychology in the same way that it can in the physical sciences. 
The circle of physical processes is complete in itself. A physi- 
cal process without ceasing to be physical can be traced end- 
lessly in the past or future, all the links of the endless process 
must all be physical in their nature. For if we permit in the 
endless chain of links of the physical process any other but 
physical links to be interpolated, all the physical sciences must 
fall to the ground, since at any stage we may get hold of a 
process of which the antecedent link is not of a physical na- 
ture. In short, the postulate that forms the basis of physical 
science is that the antecedent and consequent of a physical 
process taken at any stage of the process are physical in their 
nature. This is the principle of continuity. The whole edifice 
of the physical sciences is based on this principle. 

22 p. 267. 

23 p. 288. 

24 p. 296. 

25 P. 301. 

26 Cf., through the ensuing discussion, Table IX, at the close of sect. 95. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 171 

"If we now turn to psychology, we find that it cannot be 
based on a postulate of similar character. Psychology cannot 
work on the assumption that the processes it deals with can be 
traced endlessly in either direction, past or future. Unlike 
the physical, the psychic process is finite and final — it has a 
beginning and an end."^^ In other words, the mental realm as 
contrasted with the physical is governed by the principle of 
discontinuity; and the problem of psychical causation is 
throughout the problem of overcoming this defect (for such 
it must be regarded) of discontinuity, and saving the inde- 
pendence of psychological science in the face of that defect. 

This discontinuity, however, shows itself in various ways, 
so that beside the general problem of discontinuity, which con- 
stantly confronts us, there are two special problems which call 
for distinct treatment — the problems of the finiteness of mental 
sequences, and of the transit oriness of mental processes as 
such. We shall consider these in the order given. 

(i) The General Problem of Discontinuity shows itself in 
three directions: (a) the conscious mental life of the indi- 
vidual is subject to numerous temporary suspensions which 
produce gaps in the individual stream of consciousness — as in 
sleep, hypnosis, periods of amnesia or loss of memory, etc. ; 
(b) the conscious mental life of the individual has a definite 
beginning (at or near birth) and a definite end (at or near 
death, so far as the possibility of scientific observation is 
concerned) — "if the psychic life of the individual is taken as 
a whole and traced backward in the past, we arrive at some 
point when the stream of consciousness begins, and on follow- 
ing it forward we finally arrive at a point where the stream of 
consciousness ends";^^ (c) phyio genetically, "in the history of 
biological evolution, there was a time when psychic life began, 

27 Foundations, p. 82. Italics mine. Cf. TItchener's Textbook, pp. 39 f. 
(first part of paragraph in fine print). 

28 Sidis, Foundations, p. 83. "Ends, so far as scientific means of ap- 
proach are possible" is what is meant, of course. The question of im- 
mortality, and the methods of psychical research, are not involved here. 



172 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

and there will come a time when all psychic life will disap- 
pear from our globe."^^ 

(2) The Finiteness of Mental Sequences: Any physical 
process may be traced backward and forward in time indefi- 
nitely, each antecedent and each consequent being itself physi- 
cal; but every sequence of mental processes has a definite be- 
ginning and end as mental. Two variations of this general 
fact may be noted, (a) Many mental sequences may be actu- 
ally traced backward and forward to their initial and final 
stages, the typical mental sequence being a medium of sensori- 
motor adjustment. That is to say, all mental sequences prob- 
ably, and many by actual observation, begin originally with 
some sensation and end finally in some conative process— im- 
pulse or volition. But the antecedent of a sensation is not 
a psychical cause, but a physical stimulus; and the obvious 
consequent of a conation is not a psychical effect, but a muscu- 
lar (i.e., physical) action, (b) Some mental sequences or 
"trains of ideas" seem to start off without any antecedent in 
actual consciousness (as when an idea "suddenly pops into 
one's head," and then leads to a train of associated ideas), 
and may be checked or completely diverted by a physical 
stimulus^^ (as when, in the midst of a conversation between 
two persons, a third, who is a mutual friend of the others, 
unexpectedly enters the room). These conditions with regard 
to mental sequences may be symbolized as follows in their con- 
trast to the situation as it concerns physical sequences. — 

Sequence of Physical Sequence of Mental 

Phenomena. Phenomena. 

JKLMNOP I ABCDEFG 

T 



29Loc. cit. 

30 It is for this reason that so many of the "laws" of psychology have 
to be stated in terms of tendency — "if A occurs, B tends to follow" ; "un- 
der certain conditions, A produces B," etc. (v. examples in preceding 
section). 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 173 

Physical phenomenon M may be the effect of physical phe- 
nomenon L, L the effect of K, and so forth indefinitely; and 
M may be the cause of N, N the cause of O, and so forth in- 
definitely. Idea D may be traced back to C as its "cause/' C 
to B, and B to A; but when we come to the sensation A the 
only antecedent is a physical one : so D may arouse E, E may 
arouse F and F may arouse G; but with G the sequence may 
come to an abrupt conclusion. 

(3) Miinsterberg's argument against the principle of inde- 
pendent psychical causation is founded on a more fundamental 
difficulty than those to which we have heretofore directed our 
attention — namely, the fact of the Transit oriness of Mental 
Processes as such (79 (2)). The regular and indefinitely ex- 
tending sequence of causes and effects in the physical world is 
understandable, he tells us, because we know that through all 
the changes of form and position in physical things, their 
atoms or ultimate constituents persist; whereas each mental 
fact exists only for the moment of its actually being experi- 
enced, every new moment of (Consciousness bringing new 
contents before the experiencer. For example, "the candle 
may disappear when it burns down, but every atom of it can 
still be traced in the atmosphere"; whereas when an idea or 
feeling disappears from the mind, it is gone irretrievably — 
"we may have a thousand times new ideas of the same object, 
but the same idea cannot come back a second time."^^ There- 
fore, though there may be regularity and uniformity of se- 
quence in the mental realm, there is no detectable necessary 
causal connection among the phenomena of that realm.^^ 

These various difficulties affecting the principle of indepen- 
dent psychical causation will be met in a later division of this 
chapter; but so far as this objection of Miinsterberg's can be 
separated from the general problem of discontinuity, it may be 
disposed of in a few words at this point. For while the fact 

^''■Psychology, General and Applied, p. 31. Cf. also, Psychotherapy, 
p. 31. 

32 Cf, Sidis, Foundations, p. 85. 



174 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

of transitoriness is undoubtedly a difficulty, it is by no means 
an absolute hindrance to our principle, should the latter be 
called for on other grounds. For it is extremely questionable 
whether the idea of ^'necessary connection" is an essential part 
of the idea of cause : rather is it the case that "uniformity of 
sequence" is all that is implied in the notion of causality (53). 
As Yerkes puts it, "the essence of the causal relation is uni- 
formity of the order of events." "We never observe neces- 
sary^^ uniformity." "The important point for present con- 
sideration is that of observed sequences of events in conscious- 
ness. If the sort of regularity which we discover in the world 
about us, and upon which we have learned to depend in all 
of the affairs of life, does not exist also in mental life, there is 
no ground for a science of psychology similar to the science 
of physiology, no ground for the explanation of conscious- 
ness in terms of mental processes, and no ground for the as- 
sumption that psychical events may be predicted and controlled 
as are physical events."^* But if, on the contrary, as Miinster- 
berg himself admits, and as Yerkes by many examples^^ shows 
to be the case, "the sort of regularity which we discover in the 
world about us" does "exist also in mental life," that is all we 
need to postulate the presence of causation in the psychical 
realm. 

c. The Cerebral Theory of Psychical Causation, 

90. The Cerebral Theory, — Those psychologists who con- 
sider the above objections to the independence theory insuper- 
able, refer the causes of mental phenomena to the physiologi- 
cal realm, and explain the sequence of mental phenomena in 
terms of the accompanying brain processes. Psychologists 
who reject methodological parallelism interpret this as a di- 
rect causal explanation of mental processes in physiological 
terms: advocates of methodological parallelism, on the other 

33 Italics mine. 

^^Introduction to Psychology, pp. 328 f. 

35 Op. cit., Chap. XXV. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 175 

hand, take it as a necessarily indirect explanation. As Sidis 
puts it, "the psychic process not having its links causally con- 
nected, the causal necessity [sic] can only be followed along 
its concomitant physical or physiological series."^® Thus, in 
the diagram — 

Mental Series A B C D E 



^ 4^ yK 



Brain Series - a"^ b"^ c~^ d"^ e 

the sequence of A and B is explained by referring it to the 
brain sequence, ab.^'^ B, we say, invariably follows A, be- 
cause the accompanying brain process b is the effect of 
the accompanying brain process a. "To explain mental 
facts," says Miinsterberg, "means to think them as parallel to 
the brain processes which have their own causal connections 
in the physical world."^® 

Miinsterberg insists that this denial of causal relations to 
mental processes does not imply that mental phenomena have 
no independent inner connections, but merely that they have 
no causal relations: on the other hand, they do have a pur- 
posive connection. Mental processes in their inner reality are 
an expression of purpose; but since this inner life-purpose is 
also always further expressed through brain processes, we may 
give the mental phenomena an indirect scientific explanation 

^^Foundations, p. 85. 

37 The arrows connecting the members of the brain series indicate the 
causal relation of the brain processes. The absence of similar arrows 
connecting the members of the mental series indicates the separateness of 
the various mental processes as viewed by the advocates of the cerebral 
theory. The arrows pointing from the various members of the brain 
series to the corresponding members of the mental series indicate the 
complete dependence, according to this theory, of the latter upon the 
former. 

*8 Psychotherapy, pp. 41 f . Cf. also Psychology General and Applied, 
pp. 40 f . 



176 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

through the causal connections which subsist among those 
brain processes.^^ 

91. Criticism of the Cerebral Theory. — However one may 
feel impressed by the weight of the arguments against the in- 
dependence theory, it is hardly possible not to feel equally im- 
pressed by the artificiality and inadequacy of the alternative 
doctrine. The scientist wants to be able to say, "A is the cause 
of B," ''B is the effect of A" ; and is certain to feel that such 
expressions as, "B is explained when we think of it as parallel 
to hj which in its turn is the effect of a" — or, "the sequence 
AB is to be explained by following along the concomitant 
series ah" — are poor substitutes for the more direct formula. 
Of course, if we can say at once, "mental process B is the 
effect of brain process h" or "of brain process a," the demand 
of simplicity is satisfied; but if we take this position, we are 
renouncing the independence of psychology, even if we see 
no metaphysical objections to such a statement. What such 
writers as Sidis and Miinsterberg are trying to do is to save 
the science of psychology from dependence upon that of physi- 
ology, in the face of what seems to them to be an almost in- 
superable obstacle to the success of that endeavor — namely, 
the absence of any causal relations in the mental realm. But 
if we can satisfy ourselves that the difficulties of the principle 
of independent psychical causation are not insuperable, we can 
save the science of psychology without sacrificing simplicity. 
Before taking steps in this direction, however, there are one or 
two other points to be noted in the way of criticism. 

In the first place, we should recognize that the explanation 
of mental processes in terms of the accompanying brain pro- 
cesses is not in any sense a causal explanation of the former, 
but a distinct type of explanation peculiar to psychology — 
namely, explanation by correlation; and that the problem of 
correlating mental processes with brain processes is not strictly 
speaking a psychological problem at all, but a psychophysio- 
logical problem. 

^^Psychotherapy, p. 33. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 177 

Furthermore, as Professor Yerkes reminds us, it is "even 
truer to say that when two processes, the one physiological 
(in the brain) and the other psychological (in consciousness) 
occur together uniformly, either may be offered by science as 
an explanation of the other. "*° That is to say, the mental 
sequence AB may be explained by the brain sequence ab, or 
the brain sequence ab by the mental sequence AB, indiffer- 
ently; but in neither case is the explanation a causal one. 

The complete truth, indeed, is that every phenomenon in- 
volving intelligence is a double effect of a double cause. One 
state of mind-brain produces another state of mind-brain: 
neither is A the cause of b nor a the cause of B, but Aa is the 
cause of B^.*^ For the complete understanding of any mental 
or cerebral phenomenon, both kinds of explanation are neces- 
sary; but in purely psychological investigations, the cerebral 
aspect may be disregarded. 

The above criticism of the cerebral theory of psychical caus- 
ation may be summed up as follows : ( i ) It is an artificial and 
inadequate theory, which should not be accepted if it is pos- 
sible to escape it; (2) it is not a substitution of one type of 
causal explanation for another, but the complete rejection of 
the causal concept as inapplicable in psychology, and the sub- 
stitution for it of the principle of explanation by correlation; 
(3) this method of explanation is a psychophysiological rather 
than a psychological method, and if substituted entirely for 
the causal method results in the denial of the claim of psychol- 
ogy to be an independent science within its own field; (4) the 
principle of correlation may be employed with equal justifica- 
tion to explain either mental phenomena in terms of cerebral, 
or cerebral phenoment in terms of mental; (5) the complete 
truth with regard to phenomena involving consciousness is 
that the mental and cerebral processes taken together are joint 
effects of other mental and cerebral processes taken together, 

^^Introduction, p. 36. 

*i v.. Bain, Mind and Body, pp. 131 f. 



178 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

but we are at liberty to ignore either aspect if our concern is 
entirely with the other. 

d. Defence of the Independence Theory. 

92. Methods of Explanation in Psychology, — Our examina- 
tion of the cerebral theory has introduced us to a method of 
explanation which psychology employs, and which is as dis- 
tinctive of psychology as is the observational method of intro- 
spection — namely, the method of explanation by correlation. 
Advocates of the cerebral theory use this method alone, and 
fail to recognize that in doing so they are rejecting the causal 
concept in psychology together : advocates of the independence 
theory accept the correlation method of explanation a^ well as 
the causal method, just as all psychologists today who employ 
the method of introspection admit also the value of the method 
of observation of behavior ; but they insist that the correlation 
method is an indirect method of explaining mental processes, 
just as observation of behavior is only an indirect method of 
getting at the facts of mental life. 

Putting these various considerations together, we come to 
the following conclusion : All mental phenomena may be ex- 
plained in either of two ways — (i) in terms of other mental 
phenomena, or (2) in terms of the accompanying brain pro- 
cesses — but only the former is a causal explanation.*^ 

It is a strange fact worthy of note that methodological paral- 
lelists differ markedly in their views of the bearing of the 
principle of parallelism upon the problem of psychological ex- 
planation. Both Wundt and Yerkes hold, in the words of the 
latter, that the principle of parallelism "forces the acceptance 
of independent psychical causation,"*^ correlated at all points 
with cerebral causation, but distinct from it. Miinsterberg, 
Sidis, and Titchener, on the other hand, insist, as we have 
seen, that the principle of parallelism "forces" us to reject all 

*2 v., Yerkes, op. cit., pp. 317 f. 

*3 Ibid., p. 333. Cf, Wundt, Outlines, p. 367. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 179 

causal explanation in psychology. As a matter of fact, all that 
the principle of parallelism "forces" us to do is to reject the 
notion that brain processes cause mental processes; and the 
real difference between the two groups of parallelists is that 
the second group regard the obstacles to the acceptance of inde- 
pendent psychical causation to be insuperable, whereas the first 
group do not. The principle of parallelism forces us to deny 
the cerebral causation of mental processes and to acknowledge 
the explanation of mental processes in terms of cerebral pro- 
cesses to be a non-causal type of explanation; and if we ac- 
cept the principle that only a causal explanation of phenomena 
is a completely satisfactory explanation from the scientific 
point of view, the principle of parallelism also forces on us the 
alternative of either accepting also the principle of independent 
psychical causation, or else admitting that psychology is by 
its very nature an incomplete science. Our next step, then, 
is to see whether it may not be possible to overcome the ob- 
jections to the independence theory which we considered 
above (89). 

I append here a summary of the two theories of psycho- 
logical explanation, and a diagram of the position involved in 
the independence theory — 

TABLE VIII 

Theories of Psychological Explanation 

According to the Mental Phenomena can be explained — 

Cerebral Theory, — only in terms of the accompanying brain 

processes 

(indirect* causal explanation) . 
Independence Theory, — either (i) in terms of other mental facts 

(direct causal explanation) ; 
or (2) in terms of the accompanying brain 
processes 

(explanation by correlation). 
♦That is to say, if the psychologist is also a parallelist: if he is not; 
this would be a direct causal explanation. 



i8o THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 
INDEPENDENT PSYCHICAL CAUSATION 



L^M 


A-^B~»C->D->E 


S->T 


t t 


$ $ $ $ $ 


t t 


■ 1 -*m 


a-»b^c-»d-^e 


s-»t 


T' 


W^" X ~ 


>y-^Z 





Mental Series 
Physical Series — 

In Brain 

In External World 



The chief differences between this diagram and the one illustrating the 
cerebral theory (90), so far as the mental and cerebral series alone are 
concerned, are: (i) the presence of arrows along the mental series, in- 
dicating that there is an "independent psychical" causation as well as an 
independent cerebral causation; (2) the arrows connecting the mental and 
cerebral concomitants are double-headed, to indicate that the members 
of either series may be explained (by correlation) in terms of the other, 
not merely the mental in terms of the cerebral. A series of events in the 
external world is added here, to indicate that, the brain and the world 
outside (including, if you like, the body itself) being both of them parts 
of the one physical universe, there is a perfect causal connection between 

them. Let the series vwxyz represent a series of events connected 

with the Hghting and shining of a candle: v — a man, P, strikes a match; 
w — P lights a candle with the match; x — P presents the lighted candle 

before the eyes of another man, Q ; ys a series of events following 

the incidents enumerated. Presupposing the above, a may indicate the 
stimulation of Q's visual centres by the light from the candle — a perfect 
causal sequence, accompanied at once by A, a sensation of light in Q's 
consciousness. Now, in the diagram, Q is thought of as having been 

concerned, prior to the seeing of the candle, in a train of thought LM, 

with its accompanying series of brain processes - - - -Im. The stimulus x, 
however, produces results which interfere at once with Q's previous train 
of thought, and start an entirely new train, ABCDE; which may, for 
some reason which does not interest us, be in its turn brought to a con- 
clusion with E, and followed by a third sequence, ST . In this ex- 
ample, we have three kinds of sequences — (i) four physical causal se- 
quences, Im; - - - -vwxahcde ; vwxyz ; and st ; each of 

them complete in itself : (2) three mental causal sequences, LM ; 

ABCDE; and ST ; each of them complete in itself; and, finally, 

(3) three correlation sequences, L/-Mm; ha-^b-Cc-Dd-^e ; and Ss-Tt — 
all the requirements of psychological, physiological, and physical science 
being allowed for. 

93. The Difficulties of Independent Psychical Causation.— ' 
It will be remembered (89) that acceptance of the postulate of 
independent psychical causation gives rise to three problems — 
the general problem of the discontinuity of mental life, the. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY i8i 

problem of the finiteness (to use Dr. Sidis's term) of mental 
sequences, and the problem of the transitoriness of mental 
processes as such. Of these three problems the last, so far as 
it can be separated from the first, has already been dealt with 
(89) ; and we shall find that in only one point can the second 
problem, either, be distinguished from the more general one. 
Let us see how this is. 

The expression, "finiteness of mental sequences," means, in 
general, that every series of mental processes has a definite be- 
ginning and a definite termination, as mental. More specifi- 
cally, we may for our present purpose distinguish three points : 
(i) that most mental sequences are traceable back to sensa- 
tions, which in turn have no ^psychic cause, but originate in 
physical stimuli; (2) that many mental sequences cannot he 
traced to any appa/rent cause, mental or physical — they seem 
to start off without any antecedent in actual consciousness; 
(3) that all mental sequences issue finally in some conative 
process (impulse or volition), and so in motor {i.e., physical) 
activity. The third point, however, we can easily dispose of ; 
for though it is true that conative processes issue in motor 
activity, and have such motor activity as their raison d'etre,^* 
nevertheless they do also have psychical effects (as in char- 
acter, memory, etc.) : hence, there is after all no real problem 
here. The first difficulty we shall call "the problem of sensa- 
tions/' and shall consider at once : the second is really a part 
of the general ''problem of discontinuity/' which is to occupy 
our attention throughout most of the remainder of this book. 

94. The Problem of Sensations. — How can we defend the 
principle of independent psychical causation in the face of 
the evident fact that mental sequences originate with sensa- 
tions, and that sensations in their turn have an acknowledged 
physical origin f Three answers to this question are, I think, 
possible : 

(i) We may take the easiest way out of the difficulty, and 
admit that when we have traced our mental sequences back to 

**What Aristotelians would call their "final cause." 



i82 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

sensations we have gone as far as the principle of independent 
psychical causation can carry us ; acknowledge that sensations 
have a physical cause, and are exceptions to the general rule; 
and resort in their case to the indirect method of explanation, 
by correlating them with the accompanying brain processes. 
But thus to allow any exceptions to our general principle is 
at once to renounce our entire claim to the independence of 
psychology, and retract all the objections we have been offer- 
ing to the cerebral theory. Far better would it be to accept the 
cerebral theory throughout than to employ two separate prin- 
ciples of explanation in different parts of the same general 
field. The independence theory applies both methods of ex- 
planation (by causation and by correlation) throughout the 
entire field, the cerebral theory applies the correlation method 
throughout; but this proposed compromise would apply one 
method in one part of the field, and fall back upon the other 
in those parts of the same field in which it seems that the first 
method cannot be worked. We cannot, however, allow such 
tearing asunder of that which is in its essential nature one. 

(2) We may admit frankly that sensations have no cause. 
In so doing we are not, as in the former case, explaining what 
can be explained in two different ways at different times, but 
admitting that there are some mental processes which by their 
very nature are scientifically inexplicable. Only complex phe- 
nomena can be explained: absolutely simple and elementary 
phenomena are ultimate data, primary facts, and so inexplic- 
able. This is as true of physical phenomena as of mental, and 
not merely a condition that hampers the psychologist alone 
among all scientists: the ultimate elementary constituents of 
the physical universe (atoms, electrons, or whatever they may 
be) are as inexplicable as are the ultimate elementary con- 
stituents of the psychical universe. As Professor Yerkes puts 
it: "A sensation is just a psychic fact, an atom is similarly a 
physical fact. Each is useful in enabling us to describe and 
explain more complex phenomena, but neither can be ex- 
plained by the science whicH makes use of it."*^ 
^Introduction to Psychology, p. 323. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 183 

So far as physical things are concerned, the theologian may 
go one step further than the scientist, and refer the elements 
out of which the physical world is composed to God as their 
Creator, though in so doing he is transcending the bonds of 
the physical universe altogether, and introducing a non-scien- 
tific principle of reference. In the same way, so far as mental 
phenomena are concerned, the physicist may refer sensations 
to physical stimuli as their source, but in so doing is tran- 
scending the bounds of the mental world, even though still 
employing scientific (if non-psychological) concepts. Physi- 
cal science as science can only accept the ultimate facts of the 
physical universe as given, and pure psychology must simply 
treat the ultimate facts of mental life in the same way. 

Let us press the analogy a little further. Let us accept for 
the purpose of the illustration the theory of successive as op- 
posed to that of simultaneous creation — the theory that the 
elements out of which the physical universe as we know it 
today are composed were created, not at a single moment in 
remote time, but gradually, at successive times in the history 
of things. If we had been privileged as onlookers to be pres- 
ent during any period of this creative process, we should have 
observed a series of creative acts resulting in the production 
of a greater and greater number of atoms as time passed on. 
Now the history of the mental universe of each one of us is 
of just this nature — a series of experiences, a "stream" of 
conscious moments; each experience of a sensory type — each 
new color, sound, odor, etc. — in the early weeks or months of 
our individual lives at least, being a new creation in our mental 
universe. Even if our later mental lives give us no absolutely 
new sensations, but merely new combinations of elements 
which have been experienced before, nevertheless in our first 
years our mental universe was being gradually built up in the 
same way as was the physical universe according to the theory 
I have described. So long as we are in the world, we must 
take the primary facts of that world just as they are — ^we can- 
not explain them in scientific language, and we can neither 



i84 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

annihilate them nor create new ones. In the same way, so 
long as we are shut up within the confines of our own indi- 
vidual mental universes, we must take the primary facts of 
mental life as they are; for we can neither explain them in 
psychological terms, nor annihilate or create them. Theology, 
in other words, bears the same relation to the facts of the 
physical world that the physical sciences bear to the facts of 
the mental world. 

The method just outlined of solving the "problem of sen- 
sations" is, I think, the best one for the scientific psychologist 
to adopt; but there is a third possible solution — 

(3) We may extend, as many philosophers have done, the 
principle of psycho-cerebral parallelism into the external 
world, and adopt the metaphysical doctrine of Panpsychism or 
Universal Psychophysical Parallelism (86 (3)) — that every 
physical thing (not merely every brain process) has a 
psychical aspect. In that case, a sensation would be ex- 
plained as the effect of a psychical cause — ^namely, the psychi- 
cal aspect of the stimulus.*® This theory is not so fantastic 
or baseless as it seems as thus abruptly stated, when taken in 
connection with certain general metaphysical considerations; 
but we cannot go into ultra-scientific questions here, and for 
the purposes of scientific psychology such a solution of our 
problem as this would be undesirable. 

95. The Problem of the Discontinuity of Mental Life, 
which meets us at every turn in our attempt to explain psychi- 

*6 Our diagram would then take on somewhat the following form, the 
letters having the same significance — 



Psychical Series 
Physical Series 



In External World In Individual 



u-^v->w-»x- 
$ $ $ $ 

u — ^ V "^ w "^ X 



A-^B-»C 
$ $ J 
a "^ b "^ c 



Mental process A (Q's observation of the candle) would not be the effect 
of brain process a, as the cerebral theory would demand; and would not 
be denied any cause at all, as our second solution has it; but would be 
explained as the effect of psychical phenomenon X, the correlate of the 
physical process x. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 185 

cal processes, can be solved on independent principles only by 
the postulation of some form of mental life extending beyond 
the field or below the level of personal consciousness — i.e., by 
the Postulate of the Subconscious. If this postulate is ac- 
cepted, the principle of psychical causation is extended to in- 
clude subconscious as well as conscious psychical causes. The 
two following chapters will be devoted to a consideration of 
this postulate. 

TABLE IX 

Difficulties in Accepting the Principle of Independent Psychical Causation, 
and How they may be Met. 
Difficulties Proposed Solutions 

I. General Problem of Discontinuity Postulation of the Subconscious. 
II. Finiteness of Mental Sequences: — 

A. Sequences having Physical Ante- 

cedents and Consequents: — 

1. Sensations have Physical 

Antecedents. a. May say they have physical cause. 

b. May say they have no cause. 

c. May say they have psychical cause in 
outer world (panpsychism) 

2. Conation has Physical 

Consequents. Has also psychical effects. 

B. Sequences having no apparent (Belongs to general problem of 

Antecedents or Consequents, discontinuity) 
III. Transitoriness of Mental Processes. (Do.) 

e. The Doctrine of Chance in Psychology. 

96. Sidis's Doctrine of Chance in Mental Life. — ^Dr. Sidis 
applies the biological concept of "chance variations" to psy- 
chology. He admits that there is a "purposive thought" un- 
derlying the actual stream of conscious contents, but claims 
that the ideas that present themselves in consciousness at any 
one moment are "simply the accidental chance material which 
the given momentary purposive thought selects" as means for 
"the achievement of its purpose."*^ The agent of this mental 
selection is Attention, which for Sidis corresponds to the 

^"^Foundations, p. 98. 



i86 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

factor of "natural selection" in the biologist's scheme of 
things. In other words, ideas come into consciousness by- 
chance — i.e. J without any cause; but through the instrumental- 
ity of attention, useless ideas which do not satisfy the needs 
of the "momentary purposive thought" are rejected, and only 
the valuable ones are permitted to survive.*^ 

This is, of course, a purely negative doctrine of attention, 
and is to be contrasted with the more usual positive view that 
attention actively selects out of its material those ideas which 
are at the time the most suited to the needs of the mind. One 
might accept the chance view of how ideas come into the mind, 
and either the active or passive theory of attention as to how 
some ideas stay in the mind and others do not. 

Sidis distinguishes, furthermore, three degrees of attention. 
(i) "When the selective process of attention is rigid, more 
of the chance comers are rejected as not adapted to the pur- 
pose";*^ (2) "when the process of attention relaxes in the 
rigidity of its selective activity, more chance images and acci- 
dental variations of thoughts are presented to and accepted by 
consciousness"^^ — as in reverie, alcoholic delirium, mild hyp- 
nosis, etc.; and (3) "when the process of attention becomes 
completely relaxed — as in sleep, fever, or in the acute forms of 
mental maladies — the chance images and accidental variations 
of ideas come and go without aim or purpose."^® "Not pur- 
pose," then, "but chance," says Sidis, "is at the heart of mental 
life."^^ 

97. Criticism of the Doctrine of Chance in Psychology. — • 
But to accept this doctrine would be to surrender all claims as 
to the scientific status of psychology. When the biologist 
speaks of "chance variations," he cannot mean, if he is to 
be consistent,^^ that those variations have no cause, but merely 

*s Cf. the biological concept of "survival of the fittest." 
•*» Op. cit., p. 98. Italics mine. 
^^ Op. cit., p. 99. Italics mine. 
01 P. 100. 

52 Of course he may mean just this; but when he does, he is open to 
the same charges that I am presenting here. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 187 

that their cause is too complex or too obscure to be determin- 
able; and the same is true of the psychologist. No postulate 
can ever be empirically verified beyond any possibility of its 
refutation in the future, but the causal postulate is neverthe- 
less essential, as a postulate, to any complete science. 

Even Sidis admits a certain degree of independent psychical 
causation in the sense of "invariable sequence" — which is, after 
all, the only sense that causation ever has in science. "If of 
two phenomena, one antecedent and the other consequent, the 
consequent is invariably observed to depend in its variation on 
the antecedent, such an antecedent is declared to be the cause 
of the consequent" : "where the phenomena are observed to 
stand to each other in functional relation of invariable se- 
quence, the antecedent is declared to be the cause of the con- 
sequent" — such are his definitions of causation.^^ Later on 
he tells us that "finite as the psychic process is, it has a series 
of antecedents and consequents," and "insofar as these can 
be traced, one can keep within the bounds of the psychic pro- 
cess only."^* In admitting this, Sidis is conceding a partial 
independence to psychology; but if the latter is to be a com- 
plete as well as an independent science, the causal process 
must be held universally "within the bounds of the psychic 
process only." In other words, the principle of psychical 
causation must be what the Freudians call a principle of "psy- 
chological determinism."^^ 

53 Foundations, pp. loi f . 

54 P. 105. 

^^ Dr. Sidis's repeated strictures, throughout the book under review and 
its two successors, upon what he is pleased to refer to as the Freudian 
"so-called 'psychoanalytic science"* {op. cit., p. 99 especially), are petty, 
unfair, and indicative of that partial (in both senses of the term) knowl- 
edge which is often more pernicious than complete ignorance. We can- 
not at present enter into the question of the pros and cons of Freudian- 
ism, which, it is true, is based upon this universalized postulate of "psy- 
chological determinism" — ^the term being merely an especially powerful 
synonym for "independent psychical causation" as we have been defining 
it ; but, in any case, the validity of the Freudian doctrine and method must 
be judged finally by its fruits, not prejudged by a priori criticism. 



i88 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

REFERENCES 
The Postulates in General — 

Sidis, Foundations of Normal and Abnormal Psychology, 

Chaps. I, V, xn, xvn. 

Psycho cerebral Parallelism — 

Sidis, Foundations, Chap. XH. 

Titchener, Textbook of Psychology, § 4. 

Miinsterberg, Psychology, General and Applied, pp. 38-42. 

Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, § 22, No. 9. 

Ward, Encyclopedia Britannica article on "Psychology," pp. 
600 ff. 
Principle of Independence — 

FuUerton, Psychological Review, IH, pp. i ff. (1896). 

Hart, in Subconscious Phenomena, pp. Ii8-i22„ 

Titchener, loc. cit. 

Causation in the Physical Sciences and in Psychology — 
Sidis, Foundations, Chaps. XHI and XIV. 
Miinsterberg, Psychology, General and Applied, Chap. Ill 
(especially pp. 21-24, 3<^-32). 
The Cerebral Theory — 

Miinsterberg, Psychology, General and Applied, Chap. IV. 
" Psychology and Life, essay on "Psychology 

and Physiology." 
" Psychotherapy, Chap. HI. 

The Independence Theory — 
Yerkes, Introduction to Psychology, Chaps. Ill (especially 

pp. 33-36), XXIV, and XXV. 
Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, § 22, No. 10. 
The Doctrine of Chance in Psychology — 

Sidis, Foundations, Chaps. XV and XVI. 



CHAPTER VII 



The Subconscious 



J. The Concept of the Subconscious. 

98. Meaning of the Term. — The term "subconscious/' dis- 
regarding all its deeper elaborations of meaning and all specific 
theories as to its nature, denotes any form of psychical ex- 
istence which underlies, but is not identical with, the personal 
consciousness. That is to say, to call a phenomenon "sub- 
conscious" is to imply (i) that it is psychical rather than 
physical or physiological in its nature; (2) that personal con- 
sciousness is in some way dependent upon subconsciousness; 
but, (3) that the personality is not aware of that which is 
subconscious. 

99. The Place of the Concept in Modern Psychology. — The 
psychology of the subconscious is a favorite and almost com- 
monplace topic among popular writers, but the concept has 
been so abused and misunderstood by them that many psychol- 
ogists reject it altogether. In view of this fact it is rather 
strange to find James writing in 1902 that "the subconscious 
self is nowadays a well-accredited psychological entity,"^ and 
even Coriat asserting ten years later that ''all psychopatholo- 
gists agree . . . that our minds are made up of certain states 
for some of which we are conscious and for some not con- 
scious."^ 

However, the criticisms that have been offered against the 
subconscious are after all properly of weight only against cer- 
tain specific theories and interpretations of it, and not at all 
against the concept as such when rightly understood.^ Cor- 

^The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 511. 
^Abnormal Psychology, p. 10. Italics mine. 
8 V. Prince, The Unconscious, p. ix. 

189 



I90 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

rectly interpreted, the concept is of fundamental importance to 
psychology. 

loo. The Grounds for Postulating the Subconscious. — Ac- 
ceptance of the subconscious is based primarily and historically 
on theoretical grounds, but the theoretical demand has been 
confirmed by the observation of certain phenomena which seem 
to call for an explanation in subconscious terms. We recog- 
nize, therefore, a twofold root for the concept — (i) its basis 
as a postulate, and (2) its basis as an inference from ob- 
served phenomena. 

(i) Historically, the concept of the subconscious was con- 
structed to fulfill a demand for continuity in mental life, corre- 
sponding to that which characterizes the physical world (95). 
"It was early seen in the history of philosophy," says Bernard 
Hart, "that among the contrasts to be observed between the 
physical and the mental, one of the most prominent was the 
comparative discontinuity of the latter. The psychical life 
made its appearance in an irregular manner, in flashes of 
limited duration, and in the intervals between these flashes it 
appeared to altogether cease to exist. In contrast to this the 
material world seemed relatively continuous, permanent, and 
independent of the individual. Hence, if the study of the 
mind was to be brought into line with the rest of our knowl- 
edge, an attempt had to be made to get rid of the apparent 
discontinuity and irregularity of psychical experience."* 

This discontinuity in mental life is observable in two differ- 
ent directions — (a) in the mental life of the individual, and 
(b) in the relation between individual minds. Concerning the 
former sufficient has already been said (89, 93, 95); but let 
us dwell for a moment on the contrast between mental and 
physical occurring under the second head. 

^Subconscious Phenomena, p. 104. Leading representatives of this 
tendency in the history of philosophy have been Leibniz, Schopenhauer, 
Hartmann, Herbart, and Sir WilHam Hamilton: opposed to them may 
be named Descartes, Lotze, and the English associationists. V., Subcon- 
scious Phenomena, pp. 105-107; Klemm's History of Psychology, pp. 172- 
181; and Villa's Contemporary Psychology, pp. 280-282. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 191 

It is perfectly possible for one human body to get in touch 
with another human body upon the terrestrial globe by passing 
over the intermediate physical space, or by communicating 
through such material media as the telephone wire or the 
postal service. In fact, it is even possible to imagine, if not 
to accomplish, passage from one planet or star to another 
through intermediate physical space, just as we actually ob- 
serve the passage of light from the most distant stars to the 
earth. In all these transitions we are merely moving from one 
place to another in a single continuum. But if I wish to com- 
municate a thought from my mind to that of my friend, I 
find it impossible to do so without making use of some physi- 
cal medium — as the sound-waves of the voice, the light-waves 
produced by gesture or facial expression, etc. In other words, 
our physical bodies are parts of a great physical continuum, 
but our minds are not parts of any psychical continuum — ^not 
of any conscious one, at least. 

It is because of the absence of any such conscious psychical 
continuum between minds corresponding to the physical con- 
tinuum which subsists between bodies that some have sug- 
gested that there may be a ^z/^conscious continuum between 
minds, as there is a submarine continuum between the various 
continents and islands on the surface of the earth.^ Each con- 
scious mind may be cut off entirely from every other, as every 
island on the earth is cut off from any land communication 
with other islands; but just as if we go beneath the surface 
of the ocean we find a continuous submarine land connecting 
these various islands, so if we pass beneath the threshold of 
consciousness we may find that all conscious minds are merely 
separate "islands" projecting out of a single subconscious 
continuum. 

I merely introduce this speculation (for it is only a specu- 
lation) at this point in order to give our discussion a certain 
degree of completeness. The at least apparent discontinuity 
between minds calls for notice in passing, because it is one of 

5 V, James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. S07-515. 



192 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

the historic reasons for postulating some kind of a subcon- 
scious, but it is the discontinuity within the individual mind 
which alone demands our further attention. 

(2) The second root of the concept of the subconscious is 
the empirical or observational root — the observation of cer- 
tain phenomena which seem to involve psychical activity, and 
yet of which the subject is not personally conscious. The ex- 
istence of such phenomena seems to call for some explanation 
of them in subconscious terms, and thus to offer empirical 
confirmation to the postulate which has been constructed his- 
torically on purely theoretical grounds. These phenomenal 
evidences of the subconscious I shall group under three heads, 
each group containing three chief varieties. 

2. Evidences of the Subconscious, 

1 01. Group I. Phenomena involving Personal Continuity. 
— The first group includes those phenomena which seem to in- 
dicate that the apparent discontinuity of mental life is merely 
superficial, and that underneath there is a real persisting self 
binding together the more or less discrete moments of con- 
sciousness. These phenomena are: — 

( I ) The Sense of Personal Continuity — the feeling that is 
in each of us, however we may differ in our explanation of it, 
that notwithstanding the gaps in the "stream of consciousness" 
produced by sleep, amnesia (periods of loss of memory), de- 
lirium, etc. — each of us is nevertheless the same person after 
waking up from sleep, or "coming to himself" after an attack 
of fever or amnesia, that he was before. I go to sleep at 
night, and for a time consciousness ceases; but when I awake 
I have no doubt that I am the same person I was the day be- 
fore, and the first moment of waking attaches itself directly 
to the last moment before going to sleep.^ So, notwithstand- 
ing the changes which occur in each of us as the years pass 
by from infancy to adulthood, we nevertheless feel ourselves 
to be the same person today that we were ten, twenty, or 
more years ago. 

^ Cf. James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 237-239. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 193 

These facts of consciousness seem to show that mental life 
is not merely an aggregate of several distinct "streams of 
consciousness" succeeding one another at intervals in time, 
but a single stream — disappearing periodically below the sur- 
face of the landscape, as it were, but nevertheless continu- 
ously one. 

(2) Recognition as a Factor in Memory. — Memory, as the 
psychologist regards it, includes three essential factors, with- 
out any one of which we have no true memory at all. These 
three essential factors are retention, reproduction or recall,^ 
and recognition. Retention is simply a name for the fact that 
an experience has so impressed itself upon the mind that it 
may be recalled at some future time — i.e., retention is merely 
the potentiality of recall. Recall is the act of producing in 
consciousness an image ("memory-image") of some previous 
experience, and is often regarded as the essential feature of 
memory. This is not the case, however; for unless the 
memory-image is recognised as a revival of an experience 
which / myself have had before, it is not true memory, but 
merely a form of reproductive imagery. The third factor, 
therefore, — Recognition, the conscious identification of a 
memory-image with some perception or idea in one's own 
past experience — is the essential distinguishing mark of true 
psychological memory. 

Now, it is this recognition factor of memory which is ad- 
duced by advocates of the subconscious as evidence of the ex- 
istence of a subconscious continuum connecting past and pres- 
ent consciousnesses in the lifetime of an individual. That I 
am able to produce in consciousness an image, more or less 
similar to some former image or perception in my past ex- 
perience, is a conscious phenomenon, and may be accounted 
for in terms of consciousness; but that I should connect this 
present moment of conscious recollection with some past 
moment, perhaps many years ago, and recognize these two 
moments as parts of a single mental lifetime — as "mine," 
''Other synonyms are "revival" and "recollection." 



194 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

rather than yours or his — seems to be an inexpHcable fact un- 
less there is some psychical continuum, a personal continuity, 
underlying and connecting the separate consciousness of those 
two moments.^ 

(3) The Revival of Lost Memories. — A third and espe- 
cially striking type of phenomenon seeming to imply a sub- 
conscious continuum in mental life is the revival under ab- 
normal circumstances — as in dreams, the deliria of fever, 
automatic writing, crystal gazing, hypnosis, waking hallucina- 
tions ("visions"), and the artificial devices of psychoanalysis 
— of experiences which have long been forgotten, and which 
no amount of conscious effort on the part of the subject has 
succeeded in bringing into the subject's consciousness. 

The first four chapters of Dr. Prince's book on The Un- 
conscious contain numerous instances of this phenomenon.® 
A classic example is that recorded by Coleridge of the illiter- 
ate servant-girl who, in a delirium, was heard uttering Latin, 
Greek, and Hebrew sentences. Later inquiry revealed that 
she had formerly been employed in the house of a scholarly 
clergyman who was accustomed to read aloud to himself 
Classic and Hebrew passages as he walked up and down the 
floor in the neighborhood of the kitchen.^^ The words, which 
of course were to the woman mere meaningless sounds, had 
penetrated her mind, and awaited only the stress of the fever 
to bring them back into consciousness. I say "back into con- 
sciousness," though in reality it is doubtful if they were con- 
sciously presented to her mind even in the first instance; 
rather were they subconscious impressions even then, and not 
so much forgotten or "lost" in the interval between the time 
of the original impression and that of the fever, as non-exis- 
tent so far as the woman's normal consciousness was con- 
cerned at any time. But even should this phenomenon be ex- 

s V. Sidis, The Psychology of Suggestion, pp. 124-127. Foundations, 
pp. 182 f. 
^ Cf. also Sidis, Psychology of Suggestion, Chap. XI. 
1° V. James, Principles of Psychology, Vol I, p. 681. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 195 

plained in physiological terms, as a simple case of delayed re- 
flex action, the innumerable instances in which definitely con- 
scious experiences are known completely to drop out of con- 
sciousness for years, and are revived only under unusual stress 
at some later time, seem more naturally to call for a psychical 
than a physiological explanation. 

102. Group II. Phenowiena having no Conscious Cause, 
and therefore involving jw&conscious causes if they are to be 
explained in purely psychological terms at all. These phe- 
nomena belong to each of the three aspects of consciousness 
which psychologists recognize in their structural analyses of 
mind — ^the cognitive, the affective, and the conative; and in- 
clude, accordingly unaccountable ideas, unaccountable feelings, 
and unaccountable acts. If these conscious phenomena have 
no conscious causes, and yet are to be explained in psychical 
terms in accordance with the principle of independent psychical 
causation, their causes must be inferred to be subconscious. 

( I ) Unaccountable Ideas. — By this is meant the sudden ap- 
pearance in consciousness of ideas which have no antecedents 
in consciousness — as when one forgets a perfectly familiar 
name or other word, searches for it in vain, although all the 
while it seems to be "just on the tip of the tongue," and finally 
gives up the search in despair, only to have the looked-for 
word rush into full consciousness some time after, when we 
are thinking of something else.^^ Frequently, also, strange 
ideas come into consciousness without any such preliminary 
effort, seeming to have no explanation at all ; and yet the psy- 
chologist is loath to admit that any psychical phenomenon is 
inexplicable. Where do these ideas come from? Why did 
I think of this just at this time ? These seem to be legitimate 
questions, and to demand a satisfactory answer. 

In ordinary conversation, and in any sustained course of 

thinking, ideas follow one another easily, according to the 

familiar so-called "laws of successive association." At any 

time during the progress of such a "train of ideas," it is usu- 

^^ V. Coriat, Abnormal Psychology, p. 22. 



196 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

ally possible to stop and trace the series back step by step, 
perhaps to its origin. And so, when we are searching the 
memory for some temporarily forgotten incident, we approach 
our goal by way of associated ideas in the same manner as in 
the other instances referred to. The most natural explanation 
of "unaccountable ideas," then, would seem to be in similar 
psychical terms — of the nature in this case, however, of sub" 
conscious rather than conscious sequence of ideas. 

(2) Unaccountable Feelings , and Emotional States having 
no apparent rational basis — as moods of depression or ela- 
tion, personal likes and dislikes, fears and antipathies, moral 
and religious prejudices, etc. We cannot always explain why 
we wake up on one morning "with a grouch on," and on some 
other occasion in a particularly "good humor"; why we like 
certain people and dislike others; why we are afraid of cats, 
or have a special loathing for frogs ; why one person considers 
playing tennis on Sunday a perfectly permissible occupation, 
and another regards it as a violation of the Sabbath. 

These feelings are "unaccountable" in conscious terms, we 
cannot give our "reasons" for them; and yet there can be no 
doubt that every affective state has a cognitive basis some- 
where. We say — "I do not like you. Dr. Fell : the reason why, 
I cannot tell" — but we do not say, "I have no reason" The 
real reason, in other words, is subconscious. 

(3) Unaccountable Acts of everyday life. — Of these, the 
most common instances are the so-called "slips of the tongue" 
or "of the pen" : we intend to write or say one thing, and to 
our own surprise we discover ourselves saying or writing 
something quite different; or we may not make the discovery 
until long afterward, when someone else calls it to our atten- 
tion. Nor is it uncommon to find ourselves doing things with 
our hands or feet without conscious intention — starting to 
walk in a given direction, and actually proceeding in some 
quite different one; going into an adjacent room to get a 
knife, for example, and finding when we have returned that 
we have brought back a pencil instead ; and so on. Now, all 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 197 

these actions are unaccountable in terms of consciousness, but 
no doubt can in every case be referred to a subconscious source. 

103. Group III. Phenomena apparently involving Intelli- 
gence. — We come now to a group of phenomena of a quite 
different character from those already considered, in that they 
seem not only to call for a psychical explanation, but also ac- 
tually to involve reasoning on the part of the subject. As 
heretofore, three types of phenomena are included under this 
head. 

(i) Solutions of Problems which have been temporarily 
laid aside by consciousness. The solutions may manifest 
themselves in ordinary waking life, in the form of hallucina- 
tions, in dreams or hypnosis, through automatic writing, or in 
the crystal. Chapters VI and VH of Prince on The Uncon- 
sciotis are full of instances of this character, and I shall not 
attempt to reproduce any of them in this place. It is by no 
means uncommon for a student to work in vain upon some 
baffling problem, and to retire finally with the difficulty un- 
solved, and then to awake the next morning after a sound sleep 
with the solution clearly presented before his consciousness. 
A striking instance of a similar character is the dream of 
Professor Hilprecht, during which a problem in Assyriology 
was in a dramatic manner solved.^^ 

Under the same head should be mentioned the rapid solu- 
tion of mathematical problems by those strange anthropologi- 
cal freaks known as "lightning calculators"; and the "flashes 
of genius" of which F. W. H. Myers writes so fascinatingly 
in the third chapter of his Human Personality.^^ It is known 
that Sir W. R. Hamilton invented the abstruse mathematical 
system of quarternions "while walking with Lady Hamilton in 
the streets of Dublin, the flash of discovery coming to him 
just as he was approaching the Brougham Bridge."^* 

Now all these phenomena are of a distinctly and unescapably 

12 Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, Vol. XII, pp. 14 f. 

13 The chapter includes an account of some of the "lightning calculators." 
i*Jastrow, The Subconscious, p. 95. 



198 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

psychical nature, involving not merely concepts or single ideas 
but actual reasoning, sometimes of a highly elaborate charac- 
ter. The reasoning itself, however, is not conscious but sub- 
conscious, and the solutions appear in consciousness as the 
end-products of a series of subconscious acts of reasoning. 
, (2) Answers to Questions, or solutions of simple problems 
set by some outsider, may be made by a hypnotized subject, 
or through automatic writing; the subject himself being quite 
unaware, so far as his waking consciousness is concerned, 
either of the question or of having made any reply to the 
same. For example, I may set the subject to reading aloud, 
place a pencil in his right hand, and then whisper in his right 
ear some simple arithmetical sum; and the subject may proceed 
to add up the figures quite unconsciously and automatically, 
v/hile in no wise retarding or otherwise modifying his con- 
scious reading. 

(3) Post-hypnotic Phenomena — i.e., responses made after 
waking from an hypnotic trance, to suggestions made during 
hypnosis. The most striking variety of such reactions to sug- 
gestion are those which involve subconscious time-apprecia- 
tion — i.e., when the suggestion is made that the subject per- 
form some action (as, "get up and shut the door") at a cer- 
tain time (e.g., a quarter past four), or after a given num- 
ber of moments have elapsed (e.g., 439 seconds after the sub- 
ject has been awakened). In experiments of this kind it is 
quite surprising how accurately the subject will respond to the 
suggestion of time, and how carefully the subconscious calcu- 
lates the interval between suggestion and reaction.^^ 

5. Dissociation and the Coconscious. 

104. Meaning of the Terms. — "If we are asked," writes 
Bernard Hart^^ "to turn our mental eye inwards and carefully 
observe at any given moment the content of our mind: — or, 

15 BramweH's The Theory and Practice of Hypnotism contains numer- 
ous cases of this kind. 

16 The Psychology of Insanity, pp. 40 f. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 199 

as it is technically termed, the momentary 'field of conscious- 
rttss' — we should probably describe it as an indivisible whole, 
a uniform stream of thought progressing towards some defi- 
nite end. . . . Yet this statement is only partially true of the 
normal mind, and it is hardly true at all of" the abnormal. In 
other words, a complete Integration of the various mental 
contents, in conformity with the above description, is the ideal, 
but hardly the normal, condition of the mind. In such a 
condition, every part of the subconscious field would be per- 
fectly continuous with every part of the conscious field, so 
that any given content (idea or feeling) could pass freely 
from one field to the other — out of or into consciousness as 
needed. Usually, however, to say the least, and probably al- 
ways as a matter of fact, some degree or other of discontin- 
uity or Dissociation exists between the conscious and the sub- 
conscious fields. 

Dissociation is a condition in which the mind seems to be di- 
vided, some of its contents being split off from the stream of 
personal consciousness, and leading a more or less independent 
existence beyond the control of the personality. When these 
dissociated contents become active, they are usually nowadays 
said to be Coconscious^ and most of the phenomena of Group 
III, above noted (103), are manifestations of coconscious pro- 
cesses going on in a state of dissociation (e.g., hypnosis). 
Subconscious contents which are inactive or dormant, and so 
do not come under the head of "coconscious," are usually called 
Unconscious; and the phenomena of Groups I and II are usu- 
ally manifestations of wwconscious rather than coconscious 
contents.^^ 

I'' This division of subconscious phenomena into coconscious and un- 
conscious we owe to Morton Prince (v. Coriat, Abnormal Psychology, p. 
15-16, and note; Prince, The Unconscious, pp. x, 249-254.) Fuller con- 
sideration will be given to this distinction in the succeeding chapter (119). 
Meanwhile the table on following page may clarify our usage of the 
various terms in their relations to one another, though this does not always 
conform precisely to the usage of Dr. Prince. 



200 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 
MENTAL CONTENTS 



Conscious Subconscious 

(Personal Consciousness) | 1 — . 

Continuous with Dissociated 

Personal Consciousness 
(known as "Forecon- 

scious") (ii8) I 1. — I 

Dormant or Active and 
Inactive Intelligent 

Unconscious Co conscious 

105. Examples of Dissociation. — A curious contradiction is 
found in Coriat's Abnormal Psychology. On page 4 the 
author states that "dissociation is a pathological phenomenon," 
and yet on page 33 we find him declaring that "dissociation re- 
mains normal so long as it is transitory." The latter of these 
two statements is undoubtedly more true to the facts, and ten 
pages of the book under consideration are devoted to illustra- 
tions of the dissociations of everyday life.^® 

Common examples of dissociation in everyday waking life 
are the sudden forgetting of a name, of the topic of a con- 
versation, or of the intention of an action ;^^ slips of the tongue 
or pen; etc. In all these cases, the name, topic, purpose, or 
other datum has become dissociated from the personal con- 
sciousness, and the subject is at a loss what to do or say next. 

Dreams are dissociation phenomena occurring normally dur- 
ing sleep. It is likely that most of our dreams are completely 
forgotten — i.e., "unconscious," in the sense above distin- 
guished; though some of them are synthetized with conscious- 
ness after waking. Ahsentmindedness is a typical dissociation- 
psychosis, in which the entire mental field, with the exception 
of that portion thereof on which "the attention" is concen- 
trated, is split off from the personal consciousness. In such 

18 Pp. 22-32. 

"^^ E.g., going into a room for a definite purpose, and then forgetting 
why we are there. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 201 

a condition, special opportunity is open for the manifestation 
of subconscious phenomena.^® 

Pathological dissociations differ from these in their depth 
and duration. The ordinary non-pathological types of dissoci- 
ation are superficial and transitory — they do not produce a very 
deep cleft in the mental field, and they last but a short time: 
when the dissociation is prolonged and the phenomena conse- 
quent thereupon exaggerated, it becomes pathological, or at 
least abnormal.^^ The most striking examples of these are the 
hypnotic state, the "somnambulisms" of hysterics, and the 
various trance states of neurotics and insane persons. In these 
conditions the subject may be leading a very active psychical 
life, and yet in his normal state may be quite ignorant of the 
events occurring during the trance. 

REFERENCES 

History of the Concept — 

Klemm, A History of Psychology, Chap. VL 
Villa, Contemporary Psychology, Chap. VH. 

The Subconscious in General — 

Subconscious phenomena, by various authors. (Reprinted 

from The Journal of Abnormal Psychology 1910). 
Jastrow, The Subconscious (1906). 
Prince, The Unconscious (1914). 

Coriat, Abnormal Psychology{S&con6.'E6{t{on, 1914), Chap. I. 
Myers, Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death 

(1903), Chap. L 
Ward, Psychological Principles (1918), pp. 90-101. 

Dissociation — 

Hart, The Psychology of Insanity, Chap. IV. 
Wells, Mental Adjustments, Chap. V. 

20 Coriat's "chocolate pie case" is a good example of this. Op. cit., p. 43. 

21 Op. cit, p. 33, Cf. Hart, op. cit, p. 43. 



CHAPTER VIII 

Theories of the Subconscious 

I . Types of Theory. 

1 06. The Main Problem with regard to the explanation of 
the phenomena described in the last chapter is as to whether 
they should be interpreted as psychical or physiological in their 
nature. Of the six theories propounded in the introduction to 
the volume entitled Subconscious Phenomena,^ and reviewed 
by Coriat on pp. 11 -13 of his Abnormal Psychology, five are 
psychological explanations and one (that defended in Subcon^ 
scious Phenomena by Miinsterberg, Ribot, and Jastrow, and 
the fifth in Coriat's list) a physiological one. Advocates of a 
physiological explanation reject the concept of the subcon- 
scious altogether — chiefly, however, on the basis of arguments 
which are of real weight only when directed against one spe- 
cial form of the subconscious theory. 

The dominating question becomes, then, this : Are the phe- 
nomena called subconscious really manifestations of Subcon- 
scious Mentation — i,e., psychical, but not conscious; or are 
they merely expressions of Unconscious Cerebration — i.e., of 
brain processes entirely unaccompanied by any psychical ac- 
tivity? In the remainder of this division of the present chap- 
ter we shall consider two psychological views of the subcon- 
scious, and in succeeding divisions shall give our attention to 
a more critical study of the subconscious, defending it in the 
proper place against the attacks of the unconscious cerebra- 
tionists.^ 

^Originally, in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Vol. II, No. i 
(1907). 

2 It should be kept in mind that the very term "subconscious** involves 
"mentation" or psychical activity. The issue is not between psychological 
and physiological theories "of the subconscious," but between psychologi- 

202 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOCr^ 203 

107. The Dual Mind Theory. — The popular conception of 
the subconscious is that of a separate "secondary'* or subcon- 
scious "self" or "mind/' having all the reality of the "primary" 
or conscious mind, but living an independent life alongside of 
it. According to this view, man has two minds, one conscious 
and the other subconscious, sharply separated from each other 
but interacting.^ 

This theory was promulgated by T. J. Hudson some twenty- 
five or thirty years ago in his book, The Law of Psychic Phe- 
nomena — no doubt one of the most popular books on psychol- 
ogy ever written, and yet one having no scientific standing 
whatever. The two minds Hudson calls the "objective" and 
"subjective" minds respectively, and to each of these minds 
he ascribes distinct "faculties" or powers. The "objective 
mind," he asserts, is that by which we become aware of the 
objective world through the mediation of the physical senses : 
the "subjective mind," on the other hand, "takes cognizance 
of its environment by means independent of the physical 
senses" — namely, by "intuition," whatever that may mean. 
This "subjective" or subconscious mind is "the seat of the 
emotions and the storehouse of memory," "is constantly amen- 
able to the power of suggestion," and has unlimited powers of 
deductive inference, but is quite "incapable of inductive reason- 
ing." The "objective" or conscious mind, on the other hand, 
"is capable of reasoning by all methods," but is not control- 
able by suggestion. 

Such a view of the mind undoubtedly simplifies many prob- 
lems — or would, if there were any truth in it' — ^but, unfortu- 
nately for its advocates, it also introduces many new problems 
which would be quite insoluble on its own basis, and is totally 
indefensible from a scientific standpoint.* Any such artificial 

cal and physiological explanations of the phenomena described in the pre- 
vious chapter, and called, by those who explain them psychologically, 
"subconscious." 

3 V. Subconscious Phenomena, pp. 12 f. Miinsterberg — Psychotherapy, 
pp. 126-129. 

*Coriat, however, strangely enough, would give the unguarded reader 



204 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

division of the mind is open to all the objections offered to 
the historic "faculty theory" (ii), and is thoroughly unscien- 
tific, all psychologists today agreeing that, normally at least, 
the mind is a unit, and that man has in any case but one mind. 
Because of the misconceptions associated with this, the most 
widely held theory of the subconscious, the term "subconscious 
mind," which is perfectly defensible when understood as mean- 
ing the subconscious portion of the mind's content, should 
nevertheless ordinarily be avoided, and the single word "sub- 
conscious" substituted. 

1 08. The Ultra-Marginal View of the Subconscious. — The 
best approach to an understanding of the nature of the sub- 
conscious is, I think, from the point of view which regards the 
subconscious as a field of mental activity outside the margin 
of personal consciousness. This conception I denominate the 
"ultra-marginal view" rather than "theory" for the express 
purpose of counteracting any tendency to regard this concep- 
tion as in any way an explanation — certainly not a final theory 
— of the subconscious : it is a descriptive conception solely, a 
method of approach to an understanding of the subconscious, 
and in no sense an explanatory theory. Furthermore, the view 
of the subconscious which I shall present in this section does 
not pretend to be a complete description of what we mean by 
the subconscious, but merely an "approach" to such a descrip- 
tion; for the subconscious is much more that the ultra-mar- 
ginal. Succeeding divisions of the chapter, however, will 
elaborate what is here merely preliminary.^ 

to understand, quite unjustifiably, that the dual mind theory is the domi- 
nating view among psychologists, when he tells us on p. 3 of his Ah" 
normal Psychology that "the psychologist [i.e., every psychologist] regards 
the subconscious as an independent consciousness, coexistent with the 
healthy consciousness [does he mean to imply by this word "healthy" that 
the "subconscious mind" is pathological?] but detached from it." This is, 
of course, a very unfortunate way of putting the matter. 

5 The best presentation of the ultra-marginal view is to be found in 
Prince, The Unconscious, pp. 340-352. (C/. also Coriat's first theory—^ 
Abnormal Psychology, p. 11 ; also. Subconscious Phenomena, p. lo. This 
treatment, however, ignores the very important distinction between margin- 
al and ultra-marginal — v., inf., sect. 113.) 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 205 

General psychology recognizes that the field of personal con- 
sciousness at any one moment is not identical with the field of 
attention. As Dr. Prince puts it: "li you were to state what 
was in your mind at a given moment, it is the vivid elements 
upon which your attention was focused, that you would de- 
scribe. But as everyone knows, these do not constitute the 
whole field of consciousness at any given moment. Besides 
these there is in the background of the mind, outside the focus, 
a cofisciotis margin or fringe of varying extent (consisting of 
sensations^ perceptions^ and even thoughts) of which you are 
only dimly aware. It is a sort of twilight zone in which the 
contents are so slightly illuminated by awareness as to be 
scarcely recognizable."® 

The field of consciousness at any one moment, therefore, 
contains two more or less clearly distinguished regions — (i) 
a central or focal region of attention or clearest consciousness, 
and (2) a surrounding marginal or suhattentive region of less 
clear contents. The latter was called by James the ''fringe" 
of consciousness, to indicate its less solid, more hazy char- 
acter, and that the total field of consciousness is frayed out at 
the edges, so to speak, rather than of equal consistency 
throughout. This distinction within the field of consciousness 
is analogous to that made by all psychologists between the 
central, "focal" portion of the field of vision — the region of 
clearest vision — and the marginal or "peripheral" region. 

Now the subconscious is to be thought of primarily as the 
further extension of this fringe into what may be called (3) 
the ultra-marginal region, containing a number of instable 
contents, any of which may at any moment, under normal 
conditions, come into actual consciousness. From this point 
of view, the subconscious is the potentially conscious, and does 
not, normally at least, constitute a "self" distinct from the 
conscious self. The following diagram, a modification of a 

6 Op. cit., p. 341. 



2o6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

common form of graphic representation of the field of con- 
sciousness, may help to clarify these distinctions/ 

THE FIELD OF MENTAL CONTENT 



1. Central Region: Attentive Consciousness. 

2. Marginal Region: Suhattentive Conscious- 

ness. 

3. Ultra-Marginal Region: Subconsciousness. 



Ahsentmindedness, it is interesting to point out in this con- 
nection {cf. 105), is a condition in which the field of con- 
sciousness is narrowed down to that of attention, and all other 
contents beside those attended to are entirely subconscious. 
Such a state may be represented as follows — 





< — circle 2 being absent. 

Prince summarizes his presentation in these words : "If all 
that I have said is true, it follows that the whole content or 
field of mind^ at any given moment includes not only consider- 

"^ The lines between circles i and 2, and 2 and 3, are dotted to indicate 
that normally contents may pass more or less freely from one portion of 
the general field to another. 

8 Prince uses here the word "consciousness," and for what we have 
called ''personal consciousness" he uses the term "awareness." I prefer, 
however, in the interests of clearness and simplicity not to distinguish 
"awareness" from "consciousness," but to use these terms interchangeably. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 207 

ably more than that which is within the field of attention, hut 
more than is within the field of personal consciousness.^ The 
field of conscious states as a whole comprises the focus of at- 
tention plus the marginal fringe ; and besides this there may be 
a true subconscious ultra-marginal field comprising psychicaP^ 
states of which the personal consciousness is not even dimly 
aware."" 

109. The Subconscious as the Subliminal. — In addition to 
the metaphor which speaks of the subconscious as that which 
is "beyond the margin of consciousness, it may also be viewed 
as that which lies ''below the threshold" of consciousness — 
i.e., as that which is ''subliminal."^^ In contrast to this, the 
personal consciousness is "supraliminal," or "above the thres- 
hold." This is a terminology which extends the familiar psy- 
chophysical concept of the psychic threshold or "limen"^^ to 
the field of subconscious psychology. It is a terminology 
made familiar especially by Myers,^* but not so much favored 
at the present time. The whole field of mental content was 
likened by Dr. Stanley Hall to an iceberg, of which only a 
small portion is visible above the surface of the water : in the 
same way, it is said, only a small portion of the mental con- 
tent is above the threshold of consciousness.^^ Any given con- 
tent, moreover, may at any time (under given conditions) 
"rise above" or "fall below" this threshold, as a swimmer or a 

9 Prince uses here the word "awareness." But see previous note. 

10 Prince uses the term "conscious" here. 

11 Op. cit., p. 351. 

'^^ Siib limine, "under the threshold." 

13 In psychophysics, a stimulus (of sound, for example) which is too 
faint to be perceived is said to be "below the threshold of consciousness," 
and one which is just intense enough to be perceived and no more is said 
to be "at the threshold." 

1* Human Personality. 

15 Myers' own favorite analogy was that of the spectrum of light, con- 
sciousness corresponding to the visible portion, and subconscious processes 
to the potent but invisible ultra-violet rays. 



208 



THE FOUNDATIONS O'F PSYCHOLOGY 



submarine may rise above or fall below the surface of the 
water at will.^® 

All these figurative representations of the subconscious are 
useful for clearing up our understanding of the matter, pro- 
vided we do not allow ourselves to be carried away by them. 
Generally speaking, we may regard the ultra-marginal form 
of speech as involving a view of the mind from above, and the 
subliminal figure as a cross-section of the mind. The latter 
may be graphically represented as below, using what I shall 
hereafter designate the "Reservoir Figure" of the subcon- 
scious." 



Threshold of Attention- 



Threshold of Consciousness—^ 



Attention 

Subattention 

Subconscious 



I Conscious 
^ Subconscious 



2, Criticisms of the Concept of the Subconscioti;s. 

no. The Subconscious and its Critics. — Most psychologists 
are willing to accept the coconscious, and explain the phe- 
nomena of our third group (103) as expressions of such dis- 
sociated or coconscious activity;^® but many refuse to accept 
the broader concept of the subconscious as applied to the phe- 
nomena of Groups I and H (loi, 102), and explain all these 
in physiological terms (the theory of "unconscious cerebra- 
tion," inf.). Among these, the most prominent are probably 
Hugo Miinsterberg, Theodore Ribot, and Joseph Jastrow. I 

16 As it is important to guard ourselves in the use of the expression 
"subconscious mind," so it is highly advisable to avoid entirely the use of 
the term "subliminal self." 

17 The other representation may be called the "Circle Figure." Of 
course, if we were considering the mathematical proportion of the various 
parts of the psychical field, our reservoir figure would not have parallel 
sides, but sides, which would slope inward in passing up from die bot- 
tom. But such details must be ignored in our present study. 

"^^ E.g., Miinsterberg — Psychotherapy, pp. 155 f. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 209 

shall follow Miinsterberg's criticisms in my presentation of 
this viewpoint. 

Miinsterberg opens his discussion of the subconscious in his 
Psychotherapy with the sentence — "The story of the subcon- 
scious mind can be told in three words: there is none." Of 
course, such a summary method of rejecting a proposition in 
which one disbelieves by merely asserting its contradictory, 
can never carry conviction to those one most wishes to con- 
vince. Fortunately, however, for those who have a serious in- 
terest in understanding both sides of an issue, the author at 
once proceeds to admit that it needs "many more words to 
make clear what that means," and follows this admission by 
thirty-two pages of valuable criticism. The objections offered 
may be considered under three heads, as follows : 

III. (i) The notion of "subconscious mental facts" is self- 
contradictory. What is not conscious is not mental at all, but 
physiological. So-called "subconscious mental facts are either 
not mental but physiological, or mental but not subcon- 
scious";^^ for "to have psychical existence at all means to be 
object of awareness for a consciousness."^^ Therefore, "psy- 
chical objects which have their existence below consciousness 
are as impossible as a wooden piece of iron."^^ 

The issue here is between those who identify "mind" and 
"consciousness," and those who allow for a possible differen- 
tiation between them — making "mind" a more inclusive term 
than "consciousness," according to the "iceberg" principle 
above elucidated (109), and others of that nature. The for- 
mer view is well represented by Mark Baldwin, who asserts 
that "consciousness is the one condition and abiding character- 
istic of mental states."^^ And again — "Consciousness is the 
common and necessary form of all mental states: without it 
mind is not and cannot be conceived. It is the point of di- 

19 Psychotherapy, p. 130. 

^^Ihid., p. 133. 

^^IUd„ p. 134. 

^^ Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I {Senses and Intellect), p. 45. 



210 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

vision and differentiation between mind and not-mind."^^ The 
opposite view is expressed in Coriat's exaggerated statement 
that "all [sic] psychopathologists agree . . . that our minds 
are made up of certain states, for some oi which we are con- 
scious and for some not conscious."^* 

But, after all, this issue is one of fact rather than of theory. 
If the evidence of subconscious mental processes — of processes 
going on in the organism which are psychical in their nature, 
but of which the personality is unaware^ — is strong enough to 
be convincing, we must alter our notion of "mind'* to make 
it include these new facts; only taking care, of course, that 
we do not allow ourselves to fall into real contradition. But 
when the subconscious is thought of from the ultra-marginal 
point of view, and defended as we have done from the be- 
ginning, this first objection loses weight. For, according to 
the ultra-marginal view, "subconscious" does not mean "not 
conscious in any sense of that word," but merely "outside the 
margin of personal consciousness." The concept is not op- 
posed to that of "consciousness," as a general term for mental 
activity, but to that of ''personal consciousness" — of aware- 
ness by the personality, whatever philosophers may define that 
to be. In order to avoid all ambiguity, however, I prefer for 
the present, at least,^^ to restrict the term "consciousness" to 
"personal consciousness," and to use "mind" or "mental con- 
tent" in the broader sense (v., footnote at end of section 104). 
The expression 'subconscious mental facts," then, is self-con- 
tradictory only if we arbitrarily and before examining the 
evidence identify "mind" and ''personal consciousness," and 
then refuse to alter our ideas in the face of disturbing facts. 

23 Ibid., p. 44. 

^* Abnormal Psychology, p. 10. Just above this quotation, the author 
has naively classed those who regard "unconscious mental facts" as a "con- 
tradiction in terms" among the psychologists "who have not had experience 
in investigating abnormal mental phenomena" ! This is as bad as Miinster- 
berg's brief condemnation of the whole notion of the subconscious in 
three words ! 

25 But V. also sect. 120, where another terminology is suggested for 
final adoption. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 211 

112. (2) The hypothesis of subconscious ideas is futile. 
This objection follows from and is inextricably bound up 

with Miinsterberg's views of psychical causation and his criti- 
cism of the independence theory (89 (3)). He maintains, it 
will be remembered, that mental facts, being purely transitory 
and discontinuous, have no causal connection, but only a tele- 
ological one. But, he adds, if mental facts qiM mental have 
no causal connection, it would be useless to try to fill up the 
gaps in the series of conscious ideas by the introduction of 
purely hypothetical ^^/^conscious ideas.^^ Or, to put it in an- 
other way: mental facts are, by their very nature as mental, 
discontinuous — i.e., lack causal connection; conscious facts, 
then, being mental, lack causal connection; therefore, even if 
we concede that ^wi&conscious mental facts are possible, they, 
too would lack causal connection — not because they are sub- 
conscious, but because they are mental, and nothing mental 
has causal connection. Hence, the postulation of subconscious 
mental causes would be futile and fruitless. 

By parity of reasoning, however, if we accept the principle 
of independent psychical causation on general grounds, as we 
have decided to do, then acceptance of the subconscious neces- 
sarily follows. If we find it possible to admit ''causal connec- 
tion" between conscious processes (conscious causes), then we 
need have no hesitation in admitting it between subconscious 
processes, or between conscious and subconscious processes 
(subconscious causes). For advocates of independent psychi- 
cal causation, then, the hypothesis of subconscious ideas is not 
futile, but actually necessary. 

113. (3) The concept of the subconscious is gratuitous, and 
so unnecessary, since all the phenomena may be sufiiciently ex- 
plained without it. For the purpose of such explanation, 
Miinsterberg in effect classifies the phenomena in three groups, 
which, to distinguish this classification from our earlier one 
(101-103), I shall designate by letters: 

26(9/'. cit, pp. 138 f. 



212 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

A. CoconscioMs processes — ^active and intelligent processes, 
which are, however, dissociated from the personality. 

B. ''Mental, but not subconscious," processes — mental con- 
tents which are outside the field of attention, but inside the 
field of consciousness. 

C. "Not mental, but physiological" processes — phenomena 
which may be explained on the theory of unconscious cere- 
bration. 

The phenomena of Group A have already received sufficient 
attention from us, and we have treated the "coconscious" as a 
species of the broader genus "subconscious." The theory of 
unconscious cerebration, adduced in explanation of the phe- 
nomena of Group C, will occupy our thought in the next suc- 
ceeding division of this chapter. Further consideration must 
be given at this point, however, to the phenomena of Group B. 

"There are," says Miinsterberg, "plenty of mental experi- 
ences which we do not notice, or which we do not recognize. 
Yet if we do find later that they must have influenced our 
mind, we are easily inclined to refer them to subconscious ac- 
tivity. But it is evident that to be content of consciousness 
means not at all necessarily to be object of attention or ob- 
ject of recognition. Awareness does not involve interest [i.e., 
'consciousness' includes more than 'attention' — viz., the 
'subattentive margin']. If I hear a musical sound, I may not 
recognize at all the overtones which are contained in it. As 
soon as I take resonators and by them reenforce the loudness 
of those tones, they become vivid for me and I can now notice 
them well even when the resonators are removed. I surely 
was aware of them. — that is, had them in consciousness — all 
the time, but there were no contrast feelings and no associa- 
tions in consciousness which gave them sufficient clearness to 
attract attention. "^^ Again, in walking along the street I may 
suddenly think of some person, and later discover that I had 
actually, a few moments before the thought "came into my 
mind," passed him without noticing or recognizing him. 

27 Op. cit., pp. 158 f. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 213 

Now it is evident that what impels Miinsterberg to call such 
experiences as these "mental indeed, but not subconscious," is 
the fact that he rejects the distinction we have made between 
the "subconscious" and the "subattentive" (108). These ex- 
periences, he avers, are outside the field of attention it is true; 
but if they are mental at all, as they certainly must be, and if 
the mental and the conscious are identical, as Miinsterberg all 
along presupposes and insists, then they must lie within the 
field of consciousness. But to refuse to call these phenomena 
subconscious is merely a question of terms, and reduces back 
to the question as to whether two subdivisions of the field of 
mentality are sufificient to account for all the facts, or whether 
a threefold division is necessary. Miinsterberg identifies 
"mind" and "consciousness," dividing the field into an (atten- 
tive) centre and a (subattentive) margin, and including in 
the latter what we have called "subconscious" : advocates of 
the subconscious, in the other hand, distinguish "mind" from 
"consciousness," dividing the total field of mental content into 
three concentric regions, and distinguishing the subconscious 
from the subattentive. The justification for the latter distinc- 
tion, which Miinsterberg rejects, lies in the fact that investi- 
gation seems to show that there is a real difference between 
being subattentively aware of a certain fact, and being sub- 
conscious of it. 

For example, when attending an orchestral concert, I am 
conscious of the total volume of sound, of the lights and the 
appearances of the players and the portions of the audience 
within my field of vision, perhaps of the hardness of the seat 
on which I am sitting and the closeness of the atmosphere; 
though very likely my attention is concentrated upon the tones 
produced by whichever may be the dominating instruments of 
the moment — ^violins, oboe, kettledrums, or what not — and all 
the rest of the content of my consciousness is in the subatten- 
tive region. But over and above all this there will be a vast 
number of phenomena going on of which I am totally "un- 
T' (my personality) am concerned, and 



214 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

yet of which I may easily become conscious under the proper 
conditions — the portion of the audience outside my momentary 
field of vision, of which I may at any time think, even if I do 
not look at them; the feeling of my clothing, the pressure of 
my feet on the floor, a pain in my left forefinger; ideas of 
music in general, of the composer of the symphony being 
played, of philosophy, or of domestic events, etc. So long as 
I am not conscious of these things, and yet may become con- 
scious of them as soon as the required conditions arise, they 
have a claim to be called in some sense "mine"; and it is to 
such phenomena as these that the terms "subconscious," "sub- 
liminal," and "ultra-marginal" are applicable. 

In the case of a single musical sound, of which Miinsterberg 
writes,^^ I should deny what he implicitly, but probably unin- 
tentionally, asserts — vis., that we are attentively conscious of 
the fundamental tone only, and subattentively of the overtones. 
Rather, are we attentively conscious of the entire "clang"^^ as 
a unit, and only the trained musician is even subattentively 
conscious of the various partial tones as such, the ordinary 
hearer who knows nothing of the science of music being but 
subconscious of them. 

So, in the instance of unconsciously passing a friend on the 
street, I may at the time have been vividly aware of some other 
person who was momentarily obstructing my passage, and 
subattentively conscious of the store windows along the side 
of the walk ; and immediately afterward the order of vividness 
may have been reversed, the store windows and their contents 
becoming focal and the passers-by marginal, the thought of 
my friend bring entirely "beyond the margin" until a still later 
time. And yet the fact that I did pass him, and that the light 
reflected from him stimulated my optic nerve even if it did not 
penetrate my consciousness, requires me to admit that I was 
subconscious of him all along. 

28Loc. cit. 

29 The technical term for the complete musical tone, which the musician 
analyzes into fundamental and overtones. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 215 

The distinction between the subattentive and the subcon- 
scious which Munsterberg ignores should, therefore, I think, 
be recognized; and if so, the phenomena which our critic ex- 
plains as ''mental but not subconscious" (Group B) must — 
some of them, at least — be classified as ultra-marginal. 

3, The Theory of Unconscious Cerebration, 

114. The Cerebral Explanation of the So-called Subcon- 
scious Phenomena is a natural application of the general cere- 
bral theory of psychical causation to the particular facts now 
under investigation. The theory and the term ''unconscious 
cerebration" we owe primarily to Wm. B. Carpenter.^^ Ad- 
vocates of this theory explain all phenomena which are neither 
coconscious (Group A) nor subattentive in the sense of which 
we have just been speaking (Group B) — namely, those of 
Miinsterberg's Group C — as expressions of brain activities, en- 
tirely unaccompanied by mental activity (cerebration, rather 
than mentation). 

The great test of theories of the subconscious is the problem 
of memory. What are the conditions that make it possible to 
reproduce earlier sensory experiences in terms of memory- 
images? The usual explanation is that every sensory experi- 
ence leaves some modification in the neurones of the brain^ — 
"physiological dispositions," as they are sometimes called ; and 
that memory in its reproductive stage (101(2)) is the con- 
scious accompaniment of renewed activities in those same 
neurones. This is the explanation adopted by those who de- 
fend cerebral theories of psychical causation.^^ Advocates of 
the subconscious, on the other hand, assert the existence of 
psychical dispositions also in the subconscious region itself, as 
the source of the revived memory-image, and as the psychical 
correlates of the dispositions in the brain cells. This is in 
conformity with the general "principle of independence" 

^^ Principles of Mental Physiology (1874). 
^^E.g., Munsterberg — Psychotherapy, p. 138. 



2i6 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(86(2)), which demands a psychical cause for all mental 
processes. 

To the theory of psychical dispositions, Miinsterberg offers 
what can only be called an absurd objection, and one which 
it is difficult to take seriously. "If we really needed a mental 
disposition for each memory picture, in addition to the physio- 
logical disposition of the brain cells," he asks, "can we over- 
look that exactly the same thing would then be necessary for 
every perception also? The outer impression produces, per- 
haps through eye or ear or skin, an excitement of the brain 
cells, and this excitement is accompanied by a sensation; and 
no one fancies that the appearance of this sensation is de- 
pendent upon a special disposition for it on the mental side."^^ 
"I hear the bells ringing. The sounds enter my consciousness. 
Must I suppose that I have a subconscious disposition for these 
bell sounds, and even for this new melody of the bells which 
I have never heard before? Of course, then, I must have such 
a disposition for everything on earth which can enter into the 
sphere of my senses. I must have a disposition for the smell 
of the chemical substance which some chemist may produce 
tomorrow in his laboratory. All those dispositions resulting 
from my little personal experiences, which are postulated by 
advocates of the subconscious in explanation of memory, are, 
then, insignificant compared with the trillions for all which 
may possibly become the object of my sense-perception."** 

It is indeed difficult to take this criticism seriously. Mem- 
ory-images by their very nature have psychical antecedents : 
it never occurs to us to call an experience memory unless it is 
a reproduction of some previous conscious experience, and the 
theory of psychical dispositions is just an attempt to tide over 
the interval between the original and reproduced experiences 
by means of psychological rather than physiological concepts. 
Perception, on the contrary, — at least, on its sensory side — is 
an original primary fact of mental life, having no psychical 

32 op. cit., pp. 139 f. Italics mine. 

33 Psychology General and Applied, pp. 27 f . 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 217 

antecedents whatever (94(2)). Only the doctrine of uni- 
versal psychophysical parallelism (94(3)) calls for such an 
explanation of perception as that which Miinsterberg criti- 
cizes ; and this is a metaphysical, not a scientific, doctrine. 

115. Criticism of the Theory of Unconscious Cerebration. — 
Three criticisms of the cerebral explanation of the so-called 
subconscious phenomena may be offered' — 

(i) The cerebral theory of mefnory, as outlined above, ap- 
plies only to retention and recall, and fails to explain recogni- 
tion. This difficulty has already been discussed at length, and 
need hardly delay us again now.^* 

(2) The theory of unconscious cerebration fails to account 
for the intelligent character of many of those phenomena in 
which no definite "coconscious" activity or "dissociation" is 
observable. 

Though accepting the concept of the coconscious, Miinster- 
berg inclines to regard the phenomena of our Group HI as 
explicable physiologically as merely hilghly complex reflex 
activity, connected "by continuous transitions" with the "sim- 
plest automatic reactions." "In the simple cases," he says, "of 
course no one doubts that a purely physiological basis is in- 
volved. The decapitated frog rubs its skin where it is touched 
with a drop of muriatic acid in a way which is ordinarily re- 
ferred to the trained apparatus of his spinal cord, as no brain 
is left, and the usefulness of the action and its adjustment is 
very well understood as the result of the connecting paths in 
the nervous system. From such simple adjustments of reac- 
tions of the spinal cord, we come step by step to the more 
complex activities of the subcortical brain centres, and finally 
to those which are evidently only short-cuts of the higher brain 
processes. "^^ All these, however, even the most complex, and 
those which involve reasoning, he regards as perfectly ex- 
plicable in physiological terms. 

It is always difficult to know where to draw the line between 

s* v., sect. loi (2) , and references. 
35 Psychotherapy^ p. 143. 



2i8 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

that which does and that which does not involve rational in- 
telligence, but that the line must be drawn somewhere is in- 
dubitable. And the phenomena referred to under Group III 
(103) seem to be of the type which can only be accounted for 
on the ground of rational intelligence — and if not conscious, 
then subconscious, intelligence. Even, then, if unconscious 
cerebration will account for the phenomena of Groups I and 
II, it fails entirely to account for those of Group III. 

(3) Our final objection, however, is one which applies to 
the theory of unconscious cerebration in its broadest signifi- 
cance, and is the natural consequence of our general prin- 
ciples of independence and of independent psychical causation. 
This objection is that the theory of unconscious cerebration 
confutes the psychical with the physiological. However 
plausible this theory may be in itself, if we have no preposses- 
sions as to the independence of psychology from physiology, 
nevertheless, if we are to have, in accordance with our postu- 
lates, a purely psychical explanation of all psychical phe- 
nomena, the concept of the subconscious is a necessary one. 
Miinsterberg, of course, rejects the whole idea of an indepen- 
dent causal psychology, and so does not need (except, as I 
should insist, in explanation of the phenomena of Group III) 
the concept of the subconscious : we, on the contrary, who are 
attempting to lay the foundations of an independent causal 
psychology, find the postulation of that concept essential. 

In conclusion, my criticism of the theory of unconscious 
cerebration and defence of that of subconscious mentation 
may be summed up in two propositions : ( i ) The phenomena 
of Group III are by their very nature inexplicable in purely 
physiological terms, and therefore call for an explanation in 
terms of subconscious mentation — this is the empirical defence 
of the principle of subconscious mentation. (2) The postu- 
late of independent psychical causation forbids reference of 
any psychical phenomenon to a cerebral cause, and demands its 
explanation in purely psychical terms — this is the theoretical 
defence of the principle of subconscious mentation. In view of 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 219 

this latter basis for our doctrine, the chief purpose of this and 
the preceding chapter has up to this point been not so much to 
prove empirically that subconscious mentation goes on, as to 
vshow that the concept of the subconscious thus called for on 
theoretical grounds is reasonable; the empirical proof being a 
conifirmation of the postulate, rather than an independent 
demonstration. 

116. Consciousness and Content. — ^One paragraph in Miin- 
sterberg's chapter in the Psychotherapy calls for special com- 
ment at this point, although its subject-matter is hardly perti- 
nent to that of the chapter as a whole. I refer to that para- 
graph in which the author distinguishes between consciousness 
and content. ^^ 

"Consciousness," he writes, "is an inactive spectator [of] 
the procession of its contents." "Consciousness itself cannot 
change anything in the content, nor can it connect the contents. 
No other function is left to [it] but merely that of awareness." 

The only criticism I should care to make of this description 
w^ould be directed against the use of the term "inactive." By 
its very nature, even when merely a "spectator" (as in per- 
ception or reproductive imagery), conscioitsness is always ac- 
tive: there is no such thing possible as a purely passive state 
of consciousness. But if the word "inefficient" is substituted 
for "inactive," this objection is compensated. Consciousness 
is indeed an inefficient spectator of the procession of its con- 
tents, in the sense that consciousness is never a cause producing 
its effects. One content may be the cause of another, and all 
may be the expressions of the metaphysical self, but conscious- 
ness, as psychologists study it, is never a cause but an effect- 
less spectator of these contents. 

Dr. Sidis, however, would not be satisfied with this single 
criticism. He thinks that Miinsterberg is in this paragraph 
reviving the old substance view of consciousness. "Conscious- 
ness," he says, "is regarded in the light of a substance which 
contains the mental content somewhat after the fashion of a 

36 Paragraph beginning on page 134. 



220 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

material substance underlying physical qualities."^^ But this, 
surely, is a false interpretation. For Miinsterberg, conscious- 
ness is not in any sense a substance, but rather a subject, as the 
very expression "spectator of the contents" implies. This 
phase of his doctrine follows naturally from his general con- 
ception of scientific psychology, according to which the "con- 
sciousness" that psychologists study and analyze is an arti- 
ficial construction, not the "real self" — an objective treatment 
of what is in its true nature subjective. Sidis, indeed, criti-i 
cizes this latter view also,^^ but we cannot return to this point 
now. 

4. Recent Developments in the Theory of the Subconscious. 

117. Freud and Prince. — Two contemporary writers have 
propounded theories which involve the division of the subcon- 
scious into regions, somewhat after the fashion of the usual 
division of the field of consciousness into focus and margin. 
These psychologists are Drs. Sigmund Freud of Vienna, and 
Morton Prince of Boston. The divisions they propose are 
quite different, and each must occupy some of our attention. 

118. Freud's Theory of the Subconscious. — Freud divides 
the subconscious into two "levels," as we may call them' — (i) 
an upper level designated the 'Joreconscious'' (sometimes 
translated "preconscious"), and (2) a lower level known as 
the ''unconscious.'' The chief distinction between them is 
this: the Foreconscious is made up of contents which may 
become conscious at any time on attaining a certain degree of 
intensity, whereas the Unconscious is made up of contents 
which cannot enter into consciousness except by overcoming 
a certain "resistance." Foreconscious contents are subject to 
voluntary recall : unconscious contents can be recalled only by 
the use of certain artificial devices known as "psychoanalytic." 
The Foreconscious is the "ultra-marginal" : the Unconscious 
is a deeper stratum of the "psyche" (i.e., the total mental con- 

^"^ Foundations, p. 194. 

38 Op. cit., pp. 195 f . See also our sect. 124. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 



221 



tent), whose contents can rise into consciousness only by pass- 
ing first through the foreconscious level, the latter acting as 
a "screen" between Conscious and Unconscious.^^ 

The Unconscious, according to Freud, is the "real self," 
whose inner nature is unknown to us, and is only imperfectly 
revealed to us in consciousness. It is made up, he teaches, of 
memories, thoughts, desires, etc., which have been "repressed" 
because they are for one reason or another painful to con- 
sciousness, or contrary to the higher moral nature; the result 
being that a certain "resistance" is set up against their recall 
into consciousness, which can be overcome only by special 
methods. This particular hypothesis with regard to the nature 
and content of the Unconscious Freud infers from the 
phenomena of hysteria, hypnosis, dreams, etc., which have 
long occupied his attention : it is, therefore, an extremely im- 
portant hypothesis for abnormal psychology, but its details are 
of no interest to us in our present purely theoretical investiga- 
tion. Our sole immediate concern is with the general division 
of the field of the subconscious which Freud has suggested. 
This may be symbolized by the following modification of our 
earlier "Reservoir Figure" (109) — 



Threshold of Consciousness ^ 

Threshold of the Foreconscious-^ 
("Resistance") 



Conscious /^ 

iForeoonscious 

Unconscious 



Subconscious 



(The ease with which foreconscious contents can rise into conscious- 
ness is indicated by the dotted line representing the threshold of con- 
sciousness, and the difficulty with which unconscious contents become 
foreconscious is indicated by the solid line representing the threshold of 
the foreconscious.) 

119. Prince's Theory of the Subconscious. — Reference has 
already been made (104) to Prince's division of the subcon- 
scious into the Coconscious and the Unconscious. His use of 
the latter term, however, is quite different from that of Freud 



39 V. especially, The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 429, 488. 



222 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

(120). According to Prince, the Coconscious is made up of 
active, intelligent processes, coexisting with, but dissociated 
from, the personality; the Unconscious is composed of traces 
of previous conscious processes in the neurones of the hrain.^^ 
The Coconscious, therefore, is a psychological concept, the 
Unconscious a physiological one, in Prince's system; this, 
consequently, being a kind of compromise between the two 
usual theories — that of Subconscious Mentation and that of 
Unconscious Cerebration. 

The distinctive feature of Prince's physiological conception 
of the Unconscious is his theory of neurograms. Every men- 
tal experience, as all physiological psychologists admit (114), 
leaves traces or residua ("dispositions") in the neurones of 
the brain. But as every such experience involves, not merely 
a single neurone, but a number of distinct but related neurones, 
this "brain record" is a complex and highly organized one in 
each case — a "brain pattern/' These organized residua or 
brain patterns. Prince calls Neurograms, and these neuro- 
grams have the same relation to ideas that a phonogram 
(phonograph record) has to the voice which produces and is 
produced by it.*^ The Unconscious as a whole, then, is "the 
great storehouse of neurograms, which are the physiological 
records of our mental lives. "*^ 

120. Comparison and Suggested Modification of Freud's 
and Prince's Theories. — The chief differences between Freud's 
and Prince's theories of the Unconscious are (i) that Freud's 
conception is a psychological one and Prince's conception a 
physiological one, and (2) that Prince's doctrine does not in- 
volve the Freudian concept of "resistance."^^ From our "in- 
dependent" point of view, therefore, Freud's general view is 
preferable. 

*o V. especially, The Unconscious, pp. x, 249-254. 
*i Op. cit., p. 131. 
^^Ihid., p. 149. 

43 It does not, however, necessarily exclude that concept. V. op. cit., 
pp. 147 f. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 223 

But the difference between Freud and Prince in their gen- 
eral theory of the Subconscious is more fundamental than 
this, in that their divisions of the subconscious field are based 
on entirely different principles. This may be best stated in 
figurative language by saying that Freud's division is a hori- 
zontal one, into levels; and Prince's a vertical one, into kinds. 
Because of the fact that the two classifications are based on 
different ''principia divisionis/' the divisions themselves are en- 
tirely compatible with each other, and we shall find that each 
has a value for our complete system. Let me further elucidate 
these points, and in so doing suggest some modifications in 
the usual terminology and classification which will have, I 
think, the value of greater simplicity and comprehensiveness. 

As to Freud, if we disregard, as we have a right to do, his 
specific theories as to the Unconscious and "resistance," we 
have left three levels of psychical existence — Conscious, Fore- 
conscious, and Unconscious — distinguished fundamentally as 
regards the relative degree of intensity of the various contents. 
The term ( i ) Conscious may then be applied to any active psy- 
chical state, whether actually part of the personal stream, as is 
normally the case, or dissociated from it (i.e., "coconscious" v, 
inf.). The term (2) Subconscious may be applied to all in- 
active (dormant or potential) states — those below the "thres- 
hold of consciousness." The latter would again be divisible 
into (a) the Foreconscious — ^the aggregate of those contents 
which may at any time rise into consciousness on attaining the 
requisite degree of intensity; and (b) the Unconscious — the 
aggregate of all contents which cannot rise into consciousness 
without first passing through the Foreconscious, and only 
under special conditions whose exact nature is not yet under- 
stood. 

Prince's concept of the Coconscious, however, belongs to an 
entirely different category from the Foreconscious and the 
Unconscious, and always indicates an abnormal, if not neces- 
sarily a pathological, condition of mind. The term refers to 
any active (i.e., conscious, as this term is defined in the pre- 



224 



THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 



ceding paragraph) psychical states which are dissociated from 
the personaHty.** The term "conscious," in this usage, would 
apply equally to the personally conscious (to which we have 
heretofore restricted it) and to coconscious states; the latter 
becoming, therefore, a subdivision of "conscious" rather than 
of "subconscious." Thus the division into the personally con- 
scious and the coconscious is a "vertical division of mind, 
quite distinct from and additional to the "horizontal" division 
into "levels." 

I append several tables and diagrams to illustrate different 
aspects of our doctrine as elucidated in this section. 

Table X 
Classification of Psychical States 

1. Conscious (any active psychical state). 

a. Personally Conscious. 

b. Coconscious (active dissociated state). 

2. Subconscious (all inactive psychical states: potentially conscious). 

a. Foreconscious (can easily be recalled). 

b. Unconscious (cannot easily be recalled: inactive dissociated states). 





Continuous 


Dissociated 


Conscious (active) 
Subconscious (inactive) 


Personal 
Foreconscious 


Coconscious 
Unconscious 



Personal 


5s 

.2 

C 

o 
o 

1 o 


Foreconscious 


Unconscious 



** The Unconscious is, of course, by its very nature, always dissociated. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Personality and Its States 
Under Normal Conditions 



225 




^C^cayii^ci^u^ 



Under Dissociation 





Unccmycifiub 



C4) GcHWiUioui 



(The upper figure symbolizes in greatly simplified form a fully syn- 
thetized mind, the lower figure a case of dissociation. Ci, 2, 3, and 
4 indicate four contents — Ci a content of personal consciousness; C2 a 
foreconscious content; and C3 and C4, in the upper figure, two un- 
conscious contents. The last of these, C4, is represented in the lower 
figure as manifesting itself coconsciously. 

5. Conclusions. 

121. Principles of Psychological Explanation. — In order to 
bring to a close our long discussion of the subconscious, and 
therewith our entire program, it is necessary to recall at this 
point what was said in a former chapter concerning the two 
kinds of scientific explanation which may be employed by the 



226 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

psychologist in explanation of his phenomena (54, 55) — a 
phenomenal explanation in terms of other phenomena, and a 
conceptiml explanation in terms of concepts specially con- 
structed for the purpose. Also we must renew our acquain- 
tance at this time with our earlier Principle of Psychological 
and Physiological Independence/^ according to which psy- 
chologists are precluded from introducing physiological con- 
cepts into their explanations of psychological phenomena.*^ 
The subconscious itself, of course, was postulated by us origi- 
nally to save this principle and to make independent psychical 
causation possible (95), and these two last chapters of our 
book are devoted to a defence and explication of this concept. 

122. The Explanation of Memory. — As remarked before 
(114), "the great test of theories of the subconscious is the 
problem of memory." The explanation in terms of uncon- 
scious cerebration has been rejected because it violates the 
principle of independence, even if no other argument were 
valid against it. Let us see how advocates of the subconscious 
would explain the phenomenon. 

In the first place, it must be recognized that ''the phenome- 
non" referred to is not m£mory as a process, hut the image 
which we call the "memory-image." Memory itself is a 
psychological concept "constructed to fill up the gap in the 
phenomenal psychic series" — to explain the recurrence of pre- 
vious experiences, and satisfy the demand for continuity in 
the interval, without abandoning psychology for physiology.*'' 

All I experience directly or observe, for example, is a pic- 
ture in my mind of a New England landscape, or a scrap of 
melody, or an odor of roses where no roses are. In one way 
or another I discover the identity of this imaged scene or 
melody or fragrance with some actually perceived experience 
of yesterday or last summer — i.e., 1 "recognize" the image as 

^^ Sect. 86(2), and note to that section. 

*6 On these two points, v. Hart's chapter in Subconscious Phenomena, 
pp. 1 18-123. This entire chapter is probably the best essay on the sub- 
conscious that has ever been written. 

4'^ Hart, op. cit., p. 123. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 227 

a "reproduction" of some previous experience of my own, and 
therewith dub it a "memory-image." Why? The phenome- 
non is the image as a content of my mind now, plus its re- 
semblance to the perception at some former time: "we as- 
sume, in order to satisfy our demand for continuity, that it has 
in some way existed during the interval, and we invent the 
conception of memory to explain this continued existence."*® 
But the image, being by its very nature transitory, did not 
exist in consciousness in the interval: it must, therefore, if 
psychical at all, as the principle of independence demands, have 
been subconscious. 

This "storehouse theory of the subconscfous," as it is some- 
times called by its enemies, is often criticized on the ground 
that as mental processes are by their very nature transitory, 
memories cannot be said to have any psychical existence what- 
ever in the interval between perception and recall. "Psychical 
processes," says A. H. Pierce, "are evanescent affairs that 
cannot under any circumstances be stored. To try to store a 
psychical process would be like trying to retain the flame of a 
candle after the candle itself had been consumed. All that 
one can possibly mean by such storage is that the cerebral 
modifications are still existent as latent dispositions, ready 
again to function under adequate provocation."*^ But though 
this is true, no doubt, of conscious phenomena, it does not 
affect the validity of the concept of the subconscious, which is 
constructed for the very purpose of accounting for the phe- 
nomenon of the "memory-image," among other equally im- 
portant psychological phenomena as discussed above (loi- 

103)- 

To explain the phenomena physiologically, however, as 
Prince and Miinsterberg and Pierce do is not only to violate 
the principle of independence, but is to make no advance 
whatever toward a phenomenal explanation, since "brain pat- 
terns," "neurograms," and "physiological dispositions" in gen- 

48 Ihid. 

*9 Garman Studies in Philosophy and Psychology, p. 343. 



228 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

eral are as conceptual and hypothetical as ''psychical disposi- 
tions" and "latent memories."^^ "Translating memory into 
the physical series does not make it a phenomenal fact : it must 
inevitably remain a conception. And if memory from both 
points of view is merely a conception, then surely if we are 
talking of the recurrence of mental phenomena, it is a psycho- 
logical conception."^^ 

123. Explanation of the Varieties of the Subconscious.' — By 
its very nature, the subconscious can never become an object 
of introspection, for as soon as we are able to introspect a sub- 
conscious content it by this fact becomes conscious. Rather 
is the subconscious an inference from the observation of be- 
havior, just as is our knowledge of consciousness in other per- 
sons. "We have actual experience only of our own conscious 
phenomena — we deduce the conscious phenomena of others" 
from their speech and actions ; and our knowledge of the sub- 
conscious in ourselves and others is derived in the same way/^ 
For example, when an automatist enters into conscious con- 
versation with another person, and at the same time writes 
automatically the solution of some problem whispered into his 
ear by a third, we infer intelligence in both cases equally. 

But the term "subconscious" has been used by various 
authors to denote such different kinds of phenomena that no 
one method of explanation is applicable to all of them.^^ In 
reviewing in our minds the various usages and different varie- 
ties of the subconscious as we have been considering them, we 
find ourselves coming to the following conclusions : 

s^ Sidis, Foundations, pp. 184, 190, 212. 

61 Hart, op. cit., p. 124. Italics mine. It is interesting to note that in 
Prince's own chapter in Subconscious Phenomena (p. 98), he admits that 
with regard to the subconscious he, as a parallelist, finds *'no difficulty in 
accepting both a physiological and a psychical interpretation." A com- 
plete explanation of any human phenomenon must, of course, allow for 
both (34, 35), but the two principles of explanation should not be con- 
fused (86(2)). 

52 Op. cit, pp. 127 f. 

58 Ibid., p. 140. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 229 

(i) The ''ultra-marginal view^' of the subconscious is ap- 
plicable only to what we have come to call the Foreconscioics. 

(2) This Foreconscious, and Prince's Coconscious, are 
phenomena, as truly as consciousness itself is a phenomenon. 
The Foreconscious is a phenomenon just as is the other side 
of the moon, which no one has ever observed, but which is 
inevitably inferred, not only to exist, but to be merely a con- 
tinuation of, and SO' of the same nature with, the side which 
can be directly observed. And the Coconscious is a phenome- 
non for the same reason that a star which has never been seen 
through the telescope, but has impressed itself upon the photo- 
graphic plate, is a phenomenon. 

(3) The Unconscious, on the contrary, is not a phenomenon 
at all, but a concept constructed for the definite purpose of ex- 
plaining phenomena which seem to be proper subject-matter 
for the psychologist, and yet are not parts of the conscious or 
the ultra-marginal field. ^* We know nothing of its nature, 
but only of its manifestations. 

This concept of the Unconscious is a concept of "potential 
psychical energy," analogous to that of "potential physical 
energy" with which modern physics has made us so familiar. 
It is as valid and as valuable for psychology as the concept of 
"potential physical energy" is for physics or that of "potential 
brain-cell energy" for physiology.^^ "We thus owe to Freud," 
says Hart, "the first consistent attempt to construct a con- 
ceptual psychology" :^^ whatever we may think of his special 
psychopathological theories, we cannot take from him the 
credit of laying the foundations of a true independent science 
of psychology.^'' 

^^Ihid., pp. 130 f. 
^^ Ibid., p. 119. 

56 Ibid., p. 131. 

57 Jung has succeeded in overcoming to a large extent the onesidedness 
of Freud's doctrine of the "libido," or the energy of the Unconscious, and 
a complete treatment of the subject should no doubt include this modifi- 
cation by the well-known founder of the "Ziirich School." This must be 
left, however, for some future time. (V. especially, Jung's Theory of 
Psychoanalysis, Chap. Ill, etc.) 



230 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

124. Sidis's Criticism of the Doctrine of The Unconscious. 
— Dr. Sidis, doughty champion of the subconscious as he is, 
is nevertheless a severe, and by no means always a fair, critic 
of the Freudian psychology. His objections are three — the 
first being directed against the general principle of conceptual 
explanation, the others against the concept of "unconscious 
ideas." 

( I ) The principle of conceptual explanation, Sidis regards 
as fantastic — as a revival of the Herbartian form of associa- 
tionism (12, 13), in which mental contents (Herbarfs "con- 
cepts") are treated as metaphysical "reals," "forces," which 
"conflict with" and "resist" one another.^® The weight of this 
criticism is directed against Hart's interpretation, but, as the 
latter has replied to an earlier criticism of the same purport, 
"all sciences are compelled" to treat their subject-matter "more 
or less arbitrarily" and artificially, for their own practical and 
theoretical purposes. ^^ The associationists, however, regarded 
their elements ("concepts" or "ideas") as metaphysically real, 
whereas the "conceptual theory of the unconscious" admits 
them to be artificial. 

Sidis also criticizes the concept of "unconscious ideals" as 
(2) hazeless and (3) self-contradictory. Under the former 
head he insists (2) that any "hypothetical agency must either 
be a fact directly observed in nature, or a fact which can be 
verified later on."^° In reply we assert that though it is true 
that the Unconscious has not been and never can be observed, 
any more than many of the entities of the natural sciences, it is 
nevertheless a necessary inference from facts which have been 
observed in our mental "nature," and its results have been 
verified innumerable times. Furthermore, it only claims to 
be a provisional explanation, to be made use of so long as 
theoretically and practically valuable, and until some more 

^^Foundations, pp. 199-201. 

^^Subconscious Phenomena, p. 137. Cf. our Chapter IV. 

60 Op. cit., p. 201. 



THE POSTULATES OF PSYCHOLOGY 231 

satisfactory one within the limits of psychology can be of- 
fered. 

Finally, (3) Sidis's alarm concerning the danger of intro- 
ducing into psychology "the self -contradictory impossible con- 
cept of unconscious conscious ideas," which he thinks to be 
"equivalent to the assumption of an unconscious conscious- 
ness,"^^ is, as our previous discussion should have made clear 
(ill), quite unwarranted. "Unconscious ideas" are no more 
self -contradictory than "subconscious" ones. 

Sidis's criticisms of Freud's specific psychopathological 
doctrines concerning "repression," sexuality, etc.,^^ need not 
here concern us, since it is not our present aim to demonstrate 
the validity of any of Freud's concepts.®^ These doctrines are 
inferences from Freud's study of dreams and abnormal phe- 
nomena, but they do not in any way affect his general theory 
so far as we have adopted it. 

It is well to note, however, that Dr. Sidis is right, and well 
within his province as an advocate of an independent psychol- 
ogy, in his criticism of Prince's physiological theory of the 
Unconscious.®* " 'Unconscious' brain processes are proble- 
matical entities" indeed, for which there is no direct evidence, 
and they are quite valueless for psychology. 

REFERENCES 

The Theory of Unconscious Cerebration — 

Miinsterberg, Psychology, General and Applied, pp. 24-33. 

" Psychotherapy, Chap. VL 

Subconscious Phenomena, Chaps. I (Miinsterberg), II 

(Ribot), and HI (Jastrow). 
Pierce, A. H., in Garman Studies in Philosophy and Psy- 
chology, pp. 315 ff. 
The Unconscious (various writers), in British Journal of 
Psychology, Vol. IX, pp. 230-256, and 281 ff. 

^^Ihid., p. 202. 

^^Ibid., p. 199- 

63 Subconscious Phenomena, pp. 137 f . 

6* Foundations, pp. 207, 212. 



22,2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Defence of Subconscious Mentation — 

Sidis, Foundations of Normal and Abnormal Psychology, 
Chaps. XXV-XXVH. 

Freud's Theory of the Subconscious — 

Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 425-435, 483-493. 
" British Journal of Psychology, Vol. VI, pp. 265-271. 
Coriat, Abnormal Psychology, Second Edition, pp. 16-21. 
Mitchell, British Journal of Psychology, Medical Section, I, 
pp. 327 ff. (1921). 

Criticisms 
Solomon, Jour, of Abnormal Psychology, Vol. IX, pp. 98 ff. 

(1914). 
Solomon, Psychoanalytic Remew, Vol. II, pp. 52 ff. (1915).. 
Bellamy, Jour, of Abn. Psych., Vol. X, pp. 11 ff., 32 ff. 

(1915)- 
Haeberlin, Jour, of Philosophy, Vol. XIV, pp. 543 ff. (1917). 
Woodworth, Jour, of Abn. Psych., Vol. XII, pp. 174 ff. 

(1917)- 

(Reply by Tannenbaum, same Journal and Vol., pp. 
390 if.) 

Prince's Theory of the Subconscious — 

Prince, The Unconscious, Chaps. V and VIII. 
" in "Subconscious Phenomena," Chap. V. 

The Conceptual Interpretation of the Subconscious — 

Hart, in "Subconscious Phenomena," Chap. VI (especially, 
pp. 118-141). 

Criticism 
Sidis, Foundations, Chaps. XXVIII, XXIX. 



INDEX 

(References are to Sections) 

Abbot, E. S. : 17, 24, 28f. 

Absentmindedness : 105, 108. 

Aesthetic Attitude : 63. 

Aesthetics and Psychology: See Normative Sciences. 

Analysis: 51. 

Angell, J. R. : 22. 

Anthropology: 35. 

Aristotle: 5, 8. 

Association: 12, 124. 

Associationism : 12-14, 100. 

Attention: 96, 108, 113. 

Automatic Writing: 103. 

Bain, A.: 12. 

Baldwin, J. M.: Z7, 77, m. 

Bawden, H. H. : 77. 

Behavior: 22; behavior vs. consciousness, 25-29; implicit and explicit be- 
havior, 26, 85; need of science of, 35f; relation to consciousness, 85. 
See also Behaviorism. 

Behaviorism : 24-36, 47. See also Behavior. 

Berkeley, George: 6. 

Biography and Psychology: 68f. 

Biological Sciences and Psychology: Introduction, 22, 28, 35, 49. 

Bode, B. H. : 24. 

Brain and Mind: 75f. See also Mental vs. Material; Mind and Body. 

Brentano, F. : 37. 

Buchner: 6. 

Calkins, M. W. : 37-46, 64, 77^- 

Carpenter, W. B. : 114. 

Causation: 52f ; independent psychical, 85, 87-97, 102, 115; cerebral theory 
of, 87, 9of. {See also Psychocerebral Parallelism) ; in physical and men- 
tal realms, 89. See also Explanation. 

Chance: 96f. 

Classification: 11, 51. 

Coconscious: 104, no, 113, ii9f. See also Dissociation. 

Coleridge: 102. 

Comte: 32. 

Conceptual Explanations: See Hypotheses. 

Concomitance, Psychocerebral: 86. See also Parallelism. 

Consciousness: 3, 48, 120; motor theory of, 28; as postulate, 85; and Con- 
tent, 116. See also Behavior; Mental vs. Material; Self; Subconscious. 

233 



234 INDEX 

Continuity: 79, loi. See also Discontinuity. 

CORIAT, I.: 99, 102, 104-107, III. 

Correlation as Method of Explanation: 91. See also Concomitance; Ex- 
planation ; Parallelism. 
Creighton, J. E. : 37. 
Crystal Visions: 103. 
Curtis, J. N. : 43-45. 

Democritus: 6. 

Descartes: 5, 100. 

Description: 9, 33, 51, 56; in psychology, 82-84. See also Introspection; 

Science, Problem of. 
Dessoir, M. : 68. 
Diderot: 6. 

Discontinuity in Mental Realm: 89, 95, 100. See also Subconscious. 
Dispositions, Physiological and Psychical: 114, 122. See also Neurograms. 
Dissociation : I04f , 120. See also Coconscious. 
Dreams: 103, 105. 
Dual Mind Theory: 107. 
Dualism : 4, 5, 80. 
DuNLAP, K.: 17. 

Economics and Psychology: See Social Sciences. 

Empirical Psychology: i, 3, 8; development of, 8-15. See also under 

Psychology. 
Ends: 57. 

Energy, Mind and: 76. 
Ethics: See Normative Sciences. 
Evaluation: 57f. 

Experience: i, 3, 17, 37, 73f. See also Empirical Psychology. 
Experimental Psychology: 16. 
Explanation: 9, 11, 52-56; in psychology, 87, 92, I21. See also Causation; 

Correlation; Hypotheses; Science, Problem of. 
Extension of Mental Objects : See Space. 

Faculty Psychology: lof. 
Fine Arts and Psychology: 68. 

Finiteness of Mental Sequences: 89, 93. See also Sensations, Problem of. 
Foreconscious : 118, 120, 123. 

Freud, S. : ii7f, 120, I23f. See also Psychoanalysis. 
Frost, E. P. : 24, 27. 
Fullerton, G. S. ; 86 note. 

Functional Point of View : 18-20, 23. See also Functionalism. 
Functionalism : 20, 22f, 47, 67; and Self -Psychology, 38, 41, 45. See also 
Behaviorism; Functional Point of View. 



INDEX 235 

Gamble, E. A. McC. : 44, 46. 

Grammar and Psychology: See Linguistic Sciences. 

Haeckel : 6. 
Hall, G. S.: 109, 
Hallucinations: 103. 
Hamilton, Sir W. : 100. 
Hamilton, Sir W. R. : 103. 
Hart, Bernard: 86 note, 100, 104, 122-124. 
Hartley, D. : 12. 
Hartmann, E. von : 100. 
Herbart: I2f, 100, 124. 
Herrick, C. J. : 28. 
Hilprecht dream: 103. 
History and Psychology : 68f . 
Hobbes, T. : 6. 
Holt, E. B. : 24. 
Hudson, T. J.: 107. 
Hume, D. : 12. 
Hypnosis: 103. 

Hypotheses, Phenomenal and Conceptual: 54f, 121-124. See also Expla- 
nation; Law, Scientific. 

Ideas: I3f, 38, 74- 

Immediate Experience Theory: 73f, 80. 

Independence, Principle of: 86 and note, ii4f, I20f. 

Independence Theory of Psychical Causation : See Causation, Independent 

Psychical. 
Inner Sense Theory: 31, 72, 80. 

Interaction of Mind and Body: 5, 6. See also Mind and Body; Parallelism. 
Interpretation: 57. 
Introspectiveness : 79. 
Introspection: 16, 30-33; and self -consciousness, 39, 43f. 

James, W. : 37, 42, 70, 79, 99-ioi. 
Jastrow, J, : 106, no. 
JuDD, C. H.: 37. 
Jung, C. G. : 123. 

Kant: 6, 10. 

Laboratory Psychology: 16. 

Law, Scientific: 52, 56; in psychology, 88. See also Explanation; Hy- 
potheses. 
Leibniz: 6, 100. 
Linguistic Sciences and Psychology: 68f. 



236 INDEX 

Locke, John: 8, ^2. 

Logic and Psychology: 59. See also Normative Sciences. 

Lotze: 6, 100. 

McCoMAs, H. E. : 28. 

McDouGALL, R. : 76. 

McDouGALL, W. : 22, 35. 

Marshall, H. R. : s^. 

Material Sciences and Psychology: Chap. V. 

Material Sciences and the Real World: 65. 

Material World as Postulate: 85. 

MateriaHsm : 4-6, 29, 65. 

Meaning: 57, 59. 

Memory: 57, 59. 

Memory: loi, ii4f, 122. 

Mental, Nature of : See Mental vs. Material. 

Mental Content: 17-19, 116. See also Mental vs. Material; Structural 
Point of View; Structuralism. 

Mental Function: See Mental Process; Functional Point of View; Func- 
tionalism. 

Mental Process: 17-19. S^^ also Functional Point of View; Functionalism 

Mental vs. Material: 75-81. 

Mentalism: 26, 34, 47. 

Metaphysics and Psychology: i, 7f, 15; Chap. IV. 

Metaphysics, Problem of : 57. 

Mill, James: 12. 

Mind, Psychology as Science of : 3, 48 ; necessity of scientific study of, 66. 
See also Consciousness; Self. 

Mind and Body, Behaviorism and: 29; Self -Psychology and, 40; as postu- 
late, 85. See also Interaction; Mental vs. Material; Parallelism; 
Psychocerebral ; Psychophysiological. 

Moleschott: 6. 

Monism : 4, 6, 80. 

Montague, W. P.: 76. 

More, L. T. : 56, 60. 

MiJNSTERBERG, H. : 21, 42, 58, 61-65, 77, 83f, 87, 89-92, 106, 110-116, 122. 

Myers, F. W. H. : 103, 109. 

Nature, Attitudes toward: 63; and material sciences, 65. 
Neurograms: 119, 122, See also Dispositions. 

Neurology and Psychology: Introduction, 16. See also Physiology. 
Normative Sciences and Psychology: 68f. 

Panpsychism : See Parallelism, Universal Psychophysical. 
Parallelism: 85f. ; methodological, 86, 92; universal psychophysical, 94. 
Pearson, K. : 56, 60. 



INDEX 237 

Perry, R. B. ; yj. 

Personality: See Self. 

Philology and Psychology: See Linguistic Sciences. 

Philosophy and Psychology: Introduction, 8, 15. See also Metaphysics. 

Physical Sciences: See Material Sciences. 

Physiology and Psychology: Introduction, 16, 35, 86 and note. See also 
Mind and Body; Psychophysiological. 

Pierce, A. H. : 122. 

PiLLSBURY, W. B. : 22, 25, 31-33. 

Plato: 5, 8. 

Politics and Psychology: See Social Sciences. 

Postulates of Psychology: Chap. VI. See also Subconscious. 

Praxiology: 35f. 

Prince, M. : 99, loi, i03f, 108, 117, iigf, 122. 

Privacy of Mental Facts : 77f . 

Psychoanalysis, Sidis and : 97, 124. See also Freud. 

Psychobiology : 35. 

Psychocerebral Parallelism: 85f. See also Causation, Cerebral Theory; 
Mind and Body; Psychophysiological. 

Psychodynamics : 23, note 13. 

Psychognosis : 68, 70. 

Psychologism : 65. 

Psychology, Present Status : Introduction ; relation to philosophy, Intro- 
duction, 8, 15 (see also Metaphysics) ; relation to other sciences. Intro- 
duction, 68f, Chap. V; metaphysical vs. scientific, i, 3, 61-63 (see also 
Metaphysics) ; rational vs. empirical, i, 7 (see also under each head) ; 
conditions of a scientific, 9, i5f, 45, 49, 82; historic concepts. Chap. I; 
current concepts. Chaps. II and III, 67; individual and social, 46; 
definition of, 48; field of, Chaps. IV and V; necessity of, 66; rela- 
tion to other "mental sciences", 68f. See also Biography, Fine Arts, 
History, Linguistic Sciences, Material Sciences, Normative Sciences, 
Religion, etc. 

Psychophysical Interrelation: 85. See also Mind and Body; Parallelism; 
Psychocerebral ; Psychophysiological. 

Psychophysiological Interrelation: 85. See also Mind and Body; Parallel- 
ism; Physiology; Psychocerebral; Psychophysical. 

Psychosophy: 68, 70. 

Psychosis: 11. 

Psychostatics : 23, note 13. 

Purposes : 57. See also Self, purposive vs. causal. 

Rational Psychology: i, 2; schools of, 4-7. See also Metaphysics; Psy- 
chology. 
Religion and Psychology: 70. 
Resistance: 118, 120. 



238 INDEX 

Rhetoric and Psychology: See Linguistic Sciences. 
RiBOT, Th. : io6, no. 
Rogers, A. K. : ^y. 
RoYCE, J. : Z7, 77^ 

Scholasticism: 5. 

Schopenhauer: 100. 

Science, Psychology as a : {See Psychology) : as abstract and artificial, 45, 

58; problem of, 50-56; relation to metaphysics, 57-60; classification of, 

69. See also Material Sciences; Metaphysics. 
Scripture, E. W.: 32. 
Self: 3, 77) psychologist's use of term, 40, 42; as metaphysical concept, 

42; purposive vs. causal points of view in the study of, 58, 6if, 64, 68. 

See also Consciousness; Soul. 
Self -Consciousness : 39, 43 f. 
Self-Psychology: 37-47, ^7- 

Sensations, Problem of : 94. See also Finiteness of Mental Sequences. 
SiDis, B.: 75, 78, 85-87, 89-92, 96f, loi, 116, 122, 124. 
Singer, E. A., Jr. : yy. 
Slips of Tongue and Pen: 102, 105. 
Social Sciences: 35, 68f; and Self-Psychology, 46. 
Sociology: See Social Sciences. 
Soul: 2, 3. See also Self. 
Space and Mental Objects: 75f. 
Spencer, H. : 12. 
Spinoza: 6. 
Spiritualism: 4. 
Stout, G. F. : z^, Z7y 77- 
Stratton, G. S. : 32, 42. 

Structural Point of View: 18-20, 23. See also Structuralism. 
Structuralism: 2of, 23, 47, 67; and Self-Psychology, 38, 41, 45. See also 

Structural Point of View. 
Subattentive : 108, 113. 
Subconscious : 48, 95, Chaps. VII and VIII. 
Subconscious Causes: 102. 
Subconscious Intelligence: 103. 
Subliminal : 109. See also Subconscious. 
Teleology: 57. See also Self, purposive vs. causal. 
Tetens: 10. 

Things vs. Ideas: See Mental vs. Material. 
Thorndike, E. L. : 22, 24. 

Titchener, E. B.: 21, 33, 43, SSf, 65, 77, 86 note, 92. 
Transitoriness of Mental Objects: 79, 89. 



INDEX 239 

Ultra-Marginal View of the Subconscious: 108, 113, 118, 123. 
Unconscious: 118-120, I23f. See also Subconscious. 
Unconscious Cerebration: 106, ii4f. 
Uniformity as Postulate : 85. 

Values : 57f. 

Ward, J. : Z7- 

Washburn, M. F. : 43, 64. 

Watson, J. B. : 24. See also Behaviorism. 

Wolff, Ch. : 10. 

WuNDT, W. : 21, 71-74, 87, 92. 

Yerkes, R. M. : 21, 87f, pif, 94. 



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